The International Court of Justice has issued emergency orders (“indicated provisional measures”) three times in the case brought by South Africa against Israel alleging violations of the Genocide Convention in the Gaza Strip. The Court should do so again. If South Africa does not request additional provisional measures promptly, then the Court should indicate them at its own initiative without delay.
Under article 76(1) of the ICJ’s Rules of Court:
At the request of a party or proprio motu, the Court may, at any time before the final judgment in the case, revoke or modify any decision concerning provisional measures if, in its opinion, some change in the situation justifies such revocation or modification.
Several significant changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions concerning provisional measures justify their modification.
First, Israel’s closure of all border crossing points on Mar. 2, 2025 is denying almost all humanitarian relief from entering Gaza. This intentional deprivation of food, medical supplies, shelter, and other essential goods is even more extreme than that underway at the time of the Court’s prior decisions. Israel’s cutoff of electricity on Mar. 9 has also impaired water desalination and placed the overall supply of water at risk. This near-total denial of humanitarian relief creates a further risk of deliberately inflicting conditions of life calculated to destroy a substantial part of the Palestinian group.
Second, Israel’s current military campaign is killing civilians at a much higher rate than the military campaign underway at the time of the Court’s prior decisions. The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have reportedly killed over 500 people in three days, including at least 312 women and children. Credible reports indicate that some of these attacks may have exclusively killed civilians. The continuation of this military campaign risks directly killing a substantial part of the Palestinian group.
Finally, Israel’s Prime Minister and Defense Minister have stated their intention to remove the civilian population from Gaza, and Israeli media reports indicate that the current military campaign is designed to facilitate that aim. The forcible displacement of two million civilians plainly risks the destruction of a substantial part of the Palestinian group as such, either as a means of driving survivors from their land or as a consequence if displacement is to areas unable to provide survivors with the basic means of survival.
The consequences of these three changes compound one another. The denial of medical supplies increases the lethality of the military campaign. The military campaign impedes the provision of medical care. The forcible displacement of civilians would likely involve extreme violence while separating civilians from the few medical facilities still capable of treating them.
While the Court need not definitively find that Israel is acting with genocidal intent before indicating provisional measures and prior to a final judgment on the merits of the case, official statements of intent by high-ranking officials are relevant to the Court’s finding of further risk of irreparable prejudice. On Mar. 19, 2025, Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz issued the following statement on social media with English and Arabic subtitles:
“Residents of Gaza, this is your final warning. The first Sinwar destroyed Gaza, and the second Sinwar will bring upon it total ruin. The Israeli Air Force’s attack against Hamas terrorists was only the first step. What follows will be far harsher, and you will bear the full cost.
Evacuation of the population from combat zones will soon resume. If all Israeli hostages are not released and Hamas is not kicked out of Gaza, Israel will act with force you have not known before.
Take the advice of the U.S. President: return the hostages and kick out Hamas, and new options will open up for you—including relocation to other parts of the world for those who choose. The alternative is destruction and total devastation.”
Katz’s statement indicates that Israel’s military campaign is intended to kill civilians, cause serious harm to civilians, and inflict destructive conditions on civilians until the civilian population somehow removes Hamas from Gaza and rescues Israeli hostages—two results the IDF has been unable to achieve in 16 months of brutal war. Whether civilians are directly targeted or killed in disproportionate attacks on military objectives, their deaths as part of the promised “destruction and total devastation” are intended as a means of pressuring surviving civilians to remove Hamas and rescue hostages. Such a military campaign clearly risks destroying a substantial part of the Palestinian group. Katz’s statement also confirms that Israel’s leaders intend to remove civilians from Gaza, though on Katz’s account removal is tantamount to a reward for removing Hamas and rescuing hostages. The far more likely outcome is “total devastation.”
The conditions for the modification of the Court’s provisional measures are clearly met. The changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions risk consequences that current measures do not fully address, entailing a further risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention. In view of the fundamental values sought to be protected by the Genocide Convention, the extreme vulnerability of the civilian population in Gaza, and the intensity of Israel’s military campaign, the Court is faced with a situation of extreme urgency that would justify immediate action without holding oral hearings.
The Court should indicate provisional measures along the following lines:
The State of Israel shall immediately halt its current military offensive in Gaza, and refrain from any other action which may kill a substantial part of the Palestinian group in Gaza or inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
The State of Israel shall immediately reopen all available border crossing points and ensure the unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance, including food, water, electricity, fuel, shelter, clothing, hygiene and sanitation requirements, as well as medical supplies and medical care to Palestinians throughout Gaza, at a level matching or exceeding that achieved during February 2025.
The State of Israel shall ensure with immediate effect that its military does not deport or forcibly transfer Palestinians from the Gaza Strip, including by physical force, threat of force, coercion, or taking advantage of a coercive environment, or forcibly displace Palestinians within the Gaza Strip in a way that may involve or could result in the destruction of the Palestinian group in Gaza in whole or in part.
The first proposed measure is designed to halt the current offensive but does not preclude proportionate responses to rocket fire or targeted hostage rescue operations. The second proposed measure sets February 2025 as the minimum standard for humanitarian access because that period demonstrated the level of humanitarian relief that can be provided when Israel lifts restrictions and facilitates humanitarian access. The third proposed measure responds to another major change in the situation that creates further risk and requires the Court’s immediate intervention. The Court should indicate such measures without delay.
Legal Framework and Background
Under the Genocide Convention, genocide includes certain acts committed with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, in whole or in part, as such. These acts include killing members of the group and deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part.
On Jan. 26, 2024, the Court found that the Palestinians “appear to constitute” a protected group under the Genocide Convention, that “Palestinians in the Gaza Strip form a substantial part of the protected group,” and therefore the right of the Palestinians in Gaza to be protected from acts of genocide is “plausible.” The Court examined the factual circumstances before it, including the nature of Israel’s conduct, statements by Israeli officials, and the consequences for Palestinians in Gaza. The Court found that “there is a real and imminent risk that irreparable prejudice will be caused to the rights found by the Court to be plausible, before it gives its final decision,” including “the right of Palestinians in the Gaza Strip to be protected from acts of genocide.” On that basis, the Court indicated a series of provisional measures, including that Israel prevent acts of genocide as well as incitement to commit genocide, and “take immediate and effective measures to enable the provision of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance to address the adverse conditions of life faced by Palestinians in the Gaza Strip.”
On Feb. 16, 2024, the Court found that the “perilous situation” in Gaza “demands immediate and effective implementation of the provisional measures indicated” in January but “does not demand the indication of additional provisional measures.”
On Mar. 28, 2024, the Court found that “the spread of famine and starvation” was a change in the situation since its January decision, that this change entailed a further risk of irreparable prejudice that its prior decision did not fully address, and that this change justified the modification of its prior decision. The Court indicated further provisional measures, specifying the forms of humanitarian assistance that Israel must ensure. Notably, the Court invited written observations from Israel but did not hold oral hearings.
On May 24, 2024, the Court found that “the worsening conditions of life faced by civilians in the Rafah Governorate” was a change in the situation since its March decision, that this change entailed a further risk of irreparable prejudice that its prior decisions did not fully address, and that this change justified the modification of its prior decisions. The Court indicated further provisional measures, including that Israel shall “[i]mmediately halt its military offensive, and any other action in the Rafah Governorate, which may inflict on the Palestinian group in Gaza conditions of life that could bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part,” and “[m]aintain open the Rafah crossing for unhindered provision at scale of urgently needed basic services and humanitarian assistance.”
The same legal conditions justifying modification are satisfied here. The changes in the situation in Gaza since the Court’s prior decisions risk consequences that current measures do not fully address, entailing a further risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights of Palestinians under the Genocide Convention. These changes in the situation justify the modification of the Court’s prior decisions, either at South Africa’s request or at the Court’s own initiative, as described below.
Indication and Modification Under the Rules of Court
The ICJ’s Rules of Court provide that the Court may indicate, modify, or revoke provisional measures either at the request of a party or on its own initiative (proprio motu). When the Court acts proprio motu, it may take a decision without an oral hearing “in the event of extreme urgency.” Indeed, the Court indicated provisional measures proprio motu without receiving written observations in the LaGrand case discussed below. In contrast, the Court may not modify or revoke provisional measures without receiving written observations (art. 76(3)).
The measures proposed above are best understood as new measures rather than modifications of existing measures. While the second proposed measure resembles prior measures concerning humanitarian assistance, it makes a distinct demand (to reopen all available border crossings) and sets a new standard for compliance (the level of aid delivered in February 2025). As explained below, the conditions for the indication (rather than modification) of provisional measures proprio motu are also met, so the proposed measures may be indicated without receiving written observations.
Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court provides that:
The Court may at any time decide to examine proprio motu whether the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures which ought to be taken or complied with by any or all of the parties.
This provision has been part of the ICJ’s procedural framework since 1936 and remains “clearly established” within the Rules, affirming the ICJ’s discretionary authority to act in urgent situations to prevent irreparable harm. Importantly, Article 75(1) permits the Court to proceed without holding oral hearings in circumstances of “extreme urgency.” This is supported by precedents from the time of the Permanent Court of International Justice (see here and here).
The ICJ’s framework for provisional measures includes other key provisions. Article 41 of the ICJ Statute empowers the Court to indicate provisional measures when circumstances require action to preserve the respective rights of the parties. This power is exercised only if the Court determines there is urgency, interpreted by the Court as a “real and imminent risk” that irreparable harm will occur to the rights at stake before the Court renders its final decision.
Article 75(1) allows the ICJ to examine proprio motu whether “the circumstances of the case require the indication of provisional measures.” In the LaGrand case, the ICJ clarified that the exercise of its proprio motu powers depends on “the particular circumstances of the case,” which include circumstances that “would cause irreparable harm to the rights claimed” before the Court. Thus, the LaGrand standard builds on the general urgency framework established under Article 41 but, importantly, introduces the concept of “extreme urgency” as a heightened threshold requiring immediate judicial action. This heightened focus makes Article 75(1) distinct because it enables the Court to act without relying on a party’s formal request, responding to circumstances that may preclude timely intervention by the parties themselves.
By contrast, Article 76(1) explicitly ties the Court’s ability to revoke or modify existing measures to the existence of “some change in the situation.” This standard acts as a procedural safeguard, ensuring judicial consistency while allowing responsiveness to evolving conditions. Nonetheless, it is somewhat backward-looking, focusing on whether a material change justifies reconsideration of prior measures, rather than on the forward-looking need, like Article 75(1), to prevent irreparable harm based on extreme urgency.
Conceptually, it would appear that the standards under Articles 75(1) and 76(1) are distinct; Article 76(1) requires a demonstrable change, while Article 75(1) permits the Court to act based on the urgency and gravity of existing circumstances, regardless of whether they represent a departure from prior conditions. However, in practice, these tests may overlap. Situations extreme enough to meet the urgency and gravity threshold required for proprio motu action under Article 75(1) may arise from “some change in the situation” that would also satisfy the Article 76(1) threshold. Conversely, not all changes in the situation under Article 76(1) may meet the “extreme urgency” threshold required for Article 75(1). The LaGrand decision underscores the unique role of Article 75(1) in enabling the ICJ to act proprio motu in cases of extreme urgency, where irreparable harm is imminent and judicial intervention cannot wait. While the urgency requirement is a constant in the ICJ’s provisional measures framework, Article 75(1) reflects the Court’s discretion to respond independently when circumstances demand immediate action to protect the rights at stake.
Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court in Practice
The ICJ has invoked Article 75(1) only once. This was in the LaGrand case (Germany v. United States of America). In that case, the ICJ acted just one day after Germany’s request for provisional measures, indicating measures without holding a hearing or receiving written observations from the respondent State. The urgency of the situation — preventing the execution of Walter LaGrand — required the Court to act swiftly to avoid irreparable harm. Following LaGrand, the decision to invoke Article 75(1) depends on the Court’s assessment “in the light of the particular circumstances.”
South Africa’s Feb. 12, 2024 request for provisional measures to the ICJ explicitly invoked Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court, urging the Court to consider additional provisional measures proprio motu. Israel’s Feb. 15, 2024 response to South Africa’s request reinforced a key procedural point: the ICJ’s ability to act proprio motu under Article 75(1) is not contingent on any party’s formal request. As such, the ICJ’s procedural flexibility under Article 75(1) remains unbound by party submissions, allowing the Court to respond to situations of extreme urgency to safeguard the right to be protected from acts of genocide where they are at serious risk of irreparable harm. Ultimately, the Court did not exercise this authority at that time. Since then, the humanitarian crisis in Gaza has deteriorated to levels unimaginable not only in February but since the ICJ’s last order of provisional measures in May 2024. The circumstances surpass the extreme urgency of LaGrand, involving not just the survival of an individual but the survival of a population.
In each of its prior decisions, the Court found that the civilian population in Gaza was “extremely vulnerable.” The Court also repeatedly found that, in view of “the fundamental values sought to be protected by the Genocide Convention, the plausible rights in question in these proceedings” including the right to be protected from acts of genocide “are of such a nature that prejudice to them is capable of causing irreparable harm.” In light of the intensity of Israel’s current military campaign, the near-total denial of humanitarian access as an official policy, and the stated intention to remove Palestinians from Gaza, the situation is clearly one of extreme urgency that warrants the indication of provisional measures without an oral hearing or written observations.
Conclusion
The ICJ should indicate provisional measures directing Israel to immediately halt its current military campaign, restore the level of humanitarian assistance achieved in February 2025, and refrain from displacing Palestinians from Gaza. The Court has the legal authority to act. It must use its authority now, before it is too late.
We are not naïve. Israel has plainly violated the Court’s prior orders and may violate the proposed measures as well. But Israel’s apparent disregard for the Court’s authority cannot justify any of us failing to discharge our own responsibilities, let alone the responsibilities of the International Court of Justice.