Legal warfare, more commonly known as lawfare, is a pillar of the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s military doctrine. Although the Russian Federation has not explicitly defined a lawfare strategy, it also uses the legal domain to maneuver for strategic advantage. Russia erodes principles of international law by enforcing non-standard legal interpretations. Russia also passes domestic laws to support its strategic aims, coupled with information operations advancing false or misleading legal positions. By doing so, Russia attempts to lend a veneer of legitimacy to its illegal and gray zone operations: hybrid warfare activities that exist between peace and war.
Russia’s lawfare is part of an explicit strategy to undermine international law itself. By failing to forcefully confront Russian gray zone operations that are tacitly legitimized by its skewed legal interpretations, the international community risks permitting Russia’s freedom of maneuver to reshape established international norms. Those States that backed Russia or abstained from condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in the United Nations General Assembly largely overlap with States that have not blocked RT, the Russian international news station which trumpets Russia’s interpretations of international law. These States have tacitly accepted Russia’s legal interpretations, or are unwilling to contradict them, thwarting Ukraine’s efforts to gain international support. The United States and its allies and partners should more aggressively confront Russian lawfare and gray zone operations to slow Russia’s strategic advances and protect the rules-based international order. Utilizing international venues to confront Russian malign efforts will be key to effectively calling out illegitimate and illegal Russian activities.
A Veneer of Legitimacy
A key to Russia’s lawfare tactics is creating a colorable rationale for its distorted interpretation of international law. Russia routinely engages in institutional lawfare – the creation of laws and institutions to legitimize and advance its strategic aims. Domestic laws that enshrine a perceived right to take actions that do not comport with international law are an important component of this effort.
For instance, in December 2022, the Duma passed a law claiming portions of the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as Russian internal waters. The NSR runs through the Arctic Sea from the Barents Sea to the Bering Strait. Although it is impassible for much of the year, global warming is changing this; many hope the route will become an alternative to the dangerous Suez Canal for Asian goods to reach European markets. Russia interprets the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to allow it to draw straight baselines connecting three island groups to the mainland and assert rights typically reserved for archipelagic States, such as sovereignty over archipelagic waters and the resources therein, and the designation of archipelagic sea lanes. Accordingly, Russia claims sections of the NSR as its internal waters and heavily taxes and regulates ships transiting through them. Russia’s attempt to exercise more dominion over the Arctic and impede other State’s freedom of navigation rights likely violates UNCLOS and well-established customary international law. The United States has called out Russia’s actions and declared its claims over the NSR to be an excessive maritime claim. However, a coalition of States seeking to preserve freedom of navigation in the High North should more forcefully challenge Russia’s lawfare to deter its attempts to expand control over this important passage.
More recently, in May 2024, the Russian Ministry of Defense posted a draft resolution on its website signaling Russian intent to redefine maritime boundaries in the Baltic Sea. Baltic States exercised vigilance by monitoring the legal domain for Russian provocations and calling out Russian malign activities that potentially endangered well-established international norms regarding maritime boundary delimitation. Russia quickly deleted the draft maritime boundary proposal from the government website where it was first published, perhaps in part due to the strong and swift regional response from NATO members such as Finland, Sweden, Lithuania, and Estonia, to publicly call out Russia’s intent to redefine its maritime boundaries.
To better confront Russia’s increasing focus on gray zone operations that violate international law, the United States and its allies and partners should embrace the concept of legal vigilance: monitoring and assessing the legal environment to identify threats of legal or diplomatic actions that set conditions for future military operations, and subsequently integrating with interagency stakeholders and multilateral partners to uphold the rule of law. Exercising legal vigilance and subsequently confronting Russian malign activities are critical components to countering Russian attempts to maneuver in the legal domain for competitive advantage.
Gray Zone Operations
In spaces where there is some degree of confusion or ambiguity as to which concrete legal rules apply, Russia attempts to manipulate international law to its advantage. Russia has repeatedly sought to exploit gray zone operations. For example, Russia attempted to close large swaths of the Black Sea to maritime traffic in July 2023. Following the collapse of the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI), Russia declared that all ships departing Ukrainian ports would be deemed potential carriers of military aid and their flag States party to the conflict. Here, Russia likely illegally applied the law of treaties to suspend the BSGI, as well as misapplied the law of naval operations to permit targeting of vessels departing Ukrainian ports, including civilian vessels with no military nexus to the conflict. Earlier this year, a Russian supersonic anti-ship missile struck the M/V Aya, a Turkish-operated, civilian grain vessel in the Black Sea near Romanian territorial waters. Russia’s warped application of international law facilitates potentially unlawful strikes on civilian vessels and runs counter to established norms regarding freedom of navigation, blockade, and interdiction at sea. Further, unlawful targeting of Ukrainian grain shipments pose a threat to global food security in Africa and the Middle East where much of Ukrainian grain is bound for market.
More recently, Russia has sought to evade sanctions targeting Russian liquified natural gas (LNG) by employing “shadow fleet” LNG carriers. These vessels spoof their automatic identification system (AIS) transponders to appear that the ships are loitering in international waters outside of the Norwegian and Russian exclusive economic zones (EEZs), obfuscating their true destination: Russian ports. To ensure safe navigation, most non-government ships are legally required to operate AIS pursuant to the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. To hold Russia accountable for its violations, affected coastal States should coordinate through diplomatic and legal channels with the flag States where shadow fleet vessels are registered. Palau’s suspension of three shadow fleet LNG carriers’ registration offers a blueprint for countering these gray zone activities. Here, in response to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions against three Russian shadow fleet vessels, the Palauan authorities convened investigations of the vessels’ deceptive activities and suspended their flags, severely curtailing the shadow fleet vessels’ freedom of movement through major canals.
In addition to malign activities in the maritime domain, Russian gray zone operations have had significant negative effects on European civil aviation. Since Russia’s illegal full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, reported incidents of GPS interference affecting flights in the Baltic Sea and Eastern European regions have increased dramatically. It is unclear whether Russia is purposefully targeting European flights with GPS jamming, or if this may be a collateral effect of Russian electronic warfare related to military operations in Ukraine. In response to the increase in GPS jamming and electromagnetic interference, a number of European States filed formal complaints with the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the U.N. body which regulates internet and telecommunications standards. These States requested that the ITU address the harmful interference to GPS systems and civil aviation. As an ITU member State, Russia is required to uphold its obligations, to include a prohibition on causing “harmful interference to the radio services or communications of other Member States” under Art. 45 of the ITU Constitution.
On 1 July 2024, the Radio Regulations Board (RRB) – the ITU entity that handles complaints of electromagnetic interference – condemned intentional, harmful, interference to French and Swedish satellite networks. Despite the Russian Federation’s feigned ignorance, satellite operators traced the harmful interference to three sites within Russian territory: Moscow, Kaliningrad, and Pavlovka. The RRB requested Russia “immediately cease any deliberate action to cause harmful interference” and requested that the Board convene the administrations concerned – France, Sweden, Ukraine, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Russia, to collaborate and resolve the harmful interference cases. The Board further requested the cooperation of signatories to the Memorandum of Understanding on Space Monitoring to help identify the sources of the interference. By the time of the RRB’s subsequent meeting in November 2024, Russia had failed to communicate with the Radiocommunications Bureau to schedule a meeting with the complaining States due to “necessary governmental procedures” within the Russian government. Meanwhile, Sweden reported that harmful interference had continued. In response the RRB reiterated its prior recommendations.
States should continue to collectively leverage international organizations such as the ITU and RRB, along with international agreements, to confront Russian gray zone operations and promote legal accountability. Although the RRB has not been effective at deterring Russian behavior so far, only Sweden reported continuing interference in December, suggesting that the July decision may have had some effect. International courts and organizations, combined with pressure from law-abiding States and their publicity of Russia’ non-compliance with international law and norms, can deter and delegitimize Russia’s behavior.
How the United States Should Respond
Competition in the legal domain is a battle for legitimacy. The United States and its allies and partners can do more to identify and confront Russian lawfare and highlight Russia’s often illegal and deceptive gray zone actions.
To effectively confront Russian lawfare and gray zone operations, U.S. interagency stakeholders should harmonize domestic efforts, and seek to build coalitions of like-minded States to deter Russian malign activity. A whole-of-government approach to confronting Russian malign activities requires interagency coordination of messaging and lines of efforthis will require closer interagency coordination on information operations, to include more detailed analysis of measures of effectiveness. Cooperation with the private sector will also be necessary. In the Black Sea, insurance companies have played a critical role in facilitating the export of grain from Ukraine. States and private sector companies must clarify their respective roles in protecting undersea critical infrastructure such as submarine cables and pipelines. States, insurance companies, and private sector companies must work together to identify and curb illicit behavior by Russian shadow fleet vessels, and in other areas where Russian malign activity may affect commercial interests.
A multilateral approach to confronting Russian gray zone operations, such as States’ numerous formal ITU complaints regarding Russia’s harmful interference, will be more effective in international fora than the protests of a single State or regional bloc. Together, law-abiding States can deter further Russian malign activity by highlighting the illegitimacy of Russian actions before the U.N., regional courts, or other international fora.
Russia seeks to redefine the international legal order so it can advance its strategic objectives and gain advantage over its global competitors. The United States, in coordination with allies and partners, has the tools to counter Russia’s lawfare and to thwart Russia’s strategic aims and preserve the rules-based international order. U.S. European Command recently launched an initiative to conduct international legal operations to counter Russian lawfare: an effective step towards a harmonized, whole-of-government effort to better confront Russian malign activities in the legal domain. Taking such steps will help to promote legal vigilance together with U.S. partners and allies, to expose and object to Russian lawfare and its often illegal and deceptive gray zone activities. International legal operations will be based on coordinated legal intelligence efforts to monitor the legal domain for competitors’ indications and warnings. Working together with NATO’s international legal operations program and similar programs at U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and other U.S combatant commands, these efforts will support and defend the rules-based international order from those, like Russia, who seek to undermine it.
All views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not represent the official view of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, the Department of the Navy, U.S. European Command, or the National Defense University.