For months, Israel has been “on the brink” of war with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran. That threshold may now have been crossed. On July 30, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) acknowledged killing Lebanese Hezbollah official Fuad Shukr in Beirut, the commander they claim is responsible for the rocket attack over the weekend that killed a dozen children in the Israeli-controlled Golan Heights. Twelve hours later, Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh was killed in an airstrike at his residence in northern Tehran after attending the inauguration of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.
The attacks have elevated tensions at a time when the region is teetering on the edge of all-out war. But escalation is not inevitable. Through strategic diplomacy and the clear communication of red lines, there is a rapidly closing window of opportunity to pull all sides back from the precipice.
Practicing the New Equation: “Tel Aviv for Tehran”
Senior Iranian officials hold Israel responsible for both attacks and, with one exception, have publicly committed to respond. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Nasser Kanaani condemned the attack in Beirut as a “clear violation of Lebanon’s sovereignty,” warning Iran would hold both Israel and the United States responsible for a wider regional war. In response to the attack in Tehran, Iranian President Pezeshkian vowed Iran would “defend its territorial integrity,” while Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei said it is Iran’s “duty to seek revenge.” The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) issued a statement that “the killing of Haniyeh will be met with a harsh and painful response.” The one exception is a statement by First Vice President Mohammad Reza Aref saying that Iran has no intention of escalating the conflict, according to Iran state media.
A strike inside Iranian territory is inherently escalatory, and the last time Iran sought revenge against Israel was in mid-April, following an Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Syria on April 1 that killed seven IRGC commanders, including two generals. In response, Iran launched a barrage of over 300 drones and missiles at Israel, almost all of which were intercepted with assistance from U.S. and Arab forces. Its first-ever open attack on Israeli territory, Iranian leaders declared a “new equation” applied in the decades-long shadow war with Israel, marking a strategic shift toward more direct confrontation.
Iranian officials are now under pressure to respond in line with that equation. “Tel Aviv for Tehran,” urged an Iranian State TV presenter following the Haniyeh attack. “We should respond by eliminating top Zionist officials.” That sentiment has gained traction in Iran since April, when government-sponsored billboards around the Iranian capital declared, “Tel Aviv is our battleground, not Tehran.”
On the prevailing logic inside Iran, any response to the attack must seek to restore not only a meaningful level of deterrence, but also Iran’s ability to project power at home and abroad. The attack on Haniyeh was not just an attack on Hamas, it was a blow to Iran’s reputation. The location and timing of the attack, in a secure residence in the capital city on the night of the inauguration of Iran’s new president underscores the idea that no one in Iran is safe – including Iranian officials. The message is in stark contrast to Haniyeh’s final interview hours before he was killed, when he strolled around Tehran claiming “resistance means we are proud to walk the streets of civilized countries and travel from one nation to another.”
The Haniyeh attack represents a major intelligence and operational failure for Iran at a time when it needed to convey a message of strength. For an attack to be carried out at this level of precision, in a secure compound protected by the IRGC, there is little doubt that Iranian intelligence and security services have been compromised. The severity of the intelligence failure, compounded by the IRGC’s inability to protect Haniyeh, suggests that Iran is highly vulnerable. And while Iran has blamed Israel for carrying out a series of targeted assassinations on its soil before, this attack comes at a particularly fragile moment of transition in Iran’s domestic politics.
Beyond domestic considerations, the attacks on senior Hezbollah and Hamas leaders cast doubt on Iran’s ability to lead resistance efforts against Israel and U.S. influence in the Middle East. Iran’s self-proclaimed “axis of resistance” – a network of militant groups spanning Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Palestine, and Yemen – has suffered repeated attacks and degradation in recent months. In the past week alone, Iranian-backed militants have come under significant attack in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen.
Any Iranian response, then, will likely be planned to achieve symbolic as well as strategic impact. Tehran is likely to make calculated moves in orchestrating such a response, choosing targets that directly damage Israel, bolster the resistance movement, and restore Iran’s reputation without triggering an all-out war. That needle will be difficult to thread. In contrast to its response in April, Iran may have to go further this time in its bid to restore a semblance of deterrence by both directly attacking Israeli territory and directing regional proxy groups to attack Israeli targets abroad, such as embassies or consulates. A collective axis of resistance response against targets within and outside of Israel could provide such an effect, but it could also exceed a proportionate response to recent Israeli attacks. Militant attacks may also target U.S. military forces in the region, particularly if Iran perceives that the United States supported the attack, notwithstanding Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s denial of U.S. awareness or involvement in the strike. One major question is whether Iran would telegraph its intentions to Washington and other capitals ahead of time, as it did in April, to mitigate potential fallout and reduce the risk of spiraling into an all-out war.
Escalation is Not Inevitable
More than nine months into Israel’s war with Hamas, the Middle East is now further away from peace and closer than ever to a full-blown regional conflict. Killing Haniyeh, a key power broker in ongoing Israel-Hamas hostage negotiations, will almost certainly jeopardize fragile ceasefire talks and prolong the war in Gaza. Iran’s looming response, particularly if it includes multiple attacks from resistance groups, risks drawing the region into a broader conflict even as Israel and Lebanese Hezbollah continue to slide closer to all-out war.
The risk of escalation is high, but not inevitable. Following the attacks in Beirut and Tehran, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin told reporters, “I don’t think war is inevitable. I maintain that. I think there’s always room and opportunities for diplomacy.” Less than 48 hours before the attacks, on July 29, National Security Council spokesperson John Kirby assured reporters at a press conference that predictions of an all-out war were “exaggerated,” citing “conversations we’ve been having.”
The United States has a critical role to play in managing potential fallout from the attacks and moving all sides toward de-escalation. When Iran and Israel were “on the brink” of war in April, U.S. officials successfully communicated redlines to both sides that helped limit escalation. In particular, President Biden warned Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu that the United States would not participate in any Israeli counter-offensive against Iran.
Can the April model of crisis management work again? As Iran prepares its response and the narrative around it, there are steps the United States can take to limit the risk of escalation. First, U.S. officials, in coordination with their European counterparts and actors in the region, should communicate to Tehran that any attacks on densely populated areas or strategic sites in Israel will not be tolerated. This will be hard to finesse, because the message should not be mistaken for any approval of other forms of retaliation. Second, the Biden administration should once again set red lines with Israeli leaders. As Sec. Austin stated, the United States “certainly will help defend Israel. You saw us do that in April. You can expect to see us do that again;” but as with April the United States should also signal that it may not participate in or support Israeli counter-strikes against Iran, depending on what Tehran does. Privately warning Israeli officials that the United States is prepared to use its leverage by withholding military aid could underscore this message. Finally, the United States should support more robust UN Security Council involvement, helping to place the situation on a path of diplomacy rather than cyclical rounds of military retaliation.
Both governments and their populations have much to lose from a broader war that could drag on for months with dim prospects of success. Israel is mired in a quagmire in Gaza that has cost it significant international support, while Netanyahu contends with domestic pressures at home. Iran is in the middle of a presidential transition, facing domestic discontent, a deteriorating economy, and a looming succession crisis. There are many reasons to avoid war, and both Iran and Israel have said they are not seeking direct conflict in response to the latest attacks.
On a more optimistic note, the killing of Haniyeh might even be used to push Israel toward drawing down military operations in Gaza. The International Criminal Court Prosecutor identified Haniyeh as one of the three senior Hamas officials responsible for the Oct. 7 attack. Now that Haniyeh is dead, there is a stronger case to be made to the Israeli government that it is time to end the war in Gaza, alongside the release of remaining hostages in Gaza.
War is not inevitable; it is a choice. The recent events have undeniably brought the Middle East closer to widespread conflict, but there remains a rapidly closing window for diplomacy and de-escalation to work. The United States and the international community must and can seize this moment to steer the region away from the brink of war.