For more than three decades, the United States has refrained from conducting explosive nuclear tests, maintaining a moratorium that has become a cornerstone of global nuclear stability. This self-imposed restraint has not only bolstered the United States’ moral standing but also safeguarded its scientific and strategic advantages. Today, however, proposals to restart nuclear testing are surfacing, driven by claims that testing is necessary to maintain the reliability of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and to project strength amid intensifying global competition. Such arguments miss the mark entirely. Restarting nuclear tests would neither strengthen U.S. security nor compel challengers to submit to U.S. demands. Instead, it would erode decades of progress, hand strategic advantages to adversaries and risk setting off a dangerous cascade of testing around the world.
At its core, the debate over U.S. nuclear testing revolves around two critical questions: First, is it technically necessary? Second, what would be the strategic consequences?
On both counts, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that resuming tests would do more harm than good.
There is no compelling technical reason to conduct explosive nuclear tests. Doing so would only squander the unparalleled scientific capabilities the United States has developed over decades of non-explosive testing and simulation. Worse, a return to nuclear testing would shatter the global norm that has held firm since the end of the Cold War, likely triggering a wave of tests by other nuclear powers — Russia, China, and North Korea chief among them. This, in turn, could destabilize entire regions and undermine bedrock U.S. alliances and non-proliferation efforts. A return to explosive nuclear testing would not intimidate competitors into submission or strengthen America’s bargaining position as some claim. It would be a self-defeating act that sacrifices real security for a hollow display of power. The only winners in this scenario would be America’s adversaries.
A Technological Advantage Worth Protecting
The United States has no technical need to resume nuclear testing. Thanks to the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP), a multibillion-dollar initiative launched in the 1990s, American scientists have developed sophisticated methods to ensure the reliability and safety of the nuclear arsenal without explosive tests. Through advanced computing, non-explosive experiments and state-of-the-art facilities, researchers currently simulate the extreme conditions of nuclear detonations with unparalleled precision. These tools provide insights that go beyond what traditional explosive tests can offer, enabling the United States to maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal while avoiding the risks and costs associated with live testing.
Critics of the SSP argue that aging warheads require explosive testing to verify their reliability. But this argument ignores decades of evidence showing that the core components of U.S. nuclear weapons remain viable through regular surveillance and maintenance. The SSP has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to detect and address potential issues in the arsenal without needing to resort to explosive tests. Restarting testing would therefore be a solution in search of a problem — a move driven by politics rather than genuine technical necessity.
Moreover, resuming testing would undermine one of the America’s greatest strengths: its scientific edge. Unlike Russia and China, which lack comparable diagnostic capabilities for non-explosive testing, the United States has invested heavily in building a robust infrastructure for simulating nuclear detonations. Explosive testing would unnecessarily level the playing field, giving these adversaries an excuse to resume their own tests and close the technological gap. Russia and China, still largely reliant on data from their Cold War-era tests, stand to gain significantly from any opportunity to refine their arsenals with new experiments. By contrast, the United States would sacrifice the very advantage that has allowed it to maintain its arsenal without violating the global norm against testing.
The Global Domino Effect
The strategic consequences of U.S. nuclear testing would be even more catastrophic than the technical missteps. For decades, the global norm against testing has held firm, supported by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), even though key states like the United States, China, and India have not ratified it, and despite Russia’s withdrawal of its ratification in 2023. A U.S. test would shatter this fragile norm, likely unleashing a cascade of nuclear tests around the world and heightening the risks of miscalculation, arms races, and conflict.
Russia would almost certainly be the first to respond. With the United States seemingly pulling back from Ukraine and signaling a reduced commitment to European security, Moscow could use nuclear testing as a means of projecting strength and deterring further European aid to Kyiv. A Russian test would aim to intimidate NATO, deepen divisions among European allies, and reinforce the idea that continued support for Ukraine carries escalating risks. At the same time, with growing discussions about France potentially extending its nuclear deterrent to European allies, a Russian test could serve as a direct warning against any such efforts, demonstrating that Russia — not Paris, Brussels or any other European capital — will set the terms of nuclear security on the continent. Moreover, it would provide Russia with valuable data to refine its arsenal of low-yield tactical warheads. Such developments would exacerbate the already volatile security environment in Europe and make escalation even more likely.
China would have the most to gain and would seize the opportunity to advance its nuclear ambitions. Beijing has invested heavily in advanced supercomputing and artificial intelligence capabilities that could greatly enhance the value of even a small number of nuclear tests. With fresh data in hand, China could refine its arsenal, develop smaller, more sophisticated warheads and improve the survivability of its missiles. This would have profound implications for the Indo-Pacific region, where the United States and its South Korean and Japanese allies already face growing military threats from both China and North Korea. A more advanced Chinese arsenal would increase pressure on these allies to enhance their own deterrence capabilities, potentially including independent nuclear weapons programs — a development that would unravel decades of non-proliferation efforts. Further nuclearization of Northeast Asia would not only heighten regional tensions but also undercut any future efforts by the United States to deter potential proliferators from plunging into the nuclear weapons trade.
The reverberations would not stop there. Given the triangular nuclear tensions in South Asia, a Chinese test would likely embolden India and Pakistan to resume testing as well. For India, testing would signal technological parity with China and demonstrate its commitment to maintaining a credible deterrent vis-à-vis Beijing. Any move by India to test would almost certainly compel Pakistan to follow suit. For Islamabad, testing would serve as a reminder of its ability to counter Indian capabilities, particularly in the context of ongoing border tensions and political instability. The resumption of testing in South Asia would thus further destabilize an already precarious region burdened with a history of near-misses and crisis-driven escalations. Worse still, it would set back recent progress on risk reduction and signal to latent nuclear powers that they have a green light to push closer to weaponization.
North Korea, meanwhile, would feel even less constrained in its nuclear ambitions. Pyongyang has already conducted six nuclear tests, flouting international norms with impunity. A global return to testing would remove any remaining stigma, giving North Korea free rein to continue its experiments entirely unencumbered. This would enable Pyongyang to further refine its warheads and re-entry vehicles, potentially developing more compact and reliable designs that could be mounted on its growing arsenal of missiles. The result would be a more dangerous and unpredictable North Korea that poses an even greater threat to the United States and its allies.
For U.S. allies in Northeast Asia, the resumption of nuclear testing would have serious implications. Japan and South Korea would face immense pressure to bolster their own deterrence capabilities. This could include calls for the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the region or, more alarmingly, the development of independent nuclear weapons programs. South Korea, in particular, has seen growing public and political support for an indigenous nuclear capability, and a return to testing could add to the momentum toward such a decision.
In the Middle East, Iran could use the breakdown of the testing moratorium as a justification to accelerate its own nuclear program. Tehran is already capable of producing enough weapon-grade uranium for a testable device in less than one week. Renewed testing elsewhere could convince regime hardliners of the necessity of a credible deterrent. This, in turn, would likely prompt Saudi Arabia to advance its long-voiced interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. Turkey, which has already expressed discontent with the current nuclear order, could also reconsider its non-nuclear status if regional rivals move toward weaponization.
Globally, the resumption of testing would weaken the CTBT and other non-proliferation agreements, ultimately making it harder to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
A Self-Defeating Gesture
The idea that resuming nuclear testing would strengthen U.S. security is as flawed as it is dangerous. Testing would not coerce adversaries into acquiescing to American policies or deter them from advancing their nuclear capabilities. On the contrary, it would validate their own ambitions, triggering a chain reaction of global testing that would undermine American alliances, erode the international norm against nuclear testing, and destabilize already fragile regions. Rather than reasserting strength, the United States would find itself mired in an arms race it unwittingly legitimized.
The United States must reject this dangerous path. Far from being a sign of weakness, maintaining the moratorium on nuclear testing would be a clear demonstration of enduring strength. By refraining from unnecessary and destabilizing tests, the United States maintains its technological edge, upholds its leadership in non-proliferation, and denies adversaries the justification to advance their own capabilities.