The collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime after 13 years of uprisings marked a turning point in Syria’s history. The rapid and unexpected advancement of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), the Syrian National Army (SNA), and southern opposition forces — achieved through unprecedented coordination and minimal resistance — has profoundly altered the political and security landscape of the country. The rebels’ victory raises questions about Syria’s future governance, security dynamics, and reconstruction. It has also brought the fate of millions of refugees to the forefront of several countries’ domestic policy agendas. While many Syrians desire to return to the country, they continue to face significant risks and uncertainties.
More than 5 million refugees live in neighboring countries: Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, and Egypt. Approximately one million refugees are in Germany and 6.8 million are internally displaced. On December 9, just one day after the final collapse of the Assad regime, the German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees declared that all pending asylum applications submitted by Syrians would be suspended. Other EU countries quickly followed suit.
Research has consistently demonstrated that many Syrians wish to return to their homeland. Indeed, refugees formed long lines at Syria’s border crossing with Turkey shortly after Assad’s ouster. In addition, Syrian refugees regularly express a desire to return during interviews, and many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned to their homes since the first weeks of December.
However, our research has consistently shown that while many Syrians have a long-term aspiration to return, persistent challenges have rendered their aspiration unachievable in the short-term. Our findings are consistent with studies from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which has likewise documented the many challenges Syrians face. Undoubtedly, the continued presence of the Assad regime served as a major obstacle, significantly hindering the realization of the aspiration to return. But it is still unclear whether the departure of Assad alone is enough for large-scale, safe, and sustainable returns.
We interviewed 87 Syria returnees across various regions of Syria between February and April 2024. The interviews revealed the critical challenges and complex realities regarding reintegration and governance. Our findings highlight a pervasive lack of trust in political actors, transcending the areas formerly under regime control. Although our research predates the fall of Assad, the data provides critical insights into the actors and governance models emerging in the post-Assad context.
Can the New Actors Be Trusted?: Insights from Syrian Returnees
A majority of the returnees we interviewed, 51 out of 87 (or 58.6 percent of the total), reported that they did not feel as though they have a voice in society or that their interests are represented. Therefore, a significant portion of the population feels marginalized or disenfranchised regarding societal participation and representation. A majority of respondents, 49 out of 87 (or 56.3 percent), also believed that the political systems in Syria are not inclusive at all. This is important because the actors who now claim a hold on power have already ruled in different parts of Syria for some time.
In Turkish-controlled areas, for instance, distrust among Arab returnees is particularly pronounced, with 60 percent reporting no trust at all in local authorities. Similarly, significant skepticism exists among Turkmen returnees, with 55 percent expressing low or no trust in these authorities (35 percent low trust, and 20 percent no trust).
Our interviews across Syria also underscore the widespread experiences of discrimination, injustice, and violence faced by returnees. Notably, 50.6 percent of respondents reported encountering such treatment, indicating substantial barriers to a safe and dignified reintegration. Furthermore, the ability to exercise rights varied significantly across regions and ethnic groups. While Kurdish-controlled areas had the highest proportion of respondents feeling fully able to exercise their rights, Arab returnees in Turkish-controlled areas reported the least confidence, with 21.1 percent stating they were unable to exercise their rights at all. In contrast, Turkmen in these areas appeared relatively optimistic, with no interviewees reporting a complete inability to exercise rights, though 46.7 percent indicated only limited capacity.
Moreover, economic hardship remains a pervasive challenge for returnees, compounded by safety concerns, widespread corruption, the prevalence of checkpoints, and the informal governance structures that dominate several areas. While Assad’s departure has changed the political landscape, it is unlikely that entrenched structural challenges will be resolved soon. The continued presence of competing authorities raises the risk of new internal conflicts and power struggles, which could perpetuate violence and undermine prospects for a cohesive recovery.
Simply put, expecting the existing problems to be resolved solely through Assad’s removal is unrealistic. There is little evidence to suggest that Syria will follow a unique or distinct path compared to similar cases. As in many comparable examples, achieving a certain level of stability requires significantly more time.
Syria is Still Not a Safe Country
Syrians fled not only because of Assad’s oppressive regime but also due to the war, which intensified and expanded with the involvement of various regional actors, as well as the extensive destruction it has caused. While the end of Assad’s rule may symbolically signal freedom for those oppressed for decades, it does not yet translate into a secure or stable environment due to geopolitical and economic stressors. Even in the absence of Assad, the prospect for continued violence remains high, and the aftermath of destruction remains palpable.
For years, Syria had been characterized by fragmented control, with Assad’s regime governing only about 60 percent of the territory while several other distinct political and military entities competed for influence. Despite a decline in large-scale violence in recent years, Syria remained a “failed state,” plagued by insecurity, economic collapse, and widespread distrust of its various governing authorities. This fragmentation places Syria among the world’s most fragile states.
Even though a small number of displaced persons have returned since 2019, trust in local administrations across all regions was remarkably low, primarily due to: 1) the proliferation of armed groups and persistent intergroup conflicts and 2) economic challenges exacerbated by external interventions.
The recent removal of Assad and the waning influence of actors like Russia and Iran represent significant shifts. However, these developments have also introduced new complexities, including Turkey’s increasing presence, Israel’s incursion from the south, and the potential for greater U.S. involvement. Therefore, the path Syria will take post-Assad remains unclear. Factors such as the presence of armed groups, the extent of economic and physical destruction, and ongoing security challenges continue to be significant obstacles to refugee returns.
With Assad’s departure, the risk of returnees facing regime-led security interrogations or being detained for their previous opposition may have diminished. However, dozens of armed groups continue to operate and engage in active conflict. For instance, clashes between the SNA and Kurdish groups persist, and some pro-regime groups remain disoriented and uncertain about their next moves. Therefore, the international community must recognize that on-the-ground reporting reveals a stark reality – one that contradicts the notion that Syria is a “safe country.”
Two Types of Motivations for Returnees
While some returns are taking place, it is crucial to distinguish between two types of motivations: (1) genuine aspirations to return as part of a life plan and (2) a desire to return due to failed or denied integration into the host community. This distinction is particularly relevant for returns from neighboring countries, where prolonged legal insecurity, lack of safety, an inability to access the labor market (including due to a deteriorating economic situation in the host countries), or family separation can foster a sense of having nothing to lose by returning. Unexpected political changes in Syria have triggered spontaneous returns driven by family reasons and optimism. However, our research and current observations indicate that the majority of returnees belong to the second category.
It is also important to note that returning to insecure regions remains infeasible for many, especially those without ties to influential groups or networks. Individuals with strong connections to active armed groups are more likely to consider and act on the option to return.
For returns to be feasible and sustainable, a comprehensive reconstruction process is essential — one that not only rebuilds material infrastructure but also addresses the socio-economic and psychological scars of displacement. Immediate and impulsive individual returns were typical in many previous post-conflict cases and reflect natural human reactions. However, without deeper, long-term investments in rebuilding and reconciliation, such returns risk being temporary and precarious.
The Example of Bosnia
Sustainability is not easy, as previous repatriation processes, such as in Bosnia (1995-96), have demonstrated. The actual return and repatriation figures in the Bosnian case fell far short of expectations, and additional displacements happened due to the transfer of territories. A substantial number of the repatriating Bosnian refugees were not able to return to former homes upon arrival because of war damage or occupation by others. While some of the repatriating refugees arrived with resources or were offered cash assistance for returns, many required additional funds to be able to meet daily costs.
The lessons learned from the Bosnian case are that policies and assistance programs should capitalize on skills and continued transnational engagement, particularly for young refugees. Repatriation of Syrians could be even more challenging due to severe problems with food security and high inflation, as well as the presence of large numbers of IDPs relying on humanitarian assistance and the ongoing issue of demographic change.
Conclusion
In the months to come, sustainable returns will depend on several critical factors: the provision of security, sufficient funding for reconstruction, and the performance of political actors, including their ability to build trust and establish mechanisms to protect human rights. Without these conditions, large-scale and sustainable returns are unlikely to materialize. It is far too early to draw definitive conclusions at this stage, but the initial several weeks of experience already suggest that an inclusive structure is unlikely to emerge. Unfortunately, it may take at least six months — or even longer —before a clearer picture unfolds.
Even in the regions they governed for years, HTS and other groups faced significant trust issues, raising serious doubts about how they will shape Syria’s future. How much of the spirit of the 2011 uprisings, which began with great hope and a call for democracy, do these actors still represent? The extent to which the current players on the ground represent the ideals of those uprisings is highly questionable.
The legacy of the young democracy advocates who ignited the flames of revolution in Daraa and Homs 13 years ago, many of whom endured years of torture and deprivation of sunlight in regime prisons, as well as countless others who lost their lives, now stands at a critical crossroads. Will the values for which they made the ultimate sacrifice define the future, or will a new authoritarian regime rise in place of Assad’s government? Only time will provide the answer.