The recent political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina has once again exposed the fragile peace that has characterized the country since the end of its devastating war in the 1990s. When Bosnia’s top court sentenced Bosnian Serb leader Milorad Dodik last month to a year in prison and banned him from politics for six years for signing a decree to publish two laws that the Office of the High Representative had previously annulled as unconstitutional, events escalated rapidly. Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb-dominated entity within Bosnia, responded by signing separatist laws that rejected the authority of the State police and judiciary within RS territory, effectively challenging the country’s constitutional order.
This provocative action risked undermining the fragile stability upheld by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war. But as tensions escalated, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio took an arguably surprising decisive stance against Dodik’s efforts to divide the country. The new Trump administration’s move highlighted Europe’s continued reliance on American leadership to manage crises in its backyard, as he bypassed the European Union, which most often has taken the lead on issues related to Bosnia, a candidate for EU membership. Instead, Rubio worked directly with leaders in London and Paris on a response. At the same time, the U.S. response appeared to spur European leaders to more decisive action.
Rubio Steps Up: A Decisive Response to Dodik’s Provocations
Rubio swiftly and unequivocally condemned Dodik’s actions, a striking departure from what many feared would be a disengaged approach to European security under the second Trump administration – or even the prospect that the administration would side with the separatists. “Our government calls on political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina to engage in constructive and responsible dialogue,” Rubio stated before delivering the crucial follow-up: “We call on our partners in the region to join us in opposing this dangerous and destabilizing behavior.” Just two days later, Rubio, on his way to Jeddah for talks on Ukraine, reinforced the urgency of the Bosnia crisis, stating, “We’re hoping we can do anything we can to avoid another conflict in Europe from emerging.” Regarding potential U.S. action against Bosnian Serb leaders, he added, “We’re certainly reviewing all of our options.”
This clear articulation of American opposition to Dodik’s separatist agenda came at a critical moment, as the Bosnian Constitutional Court moved to suspend the controversial laws he had signed, which threatened to fragment the country’s judicial and security apparatus. Rubio’s intervention was particularly significant given his previous political positioning. As a senator, he had often questioned extensive American involvement in foreign disputes. Yet, as secretary of state, he has demonstrated a pragmatic recognition of the need for continued U.S. leadership in volatile regions where American interests are at stake.
The timing of Rubio’s statement was particularly notable, coming as European institutions scrambled to formulate their response. By clearly defining Dodik’s actions as threatening Bosnia’s “security and stability,” Rubio established a framework for regional partners to align with the U.S. position. This approach reflects the Trump administration’s apparent diplomatic strategy of maintaining American leadership on critical security issues while expecting European allies to contribute more substantially to crisis management in their sphere of influence. Rather than abdicating America’s traditional role in European security, Rubio has calibrated a response that preserves U.S. influence while pushing European partners toward greater responsibility.
The EU’s Paralysis Exposed
The Bosnian crisis has highlighted again the European Union’s persistent inability to respond decisively to challenges in its immediate neighborhood without American leadership. While the EU earlier this monthy announced plans to “temporarily increase” its peacekeeping force (EUFOR) in Bosnia following the court’s suspension of Dodik’s separatist laws, this decision came only after the United States had established a clear position. This pattern of EU reactivity rather than proactivity has become a familiar feature of Brussels’ approach to the Western Balkans. For years, the European Union has struggled to develop a coherent and effective strategy for Bosnia and Herzegovina, often appearing divided and ambiguous in its policy prescriptions.
This latest crisis echoes previous instances in which the EU’s approach to Dodik’s provocations has been characterized by ambivalence and concession. In 2011, when Dodik threatened a referendum on the judiciary and withdrawal from State institutions, the EU-led international community essentially rewarded his obstruction by curtailing the authority of international prosecutors and judges pursuing organized crime and corruption. One observer noted that “appeasing Dodik was starting down a slippery slope.” The consequences of this appeasement strategy are now evident as Dodik has grown increasingly bold in challenging Bosnia’s constitutional order. The EU’s institutional architecture, requiring consensus among member States with divergent interests in the Balkans, has consistently undermined its ability to present a unified and forceful response to separatist challenges.
Bilateralism Over Multilateralism: Trump’s Europe Strategy
Rubio’s handling of the Bosnia crisis reveals the Trump administration’s evolving approach to Europe. Rather than working primarily through multilateral institutions like the EU, Rubio has signaled a preference for direct engagement with key regional actors. This approach aligns with Trump’s broader “America First” foreign policy that prioritizes bilateral relationships over multilateral frameworks. By directly calling regional partners to oppose Dodik’s “dangerous and destabilizing behavior,” Rubio establishes a pattern of U.S.-led coalitions of willing partners rather than deferring to EU-led processes.
This strategy represents a significant departure from the traditional post-Cold War American approach to European security issues. For decades, U.S. policy has generally supported European integration and multilateral institutions as stabilizing forces in the continent. The Trump administration views such institutions as occasionally ineffective constraints on American action. In the Bosnian context, this means bypassing cumbersome EU consensus-building mechanisms in favor of direct engagement with actors exercising influence in the region, foremost with London, Paris, and Ankara. However, this tactical shift does not signal American disengagement from European security concerns. Instead, it reflects a recalibration of how American leadership is exercised – that it is less likely to be done through multilateral institutions than through direct diplomacy with key partners.
How to Move Forward Strategically
Successfully managing the Bosnia crisis requires a coordinated long-term strategy that extends Rubio’s initial intervention. First, the United States should maintain its clear stance against separatist activities while pressing European partners to develop more robust mechanisms for addressing challenges to Bosnia’s constitutional order. It is of utmost importance to support the authority of the High Representative and the Constitutional Court as essential guarantors of the Dayton framework, and to encourage domestic judicial and law enforcement institutions to take the necessary measures to bring Dodik to justice for his separatist laws, which appear aimed at stoking conflict. A bipartisan group of nine members of the U.S. Congress, including the Republican Chair and the top Democrat of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, issued a helpful letter to Rubio this week, urging the administration “to use all tools at its disposal, including diplomacy and sanctions, to prevent a deterioration of the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina.“
Second, the EU must move beyond reactive crisis management to develop a more coherent and proactive approach to Bosnia. As a precondition, the EU must resolve internal divisions among member States regarding the Western Balkans and create more substantial incentives for constitutional reform and democratic consolidation in Bosnia. Years of unfulfilled promises and ambiguous messaging have severely damaged the EU’s credibility as a transformative force. Restoring this credibility requires clear benchmarks for reform backed by tangible benefits for compliance.
Third, NATO should reinforce its presence and visibility in Bosnia as a counterweight to Russian and, increasingly, Chinese Influence. NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s visit to Sarajevo represents a positive step in this direction. However, more substantive security assistance will be necessary to bolster Bosnia’s resilience against external destabilization efforts.
Finally, targeted sanctions against individuals and entities undermining Bosnia’s constitutional order should be expanded and coordinated between the United States and European partners at a bilateral level. The United States has already sanctioned Dodik for corrupt practices and attempts to undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement. These measures should be strengthened and harmonized with European sanctions to maximize their impact.
It is not over: The crisis is still unfolding, but at least now Bosnian State institutions would seem to have a green light from the international community to act with all legal measures possible to curb Dodik’s separatist machinations. It is essential to ensure that Dodik and his organized group are held accountable for their attempted constitutional coup d’état. A future with Dodik and his SNSD political party in State government does not seem realistic anymore, as his escalating actions in the future are unforeseeable. Dodik should not be part of the future political constellation in Bosnia.