Questions the January 6 Select Committee Should Ask Its Witnesses

The House select committee established to investigate the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol will hold its first public hearing on July 27. Like the 9-11 Commission before it, the select committee is investigating how our nation’s defenses failed and how we can prevent similar attacks from occurring again. In an era when alternative facts have all too often substituted for the truth, it is important for Americans to have a definitive, reliable understanding of what happened. That will be a difficult challenge in today’s hyper-politicized environment, so it is critical that the committee function as a neutral collector of the evidence, acquiring relevant information and following it wherever it leads, without any predetermined outcome.

At the outset it is important to distinguish the mission of the select committee from that of the criminal investigations being conducted by the Department of Justice, which has charged more than 500 defendants with crimes. Whereas DOJ’s role is to bring criminal charges, the select committee must instead examine and chronicle what happened leading up to, on the day of, and in the wake of the attack, including the failure by government agencies and officials to properly assess the threat, collect intelligence, share information, act on that information, and provide adequate security for the Capitol and the people who were there that day. By necessity, the inquiry must study the threat of domestic terrorism in America, particularly groups that are motivated by anti-government sentiment and white supremacy. The committee should review the ways these extremists use social media and other communications platforms to recruit members and coordinate activities, and the role of disinformation in fueling violent extremism.

The committee should consider the acts and omissions of executive and legislative branch entities and individuals, up to and including former President Donald J. Trump, his associates, and others involved in the runup to the events of Jan. 6, and the use of disinformation to incite violence. Suggesting collection of this evidence is not to presuppose liability; but the country needs an accurate record, collected as contemporaneously to events as possible. Only by understanding all of the factors that did or did not contribute to the attack can we hope to prevent similar attacks in the future.

Listed below are some of the topics, witnesses, and documents the committee should seek to obtain voluntarily, or by subpoena where necessary, as well as some of the key questions to be asked. Witnesses, in fulfilling their civic responsibilities, should proactively address some of these questions in their prepared remarks without having to be asked by a member of the committee. Journalists and the general public may also want to keep an eye on these questions as a guide to key areas that should be covered in the hearings and in the select committee’s final report. Finally, the lists below may serve another, indirect purpose. They show current and former U.S. officials who may want to communicate with the committee — including potential whistleblowers — questions of importance to Congress and the American public in uncovering the truth.

One issue the select committee will have to consider is whether they will call President Trump to testify. He played a key role in the day’s events and, at a minimum, is a material fact witness. Committee members will have to weigh whether there is unique value in his potential testimony and if so, whether it is worth the spectacle Trump would undoubtedly create if he testified. If he is called, the questions posed to him would be best drafted after the committee develops the record. (We do not include questions for Trump in the list below.) Ultimately, the committee must take the path that best permits it to create a durable record of Jan. 6 that will serve as a history and a basis for preventing a recurrence of an unprecedented attack on our democracy.

Table of Contents

A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing

1. Christopher Wray, Director, FBI
2. Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary

B. On-Site Response

1. Stephen Sund, former Chief, Capitol Police
2. Robert J. Contee, III, Acting Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia
3. Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police Officers on duty at Capitol on Jan. 6
4. Maj. Gen. William Walker, former Commander, D.C. National Guard
5. Christopher Miller, former Acting Secretary of Defense
6. Kash Patel, Chief of Staff, Acting Secretary of Defense
7. Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
8. Ryan McCarthy, former Secretary of Army
9. Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, U.S. Army
10 .Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army
11. Jeffrey Rosen, former Acting Attorney General

C. White House Role and Response

1. Katrina Pierson, Trump campaign official
2. Mark Meadows, White House Chief of Staff
3. Stephen Miller, White House Adviser
4. Ivanka Trump, White House Senior Adviser
5. Kayleigh McEnany, White House Press Secretary
6 .Keith Kellogg, National Security Adviser to the Vice President
7. Eric Herschmann, White House Senior Adviser
8. Dan Scavino, White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Director of Social Media
9. Chris Christie, former Governor of New Jersey
10. Kellyanne Conway, former White House Adviser
11. Alyssa Farah, White House Director of Strategic Communications
12. Vice President Mike Pence
13. Marc Short, Vice President’s Chief of Staff

D. Organizers, Funders, and Supporters

1. Roger Stone, Trump campaign adviser
2. Rudolph Giuliani, Trump personal attorney
3. Ashley Trenzeluk, former Finance Director, Republican Attorneys General Association
4. Pete Bisbee, former Executive Director, Rule of Law Defense Fund

E. Response from Congress

1. Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Leader
2. Sen. Ben Sasse
3. Sen. Lindsey Graham
4. Sen. Tommy Tuberville
5. Rep. Mo Brooks

F. Expert Witnesses

1. Domestic Terrorism Threat
2. Social Media Platforms
3. Disinformation

A. Intelligence Collection, Threat Assessment and Information Sharing

Christopher Wray, Director, FBI

1. Although you have previously testified that you cannot monitor social media under FBI guidelines, isn’t it true that under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), if you open a threat assessment, you are permitted to review social media that is available to the public?

2. Couldn’t you open a threat assessment here? And did you? Isn’t it true that the FBI can open a threat assessment for a “special event” under the Attorney General Guidelines (pp. 17-18), and that the certification of the presidential election at the Capitol would qualify as such an event?

3. Did the FBI conduct a threat assessment of the certification vote at the Capitol in advance of Jan. 6? If not, why not?

4. Don’t you open such assessments for inaugurations, Super Bowls, and the like? Did you not think the entire legislative branch and the Vice President and Vice President-Elect being in one spot merited this attention? Did you not have any intelligence that would have provided the necessary low threshold for an assessment?

5. If you knew before Jan. 6 what the FBI knows now about militia group members’ conspiring to attack the Capitol, would the government have been able to thwart the attack? Why did the FBI not know this beforehand?

6. What precisely did the FBI — not just you — know before Jan. 6?

7. In prior testimony, you lauded the fact that the FBI’s Norfolk office broke with normal protocol to send other federal agencies raw intelligence indicating a possible attack and conveyed the information in three different formats.

Given its importance, why did the bulletin generated in the FBI’s Norfolk office, warning that extremists were planning to engage in “war” at the Capitol, fail to make its way to you and other leaders at FBI until “days after” Jan. 6 (see testimony by Assistant Director, FBI Counterterrorism Division Jill Sanborn)?

8. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Norfolk bulletin did not make its way to you and other leaders at the FBI before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?

9. You acknowledged that the social media company Parler sent several referrals to the FBI warning of threats of violence in Washington, D.C., and to the Capitol on Jan. 6. Why did these referrals fail to make their way to you until after Jan. 6?

10. Do you consider it an intelligence failure that the Parler warnings did not make their way to you before Jan. 6, and have you taken any administrative actions against FBI officials responsible for that failure? Have you made any procedural changes at the FBI to prevent this lapse from occurring again?

11. Did the FBI share the warnings from Parler with other law enforcement agencies including the U.S. Secret Service? If it did not, why not?

12. On Nov, 19, 2020, an FBI official apparently sent a Parler representative an email to “establish a working relationship” with the company. Who at the FBI was involved in the decision to establish the relationship? Were you aware of it at the time? What information did the FBI anticipate Parler might be able to provide the FBI as part of this relationship?

13. Did the FBI receive any similar warnings from other social media companies about threats of violence in Washington, D.C. — or, more specifically, threats to the Capitol — in advance of Jan. 6?

14. In her congressional testimony, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary of Homeland Security, Melissa Smislova stated the following:

“We did not issue a separate report [for Jan. 6]. In hindsight, we probably should have.” (In response to Sen. Feinstein)“In retrospect, we may have been better off if we considered sending out some kind of terrorism bulletin but we did not do that before January 6th.” (In response to Sen. Sinema)

Do you agree with those statements as they pertain to the FBI? In other words, do you acknowledge in hindsight, the FBI should have issued a separate intelligence report for Jan. 6 and would have been better off doing so?

What precisely are the successes and failures of the FBI in connection with Jan. 6? For each failure, what is being done to minimize the risk of repetition?

15. When asked about the failure of the FBI to issue a specific intelligence bulletin for Jan. 6, you have repeatedly referred to “approximately 12 intelligence products” the FBI sent to law enforcement agencies around the country about domestic violent extremism over the course of 2020. How many of those products were related to violence around Black Lives Matter protests? How many were about threats posed by white supremacist groups? By QAnon? By militia groups? Did FBI intelligence products circulated in advance of the inauguration include threats from those groups?

In late June, following your testimony, NBC News reported:

“The FBI reports Wray mentioned were sent to state and local law enforcement agencies but have not been made public, and the FBI declined an NBC News request for them. But officials who have seen them say they were broad and generic and did not lead anyone to believe the Capitol could be a target Jan. 6.” (emphasis added)

How can the American people rely on your description of these products if the FBI will not provide them to the public? What legitimate reasons prevent their disclosure? Will you provide them to Congress?

16. Did you or other FBI officials communicate within the Bureau — or with DHS or anyone else outside the FBI — about whether to issue a specific intelligence warning for Jan. 6? Was an affirmative decision taken not to issue such a warning or Intelligence Bulletin? If so, what was the reason for that decision?

17. Did you or any other senior FBI officials communicate with DHS or any other person outside the FBI (including anyone at main Justice or the WH) in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?

18. On Friday, Jan. 8, the head of the FBI’s Washington field office, Steven D’Antuono, said:

“There was no indication that there was anything [planned] other than First Amendment-protected activity.”

He made that statement before the public knew of the Norfolk report, the NYPD warnings sent to the FBI, Parler warnings sent to the FBI, and other FBI actions such as the Bureau’s disrupting the travel of specific people with intention to cause violence from coming to Washington, D.C., that day.

Do you acknowledge that Mr. D’Antuono’s statement was not accurate? What did you do to correct it? How was that statement vetted before it was made?

What actions do you take in your responsibilities as Director when a senior official makes a false statement on an issue of such public importance?

19. Did the FBI have open investigations into threats of violence against election officials following the 2020 elections? How many? Was there an increase in such threats compared to previous years? Were those threats and information from those investigations effectively included in the FBI’s assessment of the risk of violence and threats to the Capitol on Jan. 6?

20. Did the FBI fail to take seriously the nature of the threat? If so, why? Did the race and politics of the attackers cause the FBI to underestimate the seriousness of the threat?

21. Can you compare the FBI’s proactive role in advance of Black Lives Matter protests with its role in connection with Jan. 6?

a) Was the FBI at the scene or nearby for any Black Lives Matter protests?
b) Were arrests made at the scene of any Black Lives Matter protest?
c) Why were no arrests made at the scene on Jan. 6?
d) Why did the FBI need to seek public help in identifying people after Jan. 6, when those people could have been arrested at the scene?

22. Does the FBI today focus on the threat of violent extremists who are motivated by the belief that the 2020 presidential election was stolen? Will you commit to a robust interagency process, like the Domestic Terrorism Executive Committee, that shares information about different groups with a goal of providing better threat assessment?

23. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day? What is the basis for your confidence?

One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong? What assessment or investigation have you conducted involving the Jan. 6 preparation and its aftermath to confirm such a bias does not exist within the FBI?

24. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Chad Wolf, former Acting DHS Secretary

1. Not only the General Services Administration, but DHS also has a statutory role in ascertaining the President-Elect, which implicates the statutory provision for Secret Service protection.

When did DHS ascertain that Joe Biden was the President-Elect? Did you or other officials ever discuss whether a failure or delay in making such an ascertainment implicated Biden’s or Vice President-Elect Kamala Harris’ Secret Service protection during the transition?

2. Why was the Jan. 6 vote certification not designated as a National Special Security Event, the way certain sporting events, like the Super Bowl, are?

3. Did you or any other senior DHS officials communicate with the FBI in advance of Jan. 6 about the decision whether to designate the Jan. 6 certification at the Capitol as a National Special Security Event?

4. What criteria are used to decide whether to designate an event as a National Special Security Event?

5. In retrospect, do you believe DHS should have issued an intelligence bulletin specifically about the threat of violence on Jan. 6?

6. In her congressional testimony, DHS, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary Melissa Smislova stated the following:

“We did not issue a separate report [for Jan. 6]. In hindsight, we probably should have.” (In response to Sen. Feinstein)“In retrospect, we may have been better off if we considered sending out some kind of terrorism bulletin but we did not do that before January 6th.” (In response to Sen. Sinema)

Do you agree with those statements?

She also testified:

“We also at DHS are completely dissatisfied with the result of our efforts leading up to January 6th. We are reexamining how we distribute our information, how we coordinate with our partners. We thought that it was sufficient, and clearly it was not. We are also working much more focused on applying more resources to better understand this particular threat. We also are looking at how we can better understand social media to get those tips and maybe get better insight into what this adversary is doing.”

Do you agree with that statement?

7. On Jan. 13, 2021, NPR reported the following:

“NPR spoke with three FBI special agents in charge around the country and four current and former DHS officials who all agreed that Jan. 6 was a fast-moving event that was hard to anticipate. But they also said a specific threat assessment from the FBI and DHS in the weeks before might well have persuaded Capitol Police and others to beef up security.”

Do you acknowledge that if the FBI and DHS had issued a specific threat assessment for Jan. 6 it might well have persuaded Capitol Police and others to beef up security?

8. The Wall Street Journal reported:

“On Jan. 4, the heads of the fusion centers convened a rare national call to discuss alarming information they were gathering about the coming Trump rally. The offices were seeing an unsettling amount of online posts about people planning to bring weapons to the event, raising the potential for violence, said one participant in the call.
…
The DHS intelligence agency spokeswoman declined to say whether the department, which participated in the call, took any action based on the information.”

What was discussed in the Jan. 4 fusion centers call? What actions, if any, did DHS take based on the information discussed in the call?

How rare is such a call? In what other situations have the heads of the fusion centers convened a national call like this? What are responsive actions DHS has taken in the past to such a call, and how do they compare to the actions DHS took after the Jan. 4 call?

9. In a whistleblower complaint, Brian Murphy, former acting Under Secretary of DHS for Intelligence and Analysis, stated that during the summer of 2020, Acting Deputy Secretary of DHS Ken Cucinnelli said, “Mr. Murphy needed to specifically modify the section [of the draft Homeland Threat Assessment (HTA)] on White Supremacy in a manner that made the threat appear less severe,” that you repeated these concerns to Mr. Murphy; and that he was told “that further distribution of the HTA was prohibited due to concerns raised by Messrs. Wolf and Cuccinelli regarding how the HTA would reflect upon President Trump.”

If those allegations by Murphy are true, do you acknowledge that such actions could make the Department less capable of anticipating the threat of violence on Jan. 6?

10. What procedures and policies did DHS have in place before Jan. 6 to ensure that threat assessments and responses were not unduly influenced by then-President Trump, including when they might reflect negatively on him or implicate him? Did DHS document all the instances in which there was such a conflict of interest, including the intelligence gathered and the actions taken?

11. The Wall Street Journal reported the following about a DHS summary on Jan. 5:

“‘Nothing significant to report,’ read a Jan. 5 national summary from DHS’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis that was sent to law enforcement across the country, according to a copy reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.”

Do you have any knowledge of any such communication?

In a Senate hearing, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Homeland Security Melissa Smislova said:

“We have heard of that report that we supposedly sent out that said ‘nothing significant to report’ and we can’t locate that so I have no idea where that notion came from. … We don’t have a copy of that report. That wouldn’t be an official report that I&A sent out. It is possible, ma’am, that where it came from was maybe a phone call or something where we said we had nothing additional to report.”

12. Did you consider the risk presented by violent extremists who believe and/or advocate the belief that the election was stolen?

13. Did the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis conduct any assessment of the threat presented to the U.S. Capitol on Jan. 6? If not, why not?

14. Did you or other DHS officials communicate within the Department — or with FBI or others outside the Department — about whether to issue a specific intelligence warning for Jan. 6? Was an affirmative decision taken not to issue such a warning or Intelligence Bulletin?

15. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day? What is the basis for your confidence?

One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong?

What assessment or investigation has DHS conducted involving the Jan. 6 preparation and its aftermath to confirm such a bias does not exist within the Department?

16. Do you think that race played any factor in how the crowd at the Capitol reacted to police and what outrageous conduct they thought they could get away with?

17. Are you aware whether Giuliani received Secret Service Protection on Jan. 6? Were you aware of communications as to whether he should receive Secret Service Protection? What senior U.S. officials were involved in that decision? Were you aware of anyone raising concerns about whether it was appropriate to provide Secret Service protection to someone so far outside the ambit of normal protectees?

18. In her Senate testimony, Senior Official Performing the Duties of the Under Secretary for Homeland Security Melissa Smislova repeatedly suggested DHS had significant information of a threat of violence and that there were weaknesses in effectively communicating that threat. However, the Secret Service in the days immediately prior to Jan. 6 assessed there was “no indication of civil disobedience.” What explains this discrepancy between two parts of DHS? Do you acknowledge this indicates a significant intelligence failure?

Return to Table of Contents

B. On-Site Response

Stephen Sund, former Chief, Capitol Police

1. What information did you have before Jan. 6 about threats to the Capitol? Did the FBI, DHS, or any other agency reach out to the Capitol Police before Jan. 6 to share information or raise concerns about potential threats that day?

2. Why did Capitol Police disregard intelligence about the threat of an attack on Jan. 6?

3. Why were officers so greatly out-numbered?

4. Why was backup from the National Guard so slow?

5. Why were attackers allowed to enter restricted areas without arrests?

6. Did officers allow rioters to enter?

7. In June 2018, Capitol Police arrested hundreds of protesters opposing the Trump administration’s family separation policy, including Rep. Pramila Jayapal (D-WA). In July of this year, Capitol Police arrested protesters calling for passage of voting rights legislation, including Congressional Black Caucus Chair Rep. Joyce Beatty (D-OH)  and Rep. Hank Johnson (D-GA), for “crowding, obstructing, or incommoding.” How do you explain the difference in treatment between these peaceful protestors and the rioters on Jan. 6, who violently attacked the Capitol and accessed restricted areas without being arrested?

8. Did the race of rioters cause anyone to downplay the threat?

9. Why were attackers permitted to leave the Capitol without arrests?

10. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day? What is the basis for your confidence?

One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong?

What assessment or investigation has the U.S. Capitol Police conducted involving the Jan. 6 preparation and its aftermath to confirm such a bias does not exist within the agency?

11. Do you think that race played any factor in how the crowd at the Capitol reacted to police and what outrageous conduct they thought they could get away with?

12. Some have invoked Mayor Muriel Bowser’s request for only limited U.S. military and other federal law enforcement support in advance of Jan. 6 as a reason for the lack of preparedness of the U.S. military and federal law enforcement to defend the Capitol. But isn’t it true, as then-D.C. National Guard Commander Maj. Gen. Walker made clear in his Senate testimony, “the City doesn’t have standing at the Capitol” and accordingly “the Mayor’s request and the [D.C.] director of homeland security Dr. Rodriguez’s request did not talk about the Capitol at all”?

13. On Jan. 13, 2021, NPR reported the following:

“NPR spoke with three FBI special agents in charge around the country and four current and former DHS officials who all agreed that Jan. 6 was a fast-moving event that was hard to anticipate. But they also said a specific threat assessment from the FBI and DHS in the weeks before might well have persuaded Capitol Police and others to beef up security.”

Do you believe if the FBI and DHS had issued a specific threat warning for Jan. 6, the security preparation for the event could have been better? Could the issuance of such a specific warning have strengthened your ability to convince members of the Capitol Police Board to approve your request for National Guard support prior to Jan. 6?

14. Do you know of any evidence that members of Congress or their staff may have provided assistance or information to individuals who participated in the Jan. 6, 2021 attack, including any tours or visits to the U.S. Capitol in the days preceding Jan. 6 or communications on the day of the attack?

15. At 2:17 pm, a member of Congress tweeted: “We were locked in the House Chambers,” followed a minute later by her tweeting the location of Speaker Pelosi: “The Speaker has been removed from the chambers.” Did those tweets risk compromising the security for the Speaker or others? Would you have advised the member of Congress against tweeting such information at the time? Why?

Robert J. Contee, III, Acting Chief of Police, Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia

1. What information did you have before Jan. 6 about threats to the Capitol?

2. How many officers were at the Capitol that day?

3. Why were officers so greatly outnumbered by attackers?

4. Can you say with any confidence that race did not play any role in how U.S. intelligence agencies prepared for Jan. 6 and how law enforcement agencies treated some of the rioters that day?

One counterterrorism expert (who served in a prior administration) commented that officials and analysts may have failed to identify the threats leading up to the Jan. 6 events because of an “invisible bias” – the idea that “it was very hard for [them] to realize that people who look just like them could want to commit this kind of unconstitutional violence and could literally try to and want to kill them.” Do you think he is wrong?

5. Do you think that race played any factor in how the crowd at the Capitol reacted to police and what outrageous conduct they thought they could get away with?

6. Some have invoked Mayor Muriel Bowser’s request for only limited U.S. military and other federal law enforcement support in advance of Jan. 6 as a reason for the lack of preparedness of the U.S. military and federal law enforcement to defend the Capitol. But isn’t it true, as then-D.C. National Guard Commander Maj. Gen. Walker made clear in his Senate testimony, “the City doesn’t have standing at the Capitol” and accordingly “the Mayor’s request and the [D.C.] director of homeland security Dr. Rodriguez’s request did not talk about the Capitol at all”?

7. On Jan. 13, 2021, NPR reported the following:

“NPR spoke with three FBI special agents in charge around the country and four current and former DHS officials who all agreed that Jan. 6 was a fast-moving event that was hard to anticipate. But they also said a specific threat assessment from the FBI and DHS in the weeks before might well have persuaded Capitol Police and others to beef up security.”

Do you acknowledge that if the FBI and DHS had issued a specific threat assessment for Jan. 6 it might well have persuaded D.C. authorities, the Metropolitan Police and others to beef up security?

Capitol Police, Metropolitan Police Officers on duty at Capitol on Jan. 6

1. What kind of advance information did you receive about what to expect on Jan. 6?

2. What did you observe while on duty at the Capitol on Jan. 6?

3. Did you suffer any injuries? Can you tell us about any continuing physical, mental or emotional harm that you continue to experience?

4. Did you see other officers suffer injuries?

5. Why did officers largely refrain from arresting attackers at the Capitol?

Maj. Gen. William Walker, former Commander, D.C. National Guard

1. When and how did you first receive notice that there was a need for help at the Capitol?

2. Why did it take three hours for the National Guard to respond to the Capitol?

3. You previously testified that senior Army officials were reluctant to authorize the deployment of the D.C. National Guard not only because of “optics” but also because they said it could inflame the protestors.

What was your professional judgment of the merit of that concern? Do you believe the concern reflected a reasonable professional judgment on the part of those who raised it?

4. You have previously testified that if you had received authorization to respond sooner, events would have unfolded differently. In what way?

5. Did you take any steps to prevent a recurrence of an issue like this and if so, what were they?

6. Some have invoked Mayor Muriel Bowser’s request for only limited U.S. military and other federal law enforcement support in advance of Jan. 6 as a reason for the lack of preparedness of the U.S. military and federal law enforcement to defend the Capitol. But isn’t it true, as you made clear in your Senate testimony, “the City doesn’t have standing at the Capitol” and accordingly “the Mayor’s request and the [D.C.] director of homeland security Dr. Rodriguez’s request did not talk about the Capitol at all”?

7. On Jan. 13, 2021, NPR reported the following:

“NPR spoke with three FBI special agents in charge around the country and four current and former DHS officials who all agreed that Jan. 6 was a fast-moving event that was hard to anticipate. But they also said a specific threat assessment from the FBI and DHS in the weeks before might well have persuaded Capitol Police and others to beef up security.”

Do you believe if the FBI and DHS had issued a specific threat warning for Jan. 6, the security preparation for the event could have been better? Might the issuance of such a specific warning have strengthened Capitol Police Chief Sund’s ability to convince members of the Capitol Police Board to approve his request for National Guard support prior to Jan. 6?

8. Do you believe the decision to limit the D.C. National Guard to policing the perimeter of the Capitol was the best use of the National Guard on Jan. 6?

9. If reports are accurate that Vice President Pence and Senator McConnell each demanded, in calls with acting Secretary of Defense Miller, that the Defense Department immediately send the National Guard to “clear” the Capitol, do you believe that limiting the D.C. National Guard to policing the perimeter when the Guard did so completely met those demands?

10. When did you first learn of reports that Vice President Pence and Senator McConnell each demanded that acting Secretary of Defense Miller send the National Guard to clear the Capitol?

Christopher Miller, former Acting Secretary of Defense

1. According to the joint Senate Report, in a Jan. 4 conference call with Cabinet members, you and the Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley “voiced concern about the permits that had been issued, questioning whether there was a mechanism to revoke permits for the 1,000 to 2,000 people who had been granted permission to gather on Capitol grounds” and that the two of you “also suggested locking down D.C. to avoid potential violence.” You told the Senate committees that you recognized there was a threat of violence from groups such as the Boogaloo Boys and Proud Boys and that these concerns were raised internally in DOD and in interagency calls.

What information did you have at the time of potential violence that led you to raise the idea of revoking those permits for people to gather at the Capitol? What was the source of the information? How specific were the threats?

What response did you receive from other officials in the Jan. 4 call or other interagency calls about your concerns of the threat of violence on Jan. 6?

2. In prepared remarks on Jan. 7, President Trump said, “I immediately deployed the National Guard and federal law enforcement to secure the building and expel the intruders.” In your prior written testimony, you said, “I also want to address questions that have been raised in regard to the President’s involvement in the response. He had none with respect to the Department of Defense efforts on January 6.”

Do you agree that President Trump made a false statement in describing his involvement in the National Guard’s response to the attack on the Capitol?

Former White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows told Sean Hannity that President Trump acted quickly to deploy the National Guard on Jan. 6 and that you could back up that account.

Do you agree that Meadows’s statement was false?

3. On Jan. 8, under your leadership, the Department of Defense publicly released a timeline of events leading up to and including Jan. 6, which was later referred to by the Department of Defense in congressional testimony. The Timeline omits material information, such as:

• Any communications including or between your office and the White House;
• Gen. Walker’s initial call to Army leaders conveying Sund’s plea for help;
• Army leaders’ opposing Sund’s plea for help on the 2:22 pm call
• Milley’s reportedly recommending, during the 2:30 meeting with you, calling up neighboring National Guard units immediately, which you did not approve until nearly two hours later
• At or around 4:00 pm, Vice President Pence’s reported urgent call to you demanding deployment to “clear” the Capitol (the call is reportedly included in an internal DOD timeline);
• At or around 4:39 pm, your reported call with White House Chief of Staff Meadows, and Sen. McConnell’s joining the call in which he sounded furious and demanded you “clear” the Capitol.

Why was this information left off the publicly released timeline?

In prior written testimony, you stated: “I stand behind EVERY decision I made that day and the ones I made in the days following January 6” (emphasis including large caps and bold text in original). Do you stand behind the decision that allowed these omissions in the Defense Department’s public account of the timeline of events?

Are there any other communications or attempted communications between you/your office and the White House, including former Vice President Pence or former President Trump, members of Congress, or other senior government officials on Jan. 6 that were not included in the publicly released timeline?

4. Why was there a lengthy delay in deploying the D.C. National Guard to assist at the Capitol?

5. What explains the 36-minute gap between the time you conveyed final authorization to the Army for deployment of the D.C. National Guard and the Army’s leadership informing Maj. Gen. Walker of the approval?

6. Did you receive any instructions or suggestions from President Trump, or anyone acting on his behalf, about how to respond?

7. You apparently told a reporter that you did not try to contact Trump on Jan. 6; however, the reporter quoted another senior defense official who said, “They couldn’t get through. They tried to call him.” Did you or your office try to contact President Trump on Jan. 6? If so, what came of those efforts?

How should the American public understand why the Secretary of Defense and the President did not communicate with each other during an ongoing attack on the U.S. Capitol and in deploying military force to rescue Congress and the Vice President and secure the building?

8. Your chief of staff Kash Patel told a reporter, “I was talking to [White House Chief of Staff, Mark] Meadows, nonstop that day.”

Were you aware of those communications at the time? What was the content of those communications?

9. Did you talk with Vice President Mike Pence on Jan. 6? If so, how many times?

10. At or around 4:00 pm, did Mr. Pence give what sounded like an order to send the National Guard to the Capitol? In other words, if those words had come from the President of the United States instead of the Vice President would you have understood them as an order?

11. Following the call with Vice President Pence at or around 4:00 pm, did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? How did you describe the content of the call and what did you discuss about it?

12. What was your understanding as to why something that sounded like an order was coming from the Vice President instead of the President?

13. At or around 4:39 pm, you reportedly spoke with White House Chief of Staff Meadows, and Sen. McConnell joined the call in which he sounded furious and demanded you “clear” the Capitol.

Is that report accurate and if not, what parts are accurate and what parts are inaccurate?

14. Following the call with Meadows and McConnell, did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? How did you describe the content of the call and what did you discuss about it?

15. You previously testified that on Sunday, Jan. 3, President Trump told you in reference to Jan. 6, “do whatever is necessary to protect demonstrators that were executing their constitutionally protected rights.”

Did you discuss the President’s statement with any other military officials following the meeting?

16. Did you discuss with President Trump or anyone else the possibility of invoking the Insurrection Act in response to the attack on the Capitol or in the lead up to Jan. 6?

17. On Jan. 6, did you or other military officials have or express any concern that the President could direct the National Guard or other military units in an effort to undermine the certification of the election?

18. In prior written testimony, you acknowledged that “fears that the President would invoke the Insurrection Act to politicize the military in an anti-democratic manner … factored into my decisions regarding the appropriate and limited use of our Armed Forces to support civilian law enforcement during the Electoral College certification.”

You did not identify who held such fears. Were you aware that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Milley reportedly held such fears? Who else in the Pentagon or administration do you believe held such fears? Did you?

19. Setting aside questions about the D.C. National Guard, when did Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley recommend to you to call up National Guard units from other neighboring states? When did you authorize their mobilization? When did you authorize their deployment? When did the Army Secretary convey those authorizations to the state National Guard and state authorities?

20. In prior written testimony, you stated: “I stand behind EVERY decision I made that day and the ones I made in the days following January 6” (emphasis including large caps and bold text in original).

Can you say the same for the decisions of other senior military officials on Jan. 6? Did you have any concerns about the acts or omissions of any senior military official on Jan. 6, including the Secretary of the Army? Do you think any mistakes were made by any senior military official on Jan. 6?

21. Some have invoked Mayor Muriel Bowser’s request for only limited U.S. military and other federal law enforcement support in advance of Jan. 6 as a reason for the lack of preparedness of the U.S. military and federal law enforcement to defend the Capitol. In your prior written testimony, you refer to Mayor Bowser’s request at length. Isn’t it true, as then-D.C. National Guard Commander Maj. Gen. Walker made clear in his Senate testimony, “the City doesn’t have standing at the Capitol” and accordingly “the Mayor’s request and the [D.C.] director of homeland security Dr. Rodriguez’s request did not talk about the Capitol at all”?

22. As reflected in the Senate Report (pp. 78-80), several Department of Defense officials testified that DOD understood DOJ was the lead federal agency for security preparations for Jan. 6, but former acting Attorney General Jeffrey Rosen told the Senate it was “not accurate” that DOJ served in that role. What explains this discrepancy in who was the lead federal agency? Why was there any lack of clarity in who was the lead agency at the time? Wasn’t it standard practice for DOJ to serve as the lead federal agency for such domestic law enforcement activities, including the summer 2020 protests (p. 77)? Why did DOJ not assume that role for Jan. 6?

Kash Patel, former Chief of Staff, Acting Secretary of Defense

1. You told a reporter, “I was talking to [White House Chief of Staff, Mark] Meadows, nonstop that day.” Is that true?  If so, what did you discuss with Meadows? Was the acting Secretary of Defense aware of all of these communications and their content? Would there be any record of these communications?

2. Did you discuss with Meadows how to respond to the attack at the Capitol? If so, what did Meadows say about that?

3. Did you discuss then-President Trump’s involvement in or reaction to the events of Jan. 6?

4. Did you discuss how to respond to the attack at the Capitol with anyone else outside of the Department of Defense? If so, who and when?

5. Did you discuss the idea of the President’s invoking the Insurrection Act on or before Jan. 6 with anyone at the Defense Department? With anyone outside of the Defense Department? If so, who and when?

Gen. Mark Milley, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. According to the joint Senate Report, in a Jan. 4 conference call with Cabinet members, acting Secretary of Defense Miller and you “voiced concern about the permits that had been issued, questioning whether there was a mechanism to revoke permits for the 1,000 to 2,000 people who had been granted permission to gather on Capitol grounds” and that the two of you “also suggested locking down D.C. to avoid potential violence.” Miller told the Senate committees that he recognized there was a threat of violence from groups such as the Boogaloo Boys and Proud Boys and that these concerns were raised internally in DOD and in interagency calls.

What information did you have at the time of potential violence that led you to raise the idea of revoking those permits for people to gather at the Capitol? What was the source of the information? How specific were the threats?

What response did you receive from other officials in the Jan. 4 call or other interagency calls about your concerns of the threat of violence on Jan. 6?

2. Why was there a lengthy delay in deploying the National Guard to assist at the Capitol?

3. What is your understanding as to who authorized the deployment of the National Guard to the Capitol?

4. Do you know why the Vice President instead of the President issued what reportedly sounded like an order to send  the National Guard to clear the Capitol?

5. Former Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller testified that on Sunday, Jan. 3, President Trump told him in reference to Jan. 6, “do whatever is necessary to protect demonstrators that were exercising their constitutionally protected rights.” You were reportedly present at that meeting.

Can you confirm that is what the President said? Did you discuss the President’s statement with any other military officials following the meeting?

6. It has been reported that you feared that President Trump would refuse to cede power after losing the election, effectively staging a coup. If so, what was the basis for your concerns?

It has been reported that other senior military officials shared these concerns. Who else in the administration shared your concerns at the time?

7. It has also been reported that you said you were concerned that President Trump was stoking unrest in hopes of an excuse to invoke the Insurrection Act and call out the military. If so, what was the basis for your concerns?

It has been reported that other senior military officials shared these concerns. Who else in the administration shared your concerns at the time?

8. On Jan. 6, did you or other military officials have or express any concern that the President could direct the National Guard in an effort to undermine the certification of the election?

9. What explains the 36-minute gap between the time the acting Secretary of Defense conveyed final authorization to the Army for deployment of the National Guard and the Army’s leadership informing Walker of the approval?

10. It has been reported that during the 2:30 pm meeting, you directly recommended to the acting Secretary of Defense to send out a call immediately for National Guard reinforcements from the nearby states.

Is that timing and description of your recommendation accurate?

11. The Washington Post’s Carol Leonnig and Philip Rucker reported:

“Despite Milley recommending that the Pentagon call up neighboring National Guard units immediately, [Secretary of the Army] Ryan McCarthy hadn’t gotten around to it until more than 2 1/2 hours after the Capitol was breached.”

Did you have any concerns about the acts or omissions of any senior military official on Jan. 6, including the Secretary of the Army? Do you think any mistakes were made by any senior military official on Jan. 6?

12. Is it true that despite your having recommended calling up neighboring National Guard units immediately, Maj. Gen. Timothy Gowen, the adjutant general of the Maryland National Guard, was “repeatedly rebuffed” by the Pentagon?

Background: “The general . . . kept running it up the flagpole, and we don’t have authorization,” Maryland Governor Larry Hogan told the Washington Post (ellipses in original).

13. How should the American public understand why the acting Secretary of Defense and the President did not communicate with each other during an ongoing attack on the U.S. Capitol and in deploying military force to rescue Congress and the vice president and secure the building?

14. At or around 4:00 pm, acting Defense Secretary Miller reportedly spoke with Vice President Pence in which Mr. Pence gave what sounded like an order to send the National Guard to “clear” the Capitol?

Were you aware of that phone call? Did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? What did you discuss about it?

15. At or around 4:39 pm, acting Defense Secretary Miller reportedly spoke with White House Chief of Staff Meadows, and Sen. McConnell joined the call in which he sounded furious and demanded you “clear” the Capitol.

Were you aware of that phone call? Did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? What did you discuss about it?

16. As reflected in the Senate Report (pp. 78-80), several Department of Defense officials testified that DOD understood DOJ was the lead federal agency for security preparations for Jan. 6, but former acting Attorney General Rosen told the Senate it was “not accurate” that DOJ served in that role. What explains this discrepancy in who was the lead federal agency? Why was there any lack of clarity in who was the lead agency at the time? Wasn’t it standard practice for DOJ to serve as the lead federal agency for such domestic law enforcement activities, including the summer 2020 protests (p. 77)? Why did DOJ not assume that role for Jan. 6?

Ryan McCarthy, former Secretary of Army
Lt. Gen. Walter Piatt, U.S. Army
Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn, U.S. Army

1. Why was there a lengthy delay in deploying the National Guard to assist at the Capitol?

2. Did anyone express concern about the optics of deploying the National Guard to the U.S. Capitol?

3. Former Acting Defense Secretary Christopher Miller testified that on Sunday, Jan. 3, President Trump told him in reference to Jan. 6, “do whatever is necessary to protect demonstrators that were executing their constitutionally protected rights.”

Did Mr. Miller or Gen. Milley, who was also present in the Jan. 3 meeting, communicate anything about this directive/instruction/request to you other military officials? Did you have knowledge about this directive/instruction/request before or on Jan. 6? How about after Jan. 6?

4. Why did the Army initially falsely deny, before admitting, that Lt. Gen. Charles Flynn participated in the 2:22 pm call with D.C. leadership and U.S. Capitol Police? Was it a mistaken approach due to fears of political fallout should his participation become public?

5. Setting aside questions about the D.C. National Guard, when did Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Milley recommend to the acting Secretary of Defense to call up National Guard units from other neighboring states? When did the acting Secretary of Defense authorize their mobilization? When did the acting Secretary of Defense authorize their deployment? When did the Army Secretary convey those authorizations to the state National Guard and state authorities?

6. At or around 4:00 pm, acting Defense Secretary Miller reportedly spoke with Vice President Pence in which Mr. Pence gave what sounded like an order to send the National Guard to “clear” the Capitol?

Were you aware of that phone call? Did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? What did you discuss about it?

7. At or around 4:39 pm, acting Defense Secretary Miller reportedly spoke with White House Chief of Staff Meadows, and Sen. McConnell joined the call in which he sounded furious and demanded you “clear” the Capitol.

Were you aware of that phone call? Did you discuss the content of the call with any other military officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? What did you discuss about it?

Jeffrey Rosen, former Acting Attorney General

1. It has been reported that President Trump pressured you to investigate election fraud after the 2020 presidential election? Is that true?

2. Are you aware of any directions or requests from anyone at the White House to DOJ to investigate alleged voter fraud? To open any investigation? Are you aware of any such directions or requests to Public Integrity? To any U.S. Attorney? To FBI?

3. If so, what specific steps were you asked to take?

4. Did President Trump or the White House threaten to fire you and replace you with Assistant Attorney General Jeffrey Clark if you failed to comply with his requests?

5. Do you believe White House Chief of Staff Meadows acted appropriately in communicating with the Justice Department about election fraud claims following the election? Did you ever communicate to Mr. Meadows that you believed his communications or actions were inappropriate?  Did you ever communicate to Mr. Meadows that you believed his communications or actions were potentially unlawful?

6. It has been reported that on Jan. 6, you were asked to deploy all law enforcement agents at your disposal to respond to the Capitol. Did you do so? If not, why not?

7. What directives, if any, did President Trump or the White House give you regarding the certification on Jan. 6?

8. As reflected in the Senate Report (pp. 78-80), several Department of Defense officials testified that DOD understood DOJ was the lead federal agency for security preparations for Jan. 6, but you told the Senate it was “not accurate” that DOJ served in that role. What explains this discrepancy in who was the lead federal agency? Why was there any lack of clarity in who was the lead agency at the time? Wasn’t it standard practice for DOJ to serve as the lead federal agency for such domestic law enforcement activities, including the summer 2020 protests (p. 77)? Why did DOJ not assume that role for Jan. 6?

9. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Documents:

1. Any communications, memoranda or reports relating to security plans for the Jan. 6 vote certification or the attack on the U.S. Capitol
2. Video footage of attack

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C. White House Role and Response

Katrina Pierson, Trump campaign official

1. What was your role in organizing the rallies on Jan. 5 and 6?

2. Who directed you to organize the rallies?

3. Did anyone suggest to you what the purpose of the rallies was?

4. Were you aware of the attendance of members of militia groups such as the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers? If so, what were all the sources that provided you this information?

5. Did you ever discuss having the President or organizers of the events making a public statement that Proud Boys or other militia groups were not welcome to attend the events?

6. Do you know who was involved in the decision to issue “All Access” passes for Oath Keepers such as the members of Roger Stone’s security detail? Was it a matter of controversy among organizers whether to provide such access?

7. Were you involved in communications about whether or when to include the following speakers in the rallies on Jan. 5 or 6: Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, Jeremy Liggett, Enrique Tarrio? If so, were you in communication with White House officials about those decisions? If so, which officials? What concerns, if any, did you or others have about whether or when to have each of those individuals speak?

8. Were you involved in communications before Jan. 6 about a march to the Capitol for that day? With whom did you communicate about the march? Did anyone raise concerns about the march? If so, what were those concerns? Who expressed the concerns, and who with advance knowledge of the march did not?

9. Are you aware whether Giuliani received Secret Service Protection on Jan. 6? Were you aware of communications as to whether he should receive Secret Service Protection? What senior U.S. officials were involved in that decision? Were you aware of anyone raising concerns about whether it was appropriate to provide Secret Service protection to someone so far outside the ambit of normal protectees?

10. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Mark Meadows, then-White House Chief of Staff
Stephen Miller, then-White House Adviser
Ivanka Trump, then-White House Senior Adviser
Kayleigh McEnany, then-White House Press Secretary
Keith Kellogg, then-National Security Adviser to the Vice President
Eric Herschmann, then-White House Senior Adviser
Dan Scavino, then-White House Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications and Director of Social Media
Chris Christie, former Governor of New Jersey
Kellyanne Conway, former White House Adviser
Alyssa Farah, former White House Director of Strategic Communications

1. Did you hear President Trump make any statements on or before Jan. 6 about events or outcomes that were planned for that day? Who was involved in any such conversations?

2. Did you ever discuss with President Trump his goals in making statements to encourage people to come to Washington, such as this tweet: “Big protest in D.C. on January 6th. Be there, will be wild.”

3. Did you ever hear President Trump express an expectation that he could prevent the certification of the election? If yes, describe the specifics.

4. Did you ever discuss having the President or organizers of the events making a public statement that Proud Boys or other militia groups were not welcome to attend the events? If so, with whom and what did each individual in those conversations say? Is there a record of such communications?

5. Were you involved in communications about whether or when to include the following speakers in the rallies on Jan. 5 or 6: Ali Alexander, Alex Jones, Jeremy Liggett, Enrique Tarrio? If so, were you in communication with White House officials about those decisions? If so, which officials? What concerns, if any, did you or others have about whether or when to have each of those individuals speak?

6. Were you involved in communications before Jan. 6 about a march to the Capitol for that day? With whom did you communicate about the march? Did anyone raise concerns about the march? If so, what were those concerns? Who expressed the concerns, and who with advance knowledge of the march did not?

7. Are you aware whether Giuliani received Secret Service Protection on Jan. 6? Were you aware of communications as to whether he should receive Secret Service Protection? What senior U.S. officials were involved in that decision? Were you aware of anyone raising concerns about whether it was appropriate to provide Secret Service protection to someone so far outside the ambit of normal protectees?

8. What was President Trump doing on Jan. 6 after he left the rally at the Ellipse until 4:17 p.m., when he posted the message to the attackers at the Capitol?

9. What did President Trump say about the Capitol attack while it was occurring and afterwards?

10. Did President Trump express a desire to stop the attack and clear the Capitol?

11. Did you overhear any conversations President Trump had with others, either in person or by phone, regarding the attack?

12. Did President Trump take any action to stop the attack? If so, what?

13. Why did it take President Trump so long to ask the rioters to go home?

14. It has been widely reported that President Trump recorded three takes of the video telling the rioters he loved them and to go home, and that advisors thought the other two takes were more objectionable. What was the content of the other two takes that advisors considered more objectionable? Were they destroyed or do they still exist?

15. On Jan. 6, did you communicate directly or indirectly through intermediaries to try to get President Trump to make a public statement to his supporters to disperse from the Capitol or take other actions to end the assault? If so, how many times did you make such efforts? What information did you convey to try to persuade President Trump? Did you alert him to the threat to life? Did you alert him to the threat to the institution of Congress?

Do you know now if others tried to communicate with President Trump on Jan. 6 to make a public statement to his supporters to disperse from the Capitol or take other actions to end the assault? If so, how many times did they make such efforts? What information did they convey to try to persuade President Trump? Did they alert him to the threat to life? Did they alert him to the threat to the institution of Congress? Did they try to persuade him that the military would not be used for the purposes of interfering with the certification process?

In particular, did you hear or learn about President Trump’s communications with Rep. Kevin McCarthy on Jan. 6? If so, what do you know about the content of their communications?

16. Since Jan. 6, are you aware of any communications between President Trump and Kevin McCarthy about what testimony McCarthy might provide about his communications with the President on Jan. 6?

17. (For Meadows) Kash Patel, Chief of Staff for the Acting Secretary of Defense, told a reporter, “I was talking to [White House Chief of Staff, Mark] Meadows, nonstop that day.” Is that true?  If so, what did you discuss with Patel?

18. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Vice President Mike Pence

1. It has been reported that President Trump talked to you on the morning of Jan. 6 and tried to persuade you to change the outcome of the election. Did you discuss that topic with President Trump? What did he say?

2. Did you have any conversations with President Trump during the attack?

3. If so, what did he say?

4. Did you discuss with President Trump activating the National Guard for assistance? If so, what did he say?

5. Who gave the order to activate the National Guard?

6. Did you attempt to secure assistance from any other source during the attack?

7. What was the result of your efforts?

8. On Jan. 6, did you communicate directly or indirectly through intermediaries to try to get President Trump to make a public statement to his supporters to disperse from the Capitol or take other actions to end the assault? If so, how many times did you make such efforts? What information did you convey to try to persuade President Trump? Did you alert him to the threat to life? Did you alert him to the threat to the institution of Congress?

Do you know now if others tried to communicate with President Trump on Jan. 6 to make a public statement to his supporters to disperse from the Capitol or take other actions to end the assault? If so, how many times did they make such efforts? What information did they convey to try to persuade President Trump? Did they alert him to the threat to life? Did they alert him to the threat to the institution of Congress? Did they try to persuade him that the military would not be used for the purposes of interfering with the certification process?

9. It has been reported that you declined to leave the Capitol and enter a vehicle under the control of the Secret Service on Jan. 6. If this is accurate, can you explain why?

 Marc Short, Vice President’s Chief of Staff

1. Are you aware of whether Vice President Pence consulted with President Trump regarding the attack on the Capitol?

2. What did they discuss?

3. Was President Trump asked to activate the National Guard?

4. What was the result of those efforts?

5. At or around 4:00 pm, acting Defense Secretary Miller reportedly spoke with Vice President Pence in which Mr. Pence gave what sounded like an order to send the National Guard to “clear” the Capitol?

Were you aware of that phone call? Did you discuss the content of the call with any other government officials? Who exactly did you discuss it with? What did you discuss about it?

6. See questions for Vice President Pence and ask for Marc Short’s awareness of Pence’s actions, communications, and statements.

Documents

1. Any public statements by President Trump, including statements made on Twitter and other social media, regarding election fraud and efforts to contest the outcome, and encouraging supporters to come to Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6

2. All recordings of the different takes of the video President Trump prepared on Jan. 6 and time logs for the recordings

3. Any Direct Messages sent to or from President Trump’s Twitter account, and any draft Twitter texts on Jan. 6

4. Any phone logs of communications between the White House and members of Congress and government agencies on Jan. 6

5. Any phone logs of communications between the White House and organizers and participants of the political events on Jan. 5 and Jan. 6

6. Any financial records regarding payments made for the Jan 5 and 6 rallies;

7. Any communications, memoranda or reports relating to the Jan. 6 attack on the Capitol

8. Any documents prepared for president Trump in advance of Jan. 6 about the attendance and intention of attendees at the rally

9. For other suggestions of information the Select Committee might be seek from social media companies, see Justin Hendrix’s analysis.

Return to Table of Contents

 D. Organizers, Funders, and Supporters

Roger Stone, Trump campaign adviser

1. What was your role in planning the rallies on Jan. 5 and 6?

2. Were you aware, whether involved or not, in any plans made by groups including, but not limited to, the Proud Boys and Oath Keepers, for Jan. 6 and if so, what were you aware of? Did any of these groups provide security for you during this time?

3. On the night of Jan 5, did you meet at the Trump International Hotel with some of the individuals who participated in the Jan. 6 attack?

If so, what did you discuss?

4. Did you discuss with anyone a plan to prevent the certification of the vote on Jan. 6?

With whom? When? What was discussed? Where?

5. Who did you speak with at the White House about the events of Jan. 6, before, during or after Jan. 6?

6. Why did you remain at your hotel on Jan. 6 rather than attending the rally and events that followed?

7. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Rudolph Giuliani, Trump personal attorney

1. It has been reported that on election night, as results were coming in from states that were ultimately won by Joe Biden, you repeatedly told people at the White House, “Just say we won.” What was the purpose of claiming victory before the results were final?

2. What was your goal on Jan. 6 when you urged rally attendees to engage in “trial by combat”?

3. Other than your public comments at the rally on Jan. 6, did you have any discussions with any of the individuals who planned or participated in the attack on the Capitol? If so, what did you discuss?

4. Did you discuss with President Trump the certification of the vote of electors that was occurring at the Capitol? What did he say? Did he express any plans to reject or disrupt the vote?

5. In a lawsuit, Dominion Voting Systems, Inc. alleges that you made false statements to the media that Dominion uses “software that’s been used to steal elections in other countries.” What is your basis for making that statement?

6. In its lawsuit, Dominion also claims that you made false statements to the media that Dominion uses software developed by Smartmatic, which was founded by former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and is still run by allies of Chavez. What is your basis for that statement?

7. In its lawsuit, Dominion also claims that you made false statements to the media that Smartmatic “has tried and true methods for fixing elections.” What is your basis for that statement?

8. In its lawsuit, Dominion also claims that you made false statements to the media that Dominion “notifies” election officials when they are too far behind so they can add in fake ballots. What is your basis for that statement?

9. What was your goal in spreading this disinformation about the election?

10. According to the Dominion lawsuit, during an appearance on Fox News, you stated that “a Dominion employee” in Detroit on election night had been “notified by Smartmatic in Frankfurt that Biden was way behind.” What is your basis for that statement?

11. According to the Dominion lawsuit, during the same interview on Fox News, you stated, “These people want to destroy us. They are very, very bad people. … Somehow, the Democrat party was hijacked by Clinton, and since then, it’s gone more corrupt and more corrupt and more corrupt.” Then, making a throat-slashing motion, you said: “Somebody’s got to cut the head off.”  What was your purpose in making that statement?

12. Did you request Secret Service protection on Jan. 6? If you received such protection, how did it come about that you had it and what was the rationale?

13. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Ashley Trenzeluk, former Finance Director, Republican Attorneys General Association

1. You wrote that you resigned as Finance Director of the Republican Attorneys General Association because the organization hired as its executive director Pete Bisbee, whom you claim was responsible for funding robocalls to encourage people to come to Washington on Jan. 6. Did RAGA play a role in encouraging people to go to Washington?

2. What was RAGA’s purpose for encouraging people to travel to Washington?

3. Who was involved in creating and approving the robocalls?

4. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

Pete Bisbee, former Executive Director, Rule of Law Defense Fund

1. Did you lead funding efforts to pay for robocalls to urge people to travel to Washington, D.C., on Jan. 6?

2. What was RLDF’s purpose for encouraging people to travel to Washington?

3. Did you coordinate your efforts with any affiliated with the Trump campaign or the White House?

Documents:

Any communications, memoranda, reports or payment records relating to plans for rallies on Jan. 5 or 6 in Washington, D.C.

Return to Table of Contents

E. Response from Congress

Kevin McCarthy, House Minority Leader (R-CA)

1. Did you speak to President Trump by telephone during the attack on Jan. 6? How many times?

2. What did you discuss?

3. What did President Trump say?

4. On Jan. 6, did you speak with anyone else at the White House? If so, what did you discuss?  Did you speak with anyone at the Department of Defense and, if so, what did you discuss? FBI? Department of Justice? DHS?

5. On Jan. 13 on  the House floor, you stated that President Trump “bears responsibility” for the Jan. 6 attack. Why did you think President Trump was responsible for the attack?

6. Since Jan. 6, have you ever spoken with President Trump about what testimony you might provide about your communication with him on Jan. 6?

Sen. Ben Sasse (R-NE)

1. Did you speak to President Trump by telephone during the attack?

2. What did you discuss?

3. What did President Trump say?

4. On Jan. 6, did you speak with anyone else at the White House? If so, what did you discuss?  Did you speak with anyone at the Department of Defense and, if so, what did you discuss? FBI? Department of Justice? DHS?

5. You have made public comments that “senior White House officials” told you that President Trump was delighted that rioters were at the U.S. Capitol during the attack. Who told you that?

6. What else did they say about the conduct or comments of President Trump during the attack?

Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC)

1. Did you speak to President Trump by telephone during the attack?

2. What did you discuss?

3. What did President Trump say?

4. If you did not speak with President Trump on Jan. 6, did you attempt to speak with him?

5. Reports state that you telephoned Ivanka Trump at the White House during the attack on Jan. 6. Did you speak to her that day?

6. If so, what did you discuss?

7. On Jan. 6, did you communicate  with anyone else at the White House? If so, what did you discuss?  Did you communicate with anyone at the Department of Defense and, if so, what did you discuss? FBI? Department of Justice? DHS?

Sen. Tommy Tuberville (R-AL)

1. Reports indicate that you spoke to President Trump on the telephone on Jan. 6 to encourage you to object to the certification of the election. Is that true?

2. If so, what did President Trump say during the conversation?

3. What was occurring in the Capitol as you spoke to President Trump?

4. On Jan. 6, did you speak with anyone else at the White House? If so, what did you discuss?  Did you speak with anyone at the Department of Defense and, if so, what did you discuss? FBI? Department of Justice? DHS?

Rep. Mo Brooks (R-AL)

1. Who arranged for you to speak at the Jan. 6 rally and what did you understand the purpose of the event was?

2. In your remarks, you told the crowd to, “take names and kick ass.” What did you mean by that?

3. Were your comments reviewed by anyone at the White House in advance? If so, who, and what, if any suggestions or comments were made?

4. Did you speak to President Trump at any time on Jan. 6?

5. What did you discuss?

6. What did President Trump say?

7. On Jan. 6, did you speak with anyone else at the White House? If so, what did you discuss?  Did you speak with anyone at the Department of Defense and, if so, what did you discuss? FBI? Department of Justice?

8. Ali Alexander reportedly said the following in a now-deleted video about Jan. 6: “We four schemed up of[sic] putting maximum pressure on Congress while they were voting.” Mr. Alexander was referring specifically to you as well as Rep. Paul Gosar (R-AZ), Rep. Andy Biggs (R-AZ), and himself in that scheme.

Did you or your staff have any communications with Mr. Alexander before Jan. 6? If so, who else was involved in those communications? Did any of those communications reference any effort to prevent the certification of the election?

Do you know of any communications between Mr. Alexander and Rep. Gosar or his staff? Do you know of any communications between Mr. Alexander and Rep. Biggs and his staff?

9. Do you have knowledge of any communications of any of the following people in advance of Jan. 6 that referenced the prospect of Trump supporters entering the Capitol?

• President Trump
• Trump associates (e.g, Roger Stone, Rudy Giuliani)
• Members or associates of the Trump campaign
• Organizers of the Jan. 5 or 6 rallies
• Members or associates of the Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA)
• White House or other officials
• Members of Congress or their staff

If so, did those communications involve plans or a desire to have Trump supporters enter the Capitol to put pressure on members of Congress or interrupt proceedings?

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F. Expert Witnesses

Domestic Terrorism Threat

1. How do you assess the danger of the threat posed by the types of violent extremists who participated in the Jan. 6 attack?

2. What motivates them?

3. Is this threat diminishing or growing?

4. What can be done to counter this threat?

5. What triggers someone to move from mere ideology to acts of violence?

6. How might statements and actions by President Trump over the course of at least 2020 inspired members of militia groups to attack the Capitol?

7. What, if any, associations may there be between actions and individuals involved in armed protests at state capitols and statehouses during 2020 and the attack on Jan. 6?

8. How may explicit and implicit racial bias influence how intelligence and law enforcement agencies address domestic violent extremism?

9. What programs should intelligence and law enforcement agencies adopt to counter racial bias within those agencies? What are best practices? What are lessons learned from bad practices?

Social Media Platforms

1. How do domestic violent extremists use social media to recruit and radicalize others?

2. How do they use social media to coordinate their activities?

3. Are encrypted apps prevalent within groups of violent extremists?

4. How can social media companies reduce disinformation on their platforms?

5. What steps can be taken to disrupt violent extremists from their online communications?

6. How much did broadcast media contribute to the spread of disinformation about the presidential election results compared to social media?

Disinformation

1. Can you explain how governments and groups use disinformation as a political tool?

2. Are public statements by government officials to minimize the events of Jan. 6 contributing to the disinformation campaign?

3. Are public statements by government officials to support the narrative of election fraud contributing to the disinformation campaign?

4. How much did broadcast media contribute to the spread of disinformation about the presidential election results compared to social media?

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