Three years ago this month, we saw the return of unfettered power politics to the international stage as Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and ill-conceived war of conquest and national annihilation against Ukraine. The primary objective of the post-1945 international system was, of course, to prevent just such a regression. The horrors that power politics and wars of conquest had wrought were still evident in the embers of a global conflagration, and in the ashes at Auschwitz-Birkenau and elsewhere.
Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 was therefore a systemic war, aimed at demolishing international law and norms that had for the most part restrained powerful States from changing borders and using force at their whim, even if it did not bring about the end of State-on-State conflict. The international response to this Russian assault is well-documented, and while uneven, there was a great coalition of States and peoples that demanded an end to the war, restoration of lawful borders, justice for victims, and reparations for damages.
All this has now been upturned by the new American president, as he expresses his own desires of conquest using coercion or outright military force, aimed at longstanding allies no less, and even as he talks of a vague plan to end the war in Ukraine that in reality sounds like a capitulation to Russia. This has been coupled with verbalized fantasies of ethnically cleansing millions of Palestinians, an idea that has been met by mewling criticism rather than the international outrage such ideas deserve. The president has given an invaluable gift to the West’s adversaries in the Kremlin and strategic competitors in Beijing. No longer does the United States make any pretense of a moral high ground, and of defending an international rules-based order. A debate the West was struggling to win in the Global South has now been seriously undermined. And Chinese President Xi Jinping’s planned use of military force to capture Taiwan has basically been pre-emptively endorsed.
The Nordic countries, long among America’s most steadfast allies and all full members of NATO (two of them, Finland and Sweden, in response to Putin’s invasion), are now faced with navigating this difficult new geopolitical landscape. Alongside the three Baltic States, they are collectively raising their voices bilaterally and multilaterally in defense of the post-1945 order, international law, and international humanitarian law. They are no mere gadflies however. They’ve been leading supporters of Ukraine throughout and collectively have formidable military capabilities, participating regularly in NATO collective defense operations. As a group of closely aligned like-minded States, they have an important role to play in this emerging multipolar era of instability.
Trump 2.0
None of the actions or statements of the new U.S. president are surprising. In fact, they are entirely consistent with the perspective of someone who sees the world very much through a 19th century lens of “might makes right,” in which great powers should not be constrained by alliances, rules or collections of small States. Someone who considers the NATO Alliance as a protection racket run by the United States, where the protected are behind in their payments. This was clearly reflected in new Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s remarks in Brussels this past week at a NATO meeting of the Ukraine Contact Group. Ironically, this thinking echoes best in the words of Pompey, who played a crucial role in turning a Roman republic into an empire, who according to Plutarch said “Cease quoting laws to us that have swords girt about us!”
The key difference now is that the administration, and rapidly the bureaucracy of U.S. government, is being taken over by avowed loyalists who do not question the direction of the commander in chief, whatever the guardrails of law or even the Constitution. Here, there is no Bismarck to Trump’s William II, doing his best to limit the worst, most rash, impulses and steady the ship.
All this, coupled with the Defense Secretary’s comments last week stating that the U.S. is “prioritizing” away from European security, will have the effect of diminishing the U.S. position at the heart of Western security cooperation. It will, of course, also increase the likelihood of wars of territorial expansion, with human rights concerns thrown to the winds.
Nordic Responses
Even if the worst threats do not materialize, including the use of military force against allies, in addition to the economic force already delivered, the effect of weakening alliances has already materialized. NATO allies and other US allies are talking amongst themselves and considering how they respond to an unreliable – and sometimes even hostile – America. That this is happening as war rages in Europe raises the stakes unbearably.
Serving as a diplomat in Washington at the beginning of Trump’s previous term, I observed, and was privy to, how the Nordic countries navigated a difficult time when an unpredictable president made outlandish claims or expressed dangerous policy goals affecting the Nordic countries. This included a head-scratching statement about something terrible happening in Sweden that sent diplomats and officials scrambling to understand what was being referred to, and how to respond, or not. In the end, Sweden saw this as a public diplomacy opportunity, and while never mentioning the president or engaging head-to-head with his false remarks, focused its information efforts in the United States on the stability and rule of law in Sweden.
Denmark was put under greater stress when, during that term, Trump first articulated his desire to add Greenland to the United States, in what he proposed as a mutually-agreeable “real estate deal.” Greenlandic and Danish authorities rejected outright any such ideas at the time , leading to Trump cancelling a planned visit to Denmark in a fit of pique, but seemingly having no additional impact. The Danish response was fairly straightforward, as Trump was proposing to come to some sort of agreement about a purchase, echoing William Seward’s “nearly completed” negotiations in 1868 to purchase Greenland and Iceland from Denmark.
The stakes now are considerably higher, as Trump has said he wants Greenland by hook or by crook, threatening force both economic and military. The Danish Prime Minister has apparently learned her lesson from a troubled and “horrendous” phone call with Trump demanding to buy Greenland a few days prior to his inauguration, and is now pursuing a more quiet strategy of closing ranks with European allies. The strategy seems to be to take steps to secure Greenland militarily and politically, rather than engaging in direct verbal confrontation with Trump. European leaders and diplomats are now, no doubt, engaged in an effort to defuse the situation and quietly explain the problematic optics and realities of illegal land grabs in general and among allies in particular.
My country, Iceland, was fortunate that it never made it to Trump’s teleprompter or thinking during his first term in office. Generally, the government and embassy in Washington pursued a “head below parapet” strategy, trying to keep good working-level relations, but staying off the agenda as much as possible. Iceland did, however, receive unusual high-profile attention through visits by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Vice President Mike Pence in 2019. These visits were aimed at cementing an Icelandic decision not to partner with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, a decision that was never in the cards in reality. Nevertheless, it meant that Iceland, once a joint target for U.S. purchase in the 19th century, was finding itself uncomfortably on the agenda.
The security of Iceland, the only NATO ally without its own armed forces, is guaranteed by a bilateral 1951 Defense Agreement with the United States, an agreement that remained in place after the departure of permanently stationed U.S. forces in 2006. U.S. forces have returned on a rotational basis to the North Atlantic island nation in recent years in response to increased Russian naval operations. In addition to having no armed forces, Iceland contributes little to its own defense, essentially outsourcing it to the United States and other NATO allies in exchange for their presence for their own security interests. That dependency is a potential point of vulnerability were it to become the focus of a U.S. administration asking allies to spend as much as 5 percent of GDP on defense. It would be prudent for Iceland to articulate to the United States and NATO allies how it is evolving and elevating its defense efforts and the contributions it makes and plans to make to collective alliance security.
Allied and Nordic Strategies Going Forward
Generally, all the same tools of diplomacy and statecraft will continue to be applied by the Nordics. The stakes are considerably higher now that Trump is able to wield U.S. power seemingly without restraint, given a loyal interagency and a largely beholden Republican majority in Congress.
The Nordic countries should — and likely will — pursue a diplomatic version of what British interwar military thinker B.H. Liddell-Hart termed “the indirect approach.” That is to say they will seek to impact U.S. foreign policy and mitigate any hostile action through a mix of dialogue and collective action, rather than engage in head-on conflict with the United States. Here the Danish prime minister’s request that NATO and the EU not come loudly to the defense of Denmark is telling. It shows that the approach is mitigation and deflection rather than conflict. The key element of success there will be the extent to which countries in Trump’s crosshairs can quietly rally the support and diplomatic pressure of allies, while avoiding becoming isolated or engaging in direct argument and confrontation.
Were the current administration to resort to actual use of force against NATO allies, we would of course find ourselves in entirely uncharted waters, with all strategies needing to be revised and concerted allied action required. While such a scenario may be unlikely, it’s nevertheless an important strategic problem that should spur European States to plan and develop possible responses.
For Iceland — and Norway to a lesser extent — who both rely on a U.S.-led NATO for their security, this also means that other alliance options will be explored and evaluated. Iceland entered EU accession talks in 2009 motivated by economic security concerns following the catastrophic impact of the global economic crisis. In 2025, the calculation of potential EU membership for Iceland is as much one of security as economic concerns. The EU has a collective security clause, which Iceland may see as a useful insurance policy were NATO to weaken considerably. In fact, the new Icelandic government, formed in December, has promised to hold a 2027 national referendum on restarting accession.
As mentioned, all of this is already having the impact of weakening the position of the United States at the heart of the Western-led international system, where a complete lack of soft power considerations threatens to collapse the architecture that has ensured U.S. primacy since 1945 – much more so than U.S. military power.
Perhaps the most interesting development is the emergence of the so-called NB8 (Nordic-Baltic 8) group of countries as a force to be reckoned with in international affairs. These are the five Nordics and three Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), all of which have emerged as both decisive and determined in their support for Ukraine and in their resistance to Russian aggression and hybrid warfare tactics. In relative and absolute terms, these eight countries lead the way, on a per capita basis, in supporting Ukraine militarily and economically. Within NATO, following the accession of Finland and Sweden, this is particularly pertinent.
The NB8 is an informal grouping that has had a greater role thrust upon it by political turmoil among other leading powers. With Germany in the throes of an election campaign culminating on Feb. 23, France significantly weakened by inner political turmoil, and the U.K. perpetually unmoored by the impact of Brexit, the NB8 have become a beacon of stability and steadfast leadership in Europe.
The region’s economic power and resilience combines with significant defense industries and forces and a fiscal position that is world-leading, and all that is compounded by a culture of innovation, strong social support systems, and free-market thinking. It would make eminent strategic sense for the United States to remain on their good side, to the extent possible, as they have all collectively been among the most steadfast U.S. allies. It is hard to see the upside of alienating the NB8, which certainly would be more likely with loose and irresponsible talk that raises harrowing memories of Nazi Germany’s 1938 annexation of Austria — a kind of Greenland-Anschluss that should continue to be unthinkable.