Reviving the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile not only goes against sound military doctrine, it also undermines the basic national interests the United States Navy has always protected. So why do some in Congress insist on bringing it back?
Throughout its history, the U.S. government has considered a strong navy to be a vital component of national security. Freedom of navigation in peacetime and control of sea lanes in times of war have been cornerstones of security strategy since the nation’s founding. As John Adams, considered one of the founders of the U.S. Navy, wrote: “Floating Batteries and Wooden Walls have been my favorite System of Warfare and Defence for this Country… Americans in general… begin to look to that source of Security and Protection.”
Given the Navy’s crucial role in ensuring maximal security for the nation, lawmakers should seek to provide it with the ships and weapons systems best suited for the missions it is likely to perform. This is why the potential return of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) to the Navy’s submarines merits scrutiny, especially as lawmakers finalize spending plans for 2024 and beyond. Recently, the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) approved the authorization of $252 million for such a system.
It is now up to the full Senate to determine if this money should be spent on a SLCM-N capability. Would deployment of such weapons add to the options available to commanders in a crisis situation, or would it reduce actual warfighting capabilities? Would the billions of dollars needed to deploy such a system be better spent on other priorities? The answers to these questions depend largely on how one views the likely conflicts of the future.
The new SLCM-N would be developed on the basis of a Cold War-era system that was retired during the George H.W. Bush administration. When it was originally developed, the presumption was that any major conflict would involve the use of nuclear weapons, so it seemed logical to equip attack submarines with a nuclear capability. This was distinct from the capability of ballistic missile submarines, which had (and still have) a strategic deterrence mission. Putting SLCM-Ns on attack subs would have allowed them to play a role in a war involving the routine use of tactical nuclear weapons to achieve operational goals.
Times have changed, as President Bush realized more than three decades ago. Nuclear weapons no longer have a battlefield role. The Biden administration’s 2022 Nuclear Posture Review stated that “the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners,” echoing similar language from the Trump administration’s 2018 document. Additionally, U.S. conventional capabilities, particularly precision-strike systems, are far beyond what they were in the 1980s, allowing the military to hit any target effectively without weapons of mass destruction. The Reagan-era doctrines that drove deployment of SLCM-N no longer hold.
Why, then, are some trying to turn back the clock to the days of Hair Metal? Simply put, it is due to the perception that the U.S. may be at the beginning of a new nuclear arms race. With China building up its nuclear forces and Russia developing new and exotic nuclear capabilities, perceptions of global stability are getting worse. As the U. S. continues to modernize its own nuclear forces, it may seem natural to ask if the capability added by a renewed SLCM-N program makes sense.
On the surface (always a dangerous place for submarines), there is a kind of case to be made. The main argument in favor of the SLCM-N is that it would provide a flexible nuclear option for responding to limited or regional nuclear aggression. Even if one accepts that a nuclear war could be limited, U.S. forces already have a variety of weapons at their disposal, including air-launched nuclear cruise missiles and advanced conventional weapons, which allow decision-makers to tailor an appropriate response. In addition, lower-yield nuclear weapons are already available on ballistic missile submarines. Therefore, the range of potential contingencies during which a commander might want a SLCM-N capability appears to be so narrow as to approach insignificance.
It is not possible to anticipate every emergency. But even in the very unlikely scenario that a SLCM-N could provide a marginally better option, the weapon is still not worth the costs.
Several billion dollars of research and development, testing and procurement might be sustainable, but the real cost of the SLCM-N program would be to naval readiness. Attack submarines are already one of the most versatile strike platforms available. Their survivability and global range have made them the choice of combatant commanders for a variety of missions, including in support of Operation Desert Storm and in response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons in Syria in 2017. Earlier this year, attack submarines were used to retaliate against Houthi targets in Yemen.
The addition of nuclear weapons to U.S. attack subs would mean subtraction of some of their existing, proven capabilities. If something, in this case nuclear-armed cruise missiles, is added to a submarine, then something else must be taken away, presumably conventional weapons or special operations forces capability. Nuclear weapons also require specialized handling and crew, reducing the number of sailors available to oversee day-to-day operations.
In other words, in order to provide commanders with another option to respond to a narrow set of contingencies that are, at most, highly unlikely, the Navy will have to reduce its capability to perform missions that it has undertaken in actuality. In return for an additional capability to have options, one of the Navy’s greatest assets would become less sustainable, less effective and less useful.
John Adams would not be pleased. A less capable navy would be contrary to the country’s interests during a time of rising tensions. Developing and deploying the new SLCM-N would diminish the Navy’s warfighting readiness just so it could field a weapon that is all but unusable.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review announced: “The U.S. would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances …” The supposed capability gap filled by the SLCM-N system lies in the space of less extremity, where a conflict remains limited and regional tensions threaten to spread. These are precisely the conditions in which a capable navy could be most effective as a tool of power projection, but its effectiveness would be limited if shackled to unusable nuclear weapons. The Biden administration and Department of Defense understand this and have generally opposed funding for them.
Only in Congress does there remain some support for funding SLCM-N. Why? Once again, Adams had the answer: “I fear that in every [elected office], members will obtain an influence by noise not sense.”
The message to Congress is clear: Support a strong Navy and stop the SLCM-N noise.