In his first few hours in office, President Donald Trump issued an executive order initiating a process for designating international drug cartels and other transnational organizations as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs).
The order could have several potential positive outcomes. First, and foremost, it provides enhanced legal tools for law enforcement to freeze assets, impose sanctions, and prosecute individuals and entities aiding cartels. Cartels move billions of dollars annually, with much of this cash passing through the legitimate banking system. The new designations allow authorities to immediately freeze assets tied to these organizations, thereby forcing financial institutions to scrutinize transactions more closely and disrupting cartels’ ability to operate and fund illegal activities, including money laundering.
The order will undoubtably promote greater interagency collaboration between entities such as the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Treasury Department, as well as other agencies across the intelligence community to combat cartels as a unified front. The enhanced intelligence sharing and operational coordination between federal, state, and local agencies is much needed. It is an issue that I have repeatedly discussed with lawmakers.
The Trump administration’s approach also focuses more attention on the ways in which cartels exploit our porous southern border. By linking cartel activities to national security threats, the executive order makes combating these organizations a whole-of-government priority. It provides greater impetus for lawmakers and federal agencies to improve border security measures and coordination as part of a broader national security strategy.
However, the executive order has several potential downsides as well. While the intent of the order is to enhance national security, its broad designation and timing raise significant concerns about its impact on homeland security operations. The order also creates potential legal repercussions for certain state and local authorities, as well as individual U.S. persons (USPERs), while also straining already stretched counterterrorism (CT), intelligence, and law enforcement resources.
Broad Application and Overreach
The executive order’s expansive criteria encompass not only major drug cartels but also other transnational entities such as Tren de Aragua (TdA) and La Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13), as well as other groups yet to be designated. This broad categorization risks conflating criminal enterprises with terrorist organizations, thereby blurring the lines between distinct threats. The U.S. Department of State defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.” Applying this definition to profit-driven criminal enterprises may lead to overreach, misallocation of resources, and overreporting of terrorist activities.
The executive order introduces significant challenges for so-called “sanctuary cities” that do not cooperate with federal immigration enforcement. These cities often refuse to provide information about undocumented individuals within their jurisdictions, prioritizing local governance and community trust over federal objectives. However, under the new framework, their non-cooperation could be interpreted as indirectly shielding individuals affiliated with designated terrorist organizations. Even worse, individuals (including elected officials) or organizations, such as non-profits that provide human services to members or associates of newly designated groups, may be accused of providing “material support” to terrorists. Federal authorities could argue that by failing to share information or detain individuals for ICE, these organizations and individuals are enabling cartel (now terrorist) members or associates to evade detection. This raises an alarming possibility: Cities, officials, or nonprofit organizations simply providing social services to the same individuals that cartels prey on, might face accusations of indirectly providing “material support” to terrorists — a legal designation with severe penalties under U.S. federal law.
Imagine a scenario in which hospital workers find jihadi propaganda and other incriminating articles in the possession of a trauma victim, and then contact law enforcement. Now imagine that this patient has TdA body markings and trappings. Would the hospital staff be charged with providing “material support” to a designated entity if they did not report this individual to authorities?
Negative Consequences for U.S. Persons
Designating cartels and smaller gangs as FTOs or SDGTs imposes stringent legal restrictions, including prohibitions on providing “material support or resources” to designated entities. The term “material support” is broadly defined and can encompass activities such as providing legal assistance, humanitarian aid, or even engaging in certain forms of speech. This broad definition raises concerns about potential infringements on First Amendment rights and the criminalization of activities that were previously lawful and seen as benevolent by law and society.
Cartel members and those affiliated with them are not the flashy, gun-toting, jewelry-laden, attention-seeking “Narcos” that Hollywood portrays them to be. In the United States, like terrorists, they employ sophisticated tradecraft that enables them to blend into a community and become invisible. They may work regular jobs consistent with their immigration status and have family members who have little to no idea about their illegal dealings. Importantly, cartels often coerce or threaten individuals into providing services for them, often through threats of violence or by kidnapping of extended family members who reside in Latin America.
U.S. persons with familial or social ties to individuals associated with these organizations may face increased scrutiny, leading to potential violations of their privacy and civil liberties. Such persons could be placed in the U.S. government Terrorist Screening Database (also known as the terrorist watchlist), and potentially even the “No Fly” list.
These implications may extend to individuals or entities that employ, house, or otherwise engage with people loosely affiliated with cartels. Unsuspecting employers who hire undocumented workers without verifying their backgrounds (or who provide false identification) could be exposed to accusations of indirectly supporting cartel-linked activities, even if they are unaware of such connections. Similarly, landlords or organizations providing housing to individuals with past or current ties to cartels could find themselves under scrutiny. While these situations may not necessarily meet the legal standard for “material support,” the broad interpretation of this term under terrorism statutes poses potential legal jeopardy during an administration that belligerently seeks to stamp out most forms of immigration and crime. Even the perception of association with FTO-designated groups could lead to investigations, asset freezes, and reputational harm, complicating the efforts of sanctuary cities, as well as private citizens and organizations, to balance humanitarian concerns with compliance under an increasingly draconian legal framework. What’s more, the expansive liability risks for individuals under the material support laws may deter them from cooperating with law enforcement and immigration authorities on other matters.
Dilution of the Counterterrorism (CT) Mission and Resource Strain
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, it is estimated that the U.S. government spent upwards of $1 trillion on the Department of Homeland Security alone between 2002 and 2021. That figure balloons to over $5.8 trillion when factoring in the direct and indirect costs of prosecuting the “War on Terror,” including long-term treatment of injured servicemembers, and funds spent on reconstruction and humanitarian aid.
And yet, Americans still experience numerous acts of terrorism on the home front, including most notably the 2013 Boston Marathon Bombing, the 2015 San Bernadino attack that killed 14, the 2016 Orlando Nightclub shooting that left 49 dead, the 2017 NYC Truck attack that killed 8 and, most recently, the New Orleans New Year truck attack that left 14 dead.
Expanding the scope of FTO and SDGT designations to include profit-driven drug cartels and other criminal organizations risks diluting the focus of U.S. CT efforts on transnational threats. Any CT expert will tell you that not all terrorist groups are created equal. None of my former colleagues or counterparts have indicated that they have enough resources to manage the existing terrorist threat, let alone an expanded one.
Counterterrorism agencies at the federal, state, and local level, are already tasked with monitoring and combating ideologically driven terrorist threats. They will likely find their resources stretched thin by the need to address the activities of cartels. This reallocation and reprioritization of resources could lead to decreased effectiveness in preventing attacks from traditional terrorist groups. In just the first few weeks of the new Trump administration, FBI agents who would otherwise be tasked with CT efforts have been repurposed to support highly publicized, “made for television” immigration raids conducted by DHS Homeland Security Investigation (HIS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). Recent raids in suburban Denver were conducted by dozens of heavily armed federal agents in armored vehicles and accompanied by Tom Homan, Trump’s border czar, as well as a Fox News crew. These supposedly surprise raids were met with protestors and local media that were apparently pre-staged at every stop, and may have netted just one suspected TdA member out of 30 arrests.
Additionally, the intelligence and law enforcement communities will face challenges in prioritizing threats, as the motivations and operational structures of drug cartels differ significantly from those of terrorist organizations. This is particularly true at the state and local level, where various elected officials will prioritize anti-cartel efforts based on a political calculus, rather than an analysis of the existing threat environment. The result will be that in states and localities where the elected executive is aligned with the White House, law enforcement and intelligence resources could become mired in operations against illegal migrants to ferret out cartel members that, while dangerous, do not pose the same level of threat to national security as ideologically motivated terrorists.
Americans need to be clear: While cartels are violent, malignant organizations that peddle poison and drive crime in local communities, they are at their core, profit-driven criminal enterprises. On the other hand, transnational terrorist groups have a singular core mission: apocalyptic violence. To place cartels in the same basket as Daesh (the so-called Islamic State), or Al Qaeda is a fallacy that not even a junior counter-programs analysis would make.
First Mexican Cartels, Next Domestic Groups?
Trump’s designation of Mexican drug cartels as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) raises the possibility that similar actions could be taken against other, domestic groups. In the past, Trump has expressed his intent to label left-wing groups as terrorist organizations. For instance, in May 2020, he announced plans to designate Antifa as a terrorist organization along with the cartels. However, experts have pointed out that the U.S. lacks a legal framework for designating domestic groups as terrorist organizations, as current laws only provide for the designation of foreign entities. Then on Jan. 5, 2021, he issued a presidential memorandum charging the Secretary of State “whether to classify Antifa as a terrorist organization” under immigration laws.
In addition to Antifa, other domestic groups could be labeled as terrorist organizations as well. For example, in 2019, a Senate resolution was introduced calling for the designation of groups operating under the banner of Antifa as domestic terrorist organizations. A similar bill followed in the House in 2023. The U.S. currently has no domestic terrorist organizations designated or labeled by the Department of Justice, only foreign organizations. Such a designation creates a slippery slope, long debated by practitioners and academics, as crossing a sort of “Political Rubicon,” from which there is no return. Not even the infamous KKK organization, our nation’s first domestic terrorist organization, has received such a designation, even though it has continued to operate dozens of chapters across the country.
While Antifa was conspicuously left out of this executive order, Americans need not be reminded that Trump should be taken at his word. I fully expect it to be the first domestic terror group designated under this administration, as there is growing interest in Congress to apply terrorist labels to domestic entities.
Designating Antifa or any domestic group as a terrorist organization carries significant constitutional, legal, and societal risks. Such a designation could set a dangerous precedent for government overreach, potentially undermining First Amendment protections of free speech and association by criminalizing broad ideological movements rather than specific violent actions. It may also lead to selective enforcement, where political opponents or activist groups are unfairly targeted, exacerbating social polarization and eroding trust in law enforcement.
In addition, without clear legal criteria, the terrorist label could be misused to justify surveillance, arrests, and the suppression of dissent, chilling legitimate protest and activism. Historically, CT activities in the U.S have been disproportionately applied to marginalized communities, raising concerns about civil liberties and due process. An example of this is the NYPD’s post 9/11 spying activities on dozens of mosques, restaurants and schools in New York and New Jersey. Ultimately, the public is our most effective counterterrorism asset. If we want citizens to “See Something, Say Something,” then CT efforts should focus on prosecuting unlawful violent behavior rather than labeling domestic groups as terrorist organizations, which risks weaponizing national security measures for political purposes.
Recommendations for Minimizing Negative Consequences
While most homeland security experts agree that cartels and transnational gangs should be combatted with a whole-of-government approach, there is no consensus on how to do so.
The following steps could mitigate the potential adverse effects of this executive order:
- Establish Clear Criteria for Designation: Develop and publicize specific guidelines that delineate the characteristics distinguishing terrorist organizations from criminal enterprises. This clarity will help ensure that only groups meeting a well-defined threshold are designated, preventing overreach.
- Safeguard Civil Liberties: Implement oversight mechanisms to protect U.S. persons from unwarranted surveillance or legal action. This includes providing clear definitions of “material support” and ensuring that activities such as legal representation and humanitarian aid are not unjustly penalized.
- Allocate Resources Strategically: Ensure that counterterrorism agencies receive additional funding and personnel to manage the expanded scope of their responsibilities. This approach will help prevent the dilution of efforts against traditional terrorist threats.
- Enhance Interagency Collaboration: Foster cooperation between agencies specializing in counterterrorism and those focused on combating organized crime. Such collaboration will facilitate the sharing of expertise and resources, leading to more effective strategies.
- Regular Review and Assessment: Establish a framework for the periodic review of designated organizations to assess whether they continue to meet the criteria for FTO or SDGT status. This process will help prevent outdated or inappropriate designations from persisting.
- Focus on Prevention and Rehabilitation: Invest in programs addressing the socioeconomic drivers of cartel recruitment and demand for illicit goods. This includes drug treatment, efforts at countering human trafficking, and stemming the flow of illegal arms from the U.S. to Mexico.
- Designate Illicit Fentanyl as a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD): Because it is. Fentanyl is approximately 50 times more potent than heroin and 100 times more potent than morphine. Just an amount small enough to fit on the tip of a pencil is considered a potentially lethal dose. If developed into a weapon by terrorists, hundreds if not thousands could die. Such a classification would mobilize a coordinated response from multiple federal agencies and enable a more comprehensive strategy to prevent the proliferation of this lethal substance. This approach enjoys widespread bipartisan support in Congress, as evidenced by House Resolution 1172.
- Strike a Balance Between Homeland Security and the Protection of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL): The relationship between security and CRCL has always been one of friction and a need for equilibrium. The administration and policymakers should focus on targeted, behavior-based law enforcement approaches rather than broad ideological designations. Security measures must be grounded in clear legal frameworks that prioritize prosecuting unlawful actions while safeguarding constitutional rights, such as free speech and assembly. Oversight mechanisms, including independent reviews and transparency in counterterrorism policies, should be strengthened to prevent government overreach and ensure accountability. Additionally, engaging with civil society organizations and affected communities can help build trust, mitigate bias in enforcement, and ensure that security strategies do not disproportionately impact specific groups.
By upholding due process and emphasizing the rule of law, homeland security efforts can be both effective and aligned with democratic values, preventing the misuse of national security powers while addressing legitimate threats.
The opioid crisis continues to exact a devastating toll on the United States, with synthetic opioids, particularly fentanyl, driving a significant increase in overdose deaths. In 2023, the U.S. recorded over 100,000 drug overdose fatalities, marking a slight decrease from the previous year but still reflecting a national security and public heath challenge. Synthetic opioids were involved in nearly 70% of these deaths, underscoring the role that transnational gangs and cartels play in the deaths of American citizens.
While I applaud the president’s immediate, whole-of-government focus on these dangerous organizations, which wreak havoc on our society, such a broad policy will have a wide-ranging and unnecessary impact. Without careful deliberation, implementation and oversight, the order could infringe upon the rights of U.S. persons, strain counterterrorism resources, and blur the distinction between diverse types of threats. The administration should work carefully and deliberately toward achieving its security objectives while minimizing harmful outcomes.
(Editor’s note: This article is part of the Collection: Just Security’s Coverage of the Trump Administration’s Executive Actions.)