The January 15 ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas presents the best, though precarious, opportunity to end the war in Gaza and secure the release of remaining Israeli hostages after 15 months of conflict. Even a temporary cessation of hostilities, allowing for the liberation of hostages and a surge in life-saving humanitarian assistance to Gaza, is a welcome reprieve from the horrors and sacrifices of warfare. While continuation of the ceasefire beyond the 42-day first stage is possible, it is by no means probable given the political interests of the Israeli government and Hamas’s continued recalcitrance. The implementation of the second stage of the agreement, or even just continued calm, likely depends on whether President Donald Trump is prepared to intervene forcefully to keep the peace.
What does the agreement entail and why is it structured this way?
The ceasefire agreement, which President Biden said is nearly identical to what he outlined on May 31, 2024, is divided into three stages of six weeks each, consisting of incremental, reciprocal steps. In the first stage, there will be an immediate cessation of hostilities; IDF redeployment outside of populated areas, with the temporary exceptions of the Philadelphi and Netzarim corridors and a buffer zone along the border; the release of 33 Israeli hostages out of the nearly 100 left in Gaza, in exchange for a set ratio of Palestinian prisoners on an established schedule; and a major surge of humanitarian assistance. Negotiations on the conditions to transition into stage 2 are to begin no later than day 16 and conclude by the end of the fifth week, agreement on which is necessary to move to stage 2.
In the second stage, the remainder of the living Israeli hostages will be released in exchange for more Palestinian prisoners. The IDF will complete its full withdrawal from Gaza, at which point the ceasefire would become permanent.
Finally, stage three involves the return of deceased Israelis and the launch of a major international reconstruction campaign to rebuild Gaza’s decimated economy and infrastructure.
This multi-phase package leaves major questions unaddressed or unresolved, but the structure reflects compromises that were deemed necessary to the meet the specific requirements of Israel and Hamas. For Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the lack of automaticity between stages assuages the most extremist members of his coalition who want to resume the war until “total victory,” defined as the complete destruction or capitulation of Hamas.
As for the Hamas leadership, metering out the release of Israeli hostages, the terrorist group’s most precious asset, creates an incentive for Israel to continue complying with the deal. In other words, the agreement relies on strategic ambiguity to massage irreconcilable positions: the Israeli government’s desire to continue the war and retain control of Gaza and Hamas’s refusal to free Israeli hostages unless the war ends and the IDF fully evacuates.
Why did the agreement finally come to fruition eight months after it was first introduced?
This question is inseparable from the related matter of who deserves credit for the deal. In short, both the Biden Administration and the Trump Administration are responsible, and they should share in the commendations. It is not a coincidence that the agreement was sealed shortly before the inauguration of Trump, who made clear that he wanted the war to end before his second presidential term commenced. According to Arab diplomats, Steve Witkoff, Trump’s Special Envoy for the Middle East, applied substantial pressure on Netanyahu to agree after temporizing with the Biden Administration for months.
Trump, for his part, threatened Hamas that “all hell will break loose” if it did not sign the deal. Hamas may have had reason not take such a warning from the infamously impulsive president lightly. It is possible that the Biden Administration could have pressed Netanyahu and Hamas to seal agreement on the proposal months earlier had it effectively used these same sources of leverage, avoiding additional destruction and loss of life.
Yet, it would be premature to conclude that President Trump simply played his hand better than did President Biden. The reality is that Trump began with a stronger hand for reasons that have little to do with the diplomatic acumen of the two presidents. Netanyahu likely appreciated that, due to the Republican party’s cult-like devotion to Trump, he could not outmaneuver the incoming president in the U.S. domestic political arena by pitting Republicans against Democrats. Moreover, Israeli officials have high hopes regarding what is possible with Trump in the West Bank and vis-a-vis Iran, leaving them loath to pick a fight with him before he even took office. Netanyahu needs Trump for reasons of politics and statecraft, while the inverse is not true.
At the same time, Trump’s personal desire for a ceasefire would not have been sufficient to clinch a deal. Notwithstanding Netanyahu’s dependence on Trump in the ways mentioned above, he could not simply agree to any proposal the United States and other mediators tabled. Without the dogged, thankless work of the Biden Administration for over half a year, there would have been no agreement to sign. Securing Hezbollah’s exit from the war helped to isolate Hamas, while the killing of Yahya Sinwar removed an obstruction to a deal. Reported assurances from both Biden and Trump that Israel could resume the war if negotiations on stage 2 were unsuccessful gave Netanyahu comfort that he would have some degree of bipartisan support for Israel’s position should Israel return to its military campaign.
The achievement of the ceasefire was a rare display of bipartisanship in a time of extreme polarization and a stark contract with how the Reagan administration approached the hostages in Iran in 1981, when the incoming President’s team arranged for Iran to delay the release of the hostages until after he was sworn in to deny President Jimmy Carter any credit.
What are the obstacles to completing the first stage of the ceasefire?
The primary obstacle to implementation is meeting the expectations of the parties and the publics. We still do not have a reliable estimate for how many of the hostages are still alive. If most of the hostages return to Israel in body bags, that could reinforce a desire for revenge, causing more Israelis to back the resumption of hostilities even if other hostages remain in Gaza. It also is unclear how many hostages are in the physical custody of Hamas rather than other militant groups. Hamas has succeeded in securing custody of other hostages previously, but any delays in transfer, let alone outright refusal, could scuttle the agreement.
Conversely, the safe return of living hostages in the first phase could create public pressure on the Netanyahu government to continue to a second phase that would see the return of all remaining hostages. The timely release of living Israeli hostages is not only a moral obligation but also practically necessary for the success of the ceasefire. Hamas’s failure to release one female hostage, Arbel Yehud, in the second round of exchanges prompted Israel to delay the return of Palestinians to Northern Gaza, underscoring the precarity of the agreement.
For the Palestinians, Israel’s failure to ensure the regular delivery of increased humanitarian aid throughout Gaza could weaken their commitment to the agreement. Throughout the conflict, Israel has been unwilling or logistically unable to deliver assistance in sufficient quantities to meet the most basic needs of the more than two million Palestinians in Gaza. Trucks have been prevented from transiting due to arbitrary closures of the crossings, entire shipments have been turned around due to the presence of purportedly “dual-use items,” and Israeli provocateurs have obstructed trucks from reaching the border.
Even if Israel moves enough aid across the border, distribution is likely to remain a challenge due to the level of destruction within Gaza, worsened by a security vacuum that has been exploited by criminal gangs and militant groups. Hamas police are supposed to provide protection for aid convoys during the first stage, but Israel ultimately may be unwilling to condone an overt role for the terrorist group. The bottom line is that the agreement could fall apart in the first phase even if both Israel and Hamas make good-faith efforts to implement the terms.
What are the odds that the parties reach the second stage of the agreement?
Moving from stage 1 to stage 2 would require (1) first agreeing on the conditions for implementing stage 2, such as the withdrawal of all Israeli forces and post-conflict governance in Gaza, and (2) then actually implementing them. Former Israeli Minister of Defense Yoav Gallant reportedly said that the IDF does not require a permanent presence in Gaza. Based on my discussions with Israeli, Palestinian, and other Arab officials when I served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Israeli-Palestinian Conflict in the aftermath of October 7, 2023, attacks, the establishment of measures that would provide for both Israeli and Palestinian security post-IDF withdrawal is technically possible.
However, these steps are politically improbable. It is unclear that Netanyahu can agree to end the war on terms other than absolute surrender without jeopardizing his coalition government. The extremist parties in his coalition, the Religious Zionist Party and Jewish Power (which left the government but continues to vote with it), and even some Members of the Knesset from his own Likud party insist that Israel should retain control of Gaza, encourage “voluntary migration” of Palestinians from Gaza, and rebuild Israeli settlements that were dismantled 20 years ago. Bezalel Smotrich of the Religious Zionist Party has said publicly he only voted for the ceasefire because Netanyahu supposedly pledged it was “temporary” and subsequent phases would not be implemented.
The position of Netanyahu’s coalition partners is a non-starter for any Palestinian, as well as most of Israel’s allies and neighbors. But there is good reason to believe that, if confronted with a choice between ending the war and preserving his coalition, Netanyahu could choose the latter since his freedom may depend on it. For Netanyahu, the primary advantage of his current government is that all its constituent parties support granting him immunity should criminal charges against him result in a conviction. With other parties refusing to entertain that move, Netanyahu’s government, which may be the only thing standing between him and prison, is his lifeline.
As for Hamas, it is suspect whether the terrorist group is prepared to abandon any future role in government, let alone disarm its militants and renounce terrorism. There have been some indications that Hamas was amenable to turning the reins of government over to another entity but, in that scenario, it probably would seek to influence Palestinian decisionmakers. Hamas has resurfaced in Gaza every time the IDF pulls out, suggesting the group retains sufficient cohesion and arms to impose its will on other actors in the territory. With Hamas continuing to celebrate the October 7 attack, Israel’s opposition to a role for the group in Gaza’s future governance is understandable. Unfortunately, the only thing on which Israel and Hamas seem to agree is that the Palestinian Authority, the only currently viable alternative to Hamas, should not rule Gaza.
Does this mean the situation is hopeless and the war is destined to resume?
While it is a longshot, there is still one actor who could potentially change the calculus of Israel and Hamas: President Trump. It is not guaranteed he would succeed or even that he is inclined to try, but for the same reasons the ceasefire was originally agreed he could seek to influence the fate of the agreement.
As it stands, Netanyahu can bear the costs of restarting the military campaign. The likely loss of the remaining hostages would enrage much of the Israeli public, 73 percent of whom support the deal, but Netanyahu’s coalition partners prioritize the war over securing the release of the Israelis still in Gaza. He also has largely dismissed international pressure and accountability, trusting that the United States would protect him and Israel. If, however, Trump were to pressure Israel to adhere to the deal and continue implementation, Netanyahu would have a more difficult decision to make.
The critical question is whether Trump has an interest in exerting pressure on Netanyahu. As mentioned above, he apparently offered reassurances that the United States would stand by Israel if it returned to hostilities. And, when asked about the ceasefire, Trump said he was “not confident” it would continue and seemed to deflect responsibility by referring to the conflict as “their war.” His January 25 remark suggesting Palestinians should “clear out” of Gaza and resettle in Egypt and Jordan does not inspire confidence.
On the other hand, Trump probably views the continuation of the war as a distraction from his economically-driven objectives in the region. Because he played a role in reaching the agreement, it also is possible that the President would view breaches of the deal as a personal affront. Most important, the failure to reach an agreement on post-conflict Gaza by week 5 could prevent the release of American hostages, some of whom are not designated to be released until the end of week 6.
Finally, the resumption of the conflict would complicate Trump’s stated goal of reaching an Israeli-Saudi normalization agreement, which he hopes will deliver him a Nobel Peace Prize. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has told both the Biden and Trump administrations that an end to the war and progress toward a Palestinian state are necessary conditions for Riyadh’s agreement to normalize ties with Israel.
This would still leave Hamas as the potential spoiler. Perhaps, Trump’s style of making aggressive threats could move the terrorist organization to reconsider abdicating power in full. But it is equally plausible that they would have no such impact. At the very least, it would be harder for Hamas to negotiate seriously if Israel is demonstrating good faith, giving Arab countries cover to apply their own pressure on the group. It would be an oversimplification to say that Trump holds the keys to extending the ceasefire. Yet, he clearly holds some keys, and they could prove the difference. Though optimism is not warranted at the moment, an end to the war in Gaza is not yet a lost cause.