Turkey’s Interior Ministry conducted large-scale raids in 51 cities, including the Kurdish-majority city of Diyarbakir in the southeast, on Feb. 18, arresting 282 people for alleged ties with the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The arrests stirred heated debate within Turkish society, constituting renewed pressure on the group but also sending mixed signals amid a new bid by the government of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to resolve the decades-long insurgency by the PKK and strike a peace deal that could put an end to one of the most violent conflicts in the region. The attempt at a rapprochement is the first sustained effort since the two sides tried – but failed – to reconcile in 2014. Just yesterday, the PKK’s imprisoned founder and longtime leader, Abdullah Ocalan, issued an unprecedented call from prison saying, “all groups must lay down their arms and the PKK must dissolve itself.”
While Ocalan’s call on his followers was indeed a historical move and likely will influence Kurdish militant groups across the Middle East, it still arguable whether his appeal will result in massive surrender of the PKK and its Syrian affiliations. For example, Mazlum Kobane, the leader of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, has said that “Ocalan’s call on disarmament not related to us.”
The ongoing bloody conflict between the Turkish armed forces and PKK-affiliated militants in the country’s southeastern provinces, including border areas with Iraq and Syria, has been a primary source of criticism for many opponents against the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) for nearly a decade. Growing domestic discontent, as well as a dramatic defeat of the AKP in local elections in 2024 likely are spurring his political maneuvers such as a peace deal with what most of his supporters consider a notorious enemy of the State. A successful resolution of the conflict also could give Erdogan a crucial additional constituency to push a change in the constitution to allow him to run for a third term in 2028.
In October 2024, Devlet Bahcheli, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), a staunch supporter of the war against the Kurdish militia in Turkey and beyond and a longtime ally of Erdogan, proposed in a surprise move the launch of a new rapprochement effort between the Turkish government and the PKK.
A Rare Handshake
The new proposal outraged much of Turkey’s non-Kurdish public due to the high number of casualties among Turkish armed forces and civilians as a result of PKK attacks in the last two decades. However, officials of the ruling AKP, including the speaker of the Turkish parliament, Numan Kurtulmus, backed Bahcheli’s proposal.
As Erdogan’s close aide, Kurtulmus’s statement signaled that the Kurdish dialogue initiative may have broader State support. Shortly after his announcement, Bahcheli shook hands in Parliament with the co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM), Tuncer Bakırhan, and several other MPs. In the past, Bahcheli has repeatedly called for the outlawing of a predecessor to DEM and opposed a peace process with the PKK.
The new efforts come in the context of major upheavals that are significantly reshaping the region’s geopolitical landscape, including the overthrow of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad in December by Turkish-backed Sunni militants, Israel’s military operations in Gaza, Lebanon and Syria, and Iran’s diminished influence amid the Gaza War and the decimation of the Iran-backed Axis of Resistance. While Turkey seems to be satisfied with current regional dynamics, it appears to have greenlighted the peace talks with the PKK in part to prevent Israel from filling a security vacuum in northern Syria.
With the peace overtures toward the PKK, Turkey aims to shift complex intra-Kurdish relations, eliminating what Turkey regards as a “terrorist corridor” stretching into Turkey from Kurdish-dominated northern Syria and Iraq, and improving regional security in the immediate neighborhood.
Years of violent clashes between the Turkish army and PKK-affiliated militants in Iraqi and Syrian border areas, including Kurdish-dominated southern provinces of Turkey, caused catastrophic damage but failed to eliminate security threats.
It is noteworthy that Turkey’s peace plan has apparently garnered the support of the leadership of the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan Government (KRG), whose Prime Minister Masrour Barzani visited Ankara on Jan. 8. KRG support for the proposed peace plan is essential for Ankara and boosts its leverage over regional actors while helping to address confidence problems between Turkey and ethnic Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and southeastern Anatolia.
The Israel Factor
Another motivation of Turkish authorities is the fear of Israel’s potential intervention and alignment with Iraqi and Syrian Kurdish militia against Turkish forces deployed in northern Syria. While such a concern may seem far-fetched, Israel has ruled out withdrawing anytime soon from a buffer zone in southern Syria that it occupied after Assad’s fall, and Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar had said in November that Israel “must reach out and strengthen our ties” with Kurds and that this approach “has both political and security aspects.” Sa’ar’s remarks elicited positive sentiments from some local tribal leaders in the KRG and northern Syria, emboldening them to call for closer ties with Israel, which has supported Kurds in the past against Iraqi foes such as Saddam Hussein.
Turkish-Israeli relations have seen wide swings, plummeting since Israel attacked Gaza following Hamas’s attacks on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, though quiet diplomacy has continued over policy toward Iran-backed groups and efforts to achieve a Gaza cease-fire. Israel’s current stance toward the Kurdish issue is not a new phenomenon for Turkey. In 1996, Israel provided Turkey with some sophisticated weaponry to use against Kurdish militants.
Erdogan and Bahcheli have demonstrated a commitment to a peace process with the Kurds. Despite recent PKK-led deadly terror attacks on state-owned arms facilities and Turkey’s retaliatory strikes on the group and its affiliates based in Iraq and Syria, the Turkish government facilitated a meeting for Sirri Sureyya Onder and Pervin Buldan, two well-known members of the DEM, with PKK leader Ocalan where he is being held in Imrali prison.
Among regional actors, the ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party of the KRG in Erbil and the Iraqi government in Baghdad seem most enthusiastic about the prospect of peace between Turkey and the PKK. A settlement would presumably end Turkey’s frequent large-scale military operations beyond its borders into northern Iraq. A reduction of PKK influence in Iraq’s Kurdistan region (KRG) and in northern Syria could pave the way for relative stability after years of ethno-sectarian conflict in the volatile region. For years, PKK and its affiliations conducted terror attacks against KRG military and energy infrastructure, causing major damage. Hence, KRG’s Interior Minister Ahmed Reber in 2024 stated that “the PKK is the source of all problems in the region.”
As for the AKP, the recent reconciliation effort is also likely motivated by Erdogan’s desire to be re-elected in 2028. He is barred from running for a third term under current law, but successful reconciliation with the PKK would likely result in all major parties endorsing his candidacy.
In other words, a peace agreement and reconciliation with the PKK would enable Erdogan’s government to reach out to all Kurdish communities within the country to mobilize their support for the next potential term, and would achieve the disarmament of militant groups along the Iraqi and Syrian border by offering a general amnesty and integrating them into society. With that, he might be able to dissolve the decade-long opposition bloc of the DEM Party and Peoples’ Republican Party (CHP) standing in the way of prolonging his tenure for the next term.
Indeed, Turkey has gained considerable leverage in the Middle East in the last few years and strengthened its position against the PKK. If the new peace plan is implemented successfully, it could improve the security situation in the border areas of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, while potentially pushing other U.S.-backed Kurdish militant groups to join the peace process and seek a broader amnesty.