True to his campaign promises, President Donald Trump has wasted no time wielding the full breadth of presidential power in his first month back in office. Through a flurry of executive orders and administrative purges, Trump has targeted everything from diversity and gender policies to foreign aid programs and federal civil service protections – moves framed as efforts to rescue a sinking ship of government inefficiency and obstruction.
Among these directives, Trump revisited the contentious issue of declassifying government records related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. This is a subject that has fueled conspiracy theories for decades and was partially addressed during Trump’s first term, when he authorized selective disclosures, deferring to intelligence agencies’ recommendations for certain redactions.
Trump’s recent executive order directed the prompt release of all remaining records related to the assassination of John F. Kennedy, as well as those pertaining to the deaths of former U.S. Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King Jr. Framed as a long-overdue step toward transparency, the order swept aside years of institutional caution. Intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA, have resisted full disclosure, arguing that certain redactions are necessary to protect sources, tradecraft, and foreign partnerships. Trump dismissed these concerns as no longer valid, declaring, “It’s been 60 years, time for the American people to know the TRUTH!”
The decision may seem like a victory for transparency, finally putting to rest the suspicions that federal agencies have long withheld the “truth.” But when viewed in a broader context, this executive order serves as a troubling reminder of presidential declassification powers.
The Presidential Power to Declassify
Rooted in the president’s Commander-in-Chief powers, the authority to classify and declassify information grants the president vast discretion, yet it operates with few statutory or procedural guardrails. While this flexibility is intended to allow for swift executive action in matters of national security, it leaves room for unilateral decisions that prioritize expedience or personal interest over sound policy.
Past presidents have cautiously wielded this authority, consulting with intelligence and law enforcement professionals to assess the potential risks of disclosure. For instance, President Barack Obama in 2016 initiated a comprehensive declassification project concerning human rights abuses during Argentina’s dictatorship. Designed to assist victims’ families and promote transparency, the effort involved multiple U.S. agencies and released thousands of documents, including intelligence and military records. The process, in which I came to be involved, was careful and methodical, involving extensive interagency coordination and reviews that prioritized protecting sensitive information while promoting accountability. The project unfolded over several years and was not completed until 2019.
In the lead-up to and following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Biden administration directed then Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines to carry out a careful review of the materials and offer recommendations for redactions – a process in which I was directly involved and observed firsthand. This process, refined for efficiency, was replicated with each subsequent release, ensuring that sensitive sources and methods information was protected while advancing strategic transparency while still revealing Moscow’s military buildup and strategy.
Trump’s approach to declassification during his first term reflected instincts for broad disclosures, tempered at times by institutional resistance and intelligence agency recommendations. In 2017, Trump directed the release of thousands of JFK-related documents, ultimately deferring to recommendations from the CIA and FBI to withhold certain records deemed sensitive to national security.
However, in 2018, Trump demonstrated a willingness to push declassification boundaries, ordering the release of sensitive materials related to the FBI’s investigation into Russian interference in the 2016 election. While intelligence agencies and allied nations raised concerns, resulting in a delay and partial release, Trump’s directive underscored his readiness to leverage declassification powers for political advantage.
The remarks of the then-former president prior to Trump’s 2024 reelection reflect an understanding of the vast authority afforded to the president in matters of classification, though his dismissiveness toward established processes underscores the risks of this unchecked power. In 2022, amidst growing scrutiny over his handling of classified documents at Mar-a-Lago, Trump told Fox News host Sean Hannity in an interview that declassification required no formal process. “There doesn’t have to be a process, as I understand it,” he said. “You’re the president of the United States, you can declassify just by saying it’s declassified, even by thinking about it,” Trump asserted.
While Trump’s comments were challenged by some legal experts at the time, they reflect an unsettling truth: a sitting president’s authority to declassify sensitive materials is constitutionally expansive. A president willing to disregard established norms and safeguards exposes a dangerous vulnerability in the governing structure. The absence of statutory guardrails ensures that the decision to defer to intelligence and law enforcement professionals remains a matter of presidential choice rather than obligation.
The Risks of Weaponizing Declassification
The president’s broad authority to declassify information poses a significant security vulnerability, especially when leveraged for personal or political gain. Trump’s threats against perceived adversaries, coupled with his grasp of declassification’s sweeping scope, underscore the danger of conflating transparency with partisan objectives.
Former Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe’s selective declassification of intelligence in September 2020 provides a critical example of how sensitive materials can be exploited for political gain. Just before the first presidential debate that year, Ratcliffe released ambiguous intelligence related to Russian reporting on alleged activities by Hillary Clinton’s campaign during the 2016 election. The intelligence community itself admitted that the information was unverified and possibly exaggerated or fabricated by the Russians. Despite this uncertainty, Ratcliffe’s declassification implied misconduct on behalf of the Clinton campaign, allowing partisan narratives to take root at a politically opportune moment. This misuse of intelligence –under the guise of transparency – demonstrates how selective declassification could mislead the public and harm institutional credibility.
The public release of sensitive intelligence concerning U.S. persons, collected under the pretext of foreign surveillance, represents a profound breach of legal and ethical norms. Collected to monitor foreign adversaries, this intelligence – if selectively declassified – carries the risk of being used in domestic political contexts. By publicly unmasking individuals through partial disclosures, a president can sidestep privacy protections and undermine the implicit compact that such intelligence will not be used for personal or political retribution. This danger parallels, but far exceeds, the controversy over internal unmasking, as public disclosures amplify reputational damage and compromise the very sources and methods relied upon for foreign intelligence collection.
The dangers of selective disclosures are even more severe when applied to classified information held by domestic agencies such as the Department of Justice. Sensitive documents from these institutions often include raw investigative details, confidential sources, and preliminary assessments. Selectively releasing such materials – particularly when omitting exculpatory evidence – could mislead the public, fostering perceptions of guilt or misconduct where none legally exists. This weaponization of information tarnishes individual reputations, undermines the credibility and integrity of critical national institutions, and ultimately erodes trust in their impartiality and effectiveness.
Trump appointees in the new administration have already signaled their willingness to follow politically-charged directives. These early indicators suggest agency leaders are less likely to resist politically motivated declassification decisions. With oversight mechanisms weakened and internal resistance fading, Trump faces little constraint in selectively declassifying sensitive information to serve personal or political objectives.
The precedent set by weaponized declassification threatens to erase institutional norms and entrench this behavior across future administrations. A system that permits selective exploitation of sensitive information risks becoming an enduring feature of presidential governance. Successive leaders could justify similar actions under the guise of transparency, turning what should be a safeguard of accountability into a routine mechanism for partisan advantage.
Such misuse of declassification power also compromises national security. Adversaries such as Russia and China excel at exploiting fragmented disclosures, piecing together declassified information to identify sources, tradecraft, and operational vulnerabilities. The exposure of sensitive intelligence not only undermines ongoing operations but also jeopardizes foreign partnerships, as allies may hesitate to share information for fear of its untimely or irresponsible declassification.
This trajectory would also threaten to normalize the erosion of trust in government institutions. In an era of increasing polarization, selective declassification could deepen divisions, discredit intelligence agencies, and fuel conspiracy theories – all while stifling legitimate efforts to improve transparency.
The irony is stark: declassification, a power designed to protect national security and foster accountability, could instead become a destabilizing force, magnifying public cynicism and institutional dysfunction.
Be Careful What You Wish For
Unlike the pardon power, which tends to provoke partisan controversy but carries limited institutional consequences, declassification has a uniquely destabilizing potential. It offers presidents the ability to reshape public narratives, discredit opponents, and even jeopardize national security under the guise of transparency.
As legal analyses have noted, no statutory or procedural requirements constrain a president’s ability to declassify information. Executive Order 13526, while setting standards for agency practices, imposes no binding constraints on the president. This lack of formal requirements underscores how declassification, even for the nation’s most sensitive information, remains a matter of executive choice rather than an obligation to follow best practices.
Trump has already signaled that legal precedent, executive norms, and even court rulings will not stand in his way. Congress could introduce reforms to mitigate these risks – such as requiring formal notifications to Congress detailing the date, scope, and consultations involved in any presidential declassification order, similar to covert action notifications. Yet even such measures would rely on the president’s willingness to comply. Judicial intervention could offer another check, but courts often act slowly, and by the time a ruling is issued, the damage from initial disclosures may already be done. Ultimately, without enforceable procedural safeguards, the responsible use of declassification hinges on presidential restraint – something Trump has demonstrated little inclination to observe.
A president intent on disregarding established norms could fundamentally reshape the classification system, turning what should be a safeguard for national security into a tool of political expedience. Trump’s willingness to test, and potentially disregard, judicial pushback risks cementing this dangerous precedent, normalizing executive overreach, and leaving future administrations with the power to exploit these unchecked vulnerabilities. U.S. alliances, institutions, safety and security will suffer as a result.
Editor’s note: This piece is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions