It’s usually not a good sign when Moscow cheers developments in Washington. President Donald Trump’s public blowup with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in the Oval Office coupled with the freezing of military assistance and intelligence sharing are the clearest signs yet of Trump’s attempted rapprochement with Russia and break with Washington’s allies in Europe.
Europe should be clear-eyed about these developments and work to take further ownership of their security absent the United States. Building on the momentum from this past weekend’s summit of leaders in London means preparing for real action on seizing frozen Russian assets to support Ukraine, massive new defense spending, and readying for a peace enforcement operation in Ukraine. All these issues should be on the table at tomorrow’s European Council meeting.
Trump has started his second presidency by inverting the traditional U.S. approach to Russia and Europe. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, this represents an embrace of his desire to normalize relations with the United States and deal with a great power as equals at the expense of Ukraine and Europe’s security. For Europe, it is a rejection of the alliance system that the United States has led since the conclusion of World War II and that has benefited the United States politically – see Europe’s aid to the United States in coalitions for Afghanistan and Iraq — and economically in terms of trade and tourism. The problem with Trump’s worldview of spheres of influence and “might makes right” is that it aligns more closely with Russia that it does with America’s closest allies or, for that matter, true American interests.
Start with Russia, where Trump is seeking yet another attempted reset in relations, as each of his predecessors has attempted and failed with Putin. In just six weeks since his inauguration, the Trump administration has ended Washington’s isolation of Putin, including siding with Moscow at the United Nations against Ukraine. Trump and his foreign policy team are eagerly seeking closer economic and diplomatic ties with the Kremlin, while ending offensive cyber operations against Russia.
Pressure on Kyiv Instead of Moscow
After Trump’s victory last November, “peace through strength” became the ostensible justification for Trump’s approach to Russia. Since taking office, Trump has done the opposite. He has instead put pressure on Kyiv instead of Moscow while making concessions to the Kremlin for seemingly nothing in return. Seeking an end to the war in Ukraine at any cost, Trump and his team have attempted to coerce Kyiv into surrendering half of its natural resources, paused military aid to Ukraine, halted intelligence sharing with Kyiv, and suggested that Zelenskyy should be removed from power.
Trump’s approach to Ukraine frames peace as a central component of revitalizing relations with Russia. It explains why the Trump team has voluntarily taken key objectives off the negotiating table, such as Ukraine’s membership in NATO. It ignores the reality of why Russia invaded Ukraine — and even the fact that Russia invaded Ukraine — opting instead to revive nonsensical claims that NATO started the war or that Ukraine is responsible for the invasion. All these concessions are explained if the Trump administration does not view Russia as the aggressor, just a great power that will cooperate once its interests are met.
The Trump foreign policy outlook extends to Europe too. His worldview does not see the value in the alliance system with Europe. It sees the European Union, the development of which the United States encouraged and nurtured, as an adversary which was “formed to screw the United States” and must be countered. This philosophy understands the transatlantic alliance not as a strength but as a constraint on the ability of the United States to exercise its power at will — demanding territorial concessions over Greenland, for example. It questions why the United States must spend so much protecting these allies when they take supposedly advantage of the United States on trade, over-regulate American companies, and, as Vice President J.D. Vance explained it in his broadside against Europe at the Munich Security Conference last month, increasingly do not hold the same values as Trump’s administration.
This approach is a mistake. It is not in the U.S. strategic interest to pursue enhanced relations with Russia while Moscow still hopes to violently re-establish a sphere of influence at the expense of Ukraine and America’s European allies. The supposed benefits of good terms with Moscow through diplomatic normalization and the reestablishment of economic ties are far outweighed by the tremendous costs: morally, as the horrors of Russian occupation would be cemented and legitimized, as well as strategically, wherein Putin and other authoritarian aggressors would be emboldened to further undermine the international order that enriched the United States and to increasingly challenge the alliance system that has kept it safe.
The greatest casualty of this approach in the short term would, of course, be Ukraine. U.S. support for Kyiv has been vital to Ukraine’s defense these last three years since Russia’s unprovoked full-scale invasion in February 2022. The support isn’t charity; it was provided chiefly to prevent Russia from dragging the world back into an international system in which aggression is not a crime but rather becomes a legitimate and common tool of statecraft. Russia hasn’t changed in its desire to destroy the Ukrainian identity and the democracy for which Ukrainians have been fighting for — politically and now militarily – for decades.
Europe as a Whole Under Threat
Europe is also under threat. Ukraine’s defeat or a U.S.-Russia deal made over the heads of Europe could leave leaders from Spain to Lithuania tasked with enforcing a deal they did not make or living with the grave consequences of a mortally wounded Ukraine unable to safely rebuild. A Washington that is closer to Moscow than Brussels also fundamentally calls into question the reliability of the U.S. security guarantee for Europe against Russia.
Critics may label these conclusions hyperbolic. The breakdown in the Oval Office may not necessarily be a breakup. The Ukrainian president has left the door open by announcing his readiness to sign the minerals deal and work with Washington. Trump may yet be convinced to return to the table to lead efforts to create a genuine and durable peace in Ukraine. Indeed, he toned down some of his rhetoric in his address to Congress, welcoming Zelenskyy’s efforts to engage in peace talks — though military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine remain frozen. And while undermining Europe, Trump does still engage with its leaders. He welcomed U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer and French President Emmanuel Macron to Washington last week for meetings, but they left without any tangible commitments or developments. The Trump administration has praised the U.K.’s and Poland’s defense spending plans. But leaders have also been disregarded, such as the Polish president and the EU’s top diplomat Kaja Kallas, who was turned away from meetings after arriving in Washington.
Europe’s leaders should still try to engage Trump. But it would be political malpractice for them to bank on Trump reversing course. Instead, Europe must work on the assumption that U.S. and European leadership are not aligned at this moment. Europe should not abandon the United States, and the transatlantic relationship may not be over, but it is on pause. Europe therefore must be ready to act on its own accord, even if that means moving independently of Washington.
There are reassuring signs that Europe has recognized the seriousness of the moment. The wave of proclamations in support of Zelenskyy following the Oval Office meeting are an important symbol that Europe sees what is at stake. But statements of support cannot be fired out of howitzers or wielded to defend against missile attacks. Far more important were the conclusions Starmer announced from the March 2 summit of leaders in London that Europe would begin forming a “coalition of the willing” to deploy troops to Ukraine for enforcing a peace. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the EU and its members would flood Ukraine with assistance to turn it into a “steel porcupine” to resist future aggression.
Capitalizing on this momentum is critical as Europe considers not just whether it can get a seat at the table with Trump and Putin, but whether to make its own table altogether to secure peace on the continent. The effort von der Leyen advocates will require collective European action. No single country in Europe has the weight to replace the United States in support of Ukraine. The EU, in close partnership with non-EU countries such as the U.K., will be the necessary body to facilitate this movement.
European Council Meeting
The upcoming European Council meeting on March 6 is the next logical point for action, both in the formal meeting and on the sidelines. This cannot be another meeting full of strong rhetoric but short on immediate action — European leaders must agree to move. They must pull ever lever they have.
First, the Council should articulate its strategic interests in Ukraine’s victory and its own negotiating position. It should empower High Representative Kaja Kallas to coordinate and act on behalf of the bloc to discuss peace in Ukraine with Ukraine and other parties.
Second, the Council should welcome EU members taking part in any coalition to provide Ukraine with security guarantees in the form of coalitions of the willing. Leaders should also include non-EU members including the U.K., Norway, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey in relevant parts of the discussion as both a show of unity and to increase the pro-Ukraine bloc’s capacity for coordinated action.
Third, Europe should finally move on seizing Russia’s frozen assets. The annual interest on the €200 billion currently frozen in European jurisdictions will not be enough to get Ukraine through this critical moment, and the bulk of the assets should be transferred to Ukraine or immediately used for purchases of weapons to ensure there is no risk of them being released back to Moscow during peace talks. Member States should direct the Commission, the EU’s executive arm, to rapidly assemble the legal reasoning for such action. They also should direct the Commission to work on a new round of sanctions to strip Russia’s diplomats of visa-free travel, crack down on the sale of critical components, and bludgeon Russian energy revenues.
Fourth, European leaders must make deeper military commitments to Ukraine. The Council should agree on a package the Commission is drafting for military support to Ukraine. It should also agree to benchmarks of aid to Ukraine for EU countries to meet, either through materiel itself, or the value of it in financial contributions. Neutral countries such as Ireland can be exempted and their share of funding should go to non-lethal military aid, or to financial and humanitarian support. Ukraine’s greatest needs — ammunition, air defense, and armored vehicles — have not changed.
Fifth, leaders must dramatically boost their own defense investments, buying and building up their weapons stocks to the greatest extent possible. This will be expensive. Increasing defense spending to 3.5 percent of the EU’s GDP — what French President Emmanuel Macron and others have called for — will cost about €250 billion. Europe should follow through on the idea to relax deficit-spending to exempt defense spending or military aid to Kyiv. But that won’t be enough. The bloc should embrace borrowing money collectively the way it did during the COVID-19 pandemic, or direct members to borrow using their own credit. Investment in a European defense industrial base also would be significantly aided by investing in Ukraine’s defense industry, which has significantly more capacity than is currently being utilized.
Each of these recommendations individually will be politically difficult to agree on, and agreement on such divisive issues at the European Council is unlikely because of the EU’s unanimity requirements. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, a Putin and Trump ally, has already sworn that there will not be consensus on Ukraine at the Council. Understanding the reality of EU politics makes it difficult to see the bloc as the solution to the current challenge. But the bloc is the best Europe has to offer. Plus, many of the decisions above can only happen at the EU level.
And, if the old saying that Europe is forged in crisis is true, then in this existential moment Europe must be ready to abandon the rigid systems of peacetime. It should first try for unanimity across the EU’s 27 members, and carrots such as financial assistance should be on the table, as they have worked in the past. But the stick of suspended voting rights, which allows for the Council to suspend EU membership rights “if a country seriously and persistently breaches the principles on which the EU is founded,” should be considered as well. EU members have been hesitant to use this option in the past for the precedent it could set, but Hungary’s continued opposition to Ukraine and the rest of Europe’s defense necessities such action.
Even considering these possibilities, leaders should be clear-eyed that unanimity on any of the above is unlikely, especially as Orban will be emboldened following the Trump-Zelenskyy blowup. In the likely event a Council meeting goes nowhere, it should be concluded early, and coalitions of the willing should convene to move forward anyway – and fast.
Embracing these decisions will help Ukraine and Europe. It will also help rekindle Europe’s geopolitical ambitions. As best encapsulated by Zelenskyy himself, “Some in Europe may be frustrated with Brussels. But let’s be clear — if not Brussels, then Moscow.” Let’s hope this is truly Europe’s moment.