In just twelve days late last year, Syria’s armed opposition toppled Bashar al-Assad’s regime and captured Damascus. The lightening offensive has broad implications beyond Syria, rolling back Iran’s and Russia’s influence in the region and resetting the balance of power in the Middle East. While the rebels’ advances stunned the world, questions remain about how they were able to capture the country so quickly — and what will come next. The insurgents’ victory was a result of their evolution and patient planning, as well as the weakness of the Syrian regime and its foreign backers. But the road ahead is fraught with difficulties.
From Insurgents to a Nascent Government
The offensive involved a wide array of rebel groups, but it was initiated and led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). While HTS and its leadership have deep roots in the global Salafi-Jihadist movement, it has undergone many iterations over the course of the Syrian Civil War. Despite adopting a more pragmatic approach, HTS remains a designated terrorist entity by the UN, EU, U.S. and other countries. Much of the leadership and senior members of HTS were part of Jabhat al-Nusra, an official branch of Al Qaeda, at the beginning of the conflict and continued to lead HTS following a series of mergers with other insurgent groups that began in 2017.
Jabhat al-Nusra broke from its previous affiliation with ISIS in 2013 after disputes over leadership broke out. In response, the group declared itself independent of ISIS and declared its direct allegiance to Al-Qaeda. In 2016, Jabhat al-Nusra publicly disassociated itself from Al Qaeda, portraying itself as solely interested in the Syrian cause, and was rebranded as HTS the following year. Despite this, governments remained concerned about its links to Al-Qaeda members and it has been unable to shake its terrorist designation in the years since. In addition, several designated jihadist groups that fight alongside HTS remain in Al Qaeda’s orbit, including: the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), Katibat al-Imam al-Bukhari, and Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad. Non-designated rebel groups also participated in the offensive, including many factions in the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) coalition, as well as smaller local groups from southern Syria. While the rebels’ lightning advance caught the world by surprise, the groundwork for their success began years earlier.
Since 2017, HTS has undertaken a deliberate process to transform itself from an insurgent fighting force into a nascent government. It has professionalized its forces and built strong institutions capable of providing services to civilians in the territories under its control. These efforts included the December 2021 establishment of a military academy, which trained professional officers to compete with the conventional military forces of the Syrian Arab Army (SAA). Even more importantly, the military college enabled HTS to integrate each of the smaller groups and factions it had subsumed or merged with since 2017 into an effective, cohesive fighting force. Specialized units, including those for drone operations (The Shaheen Brigades) and special operations forces (The Red Brigades) received additional training to build up military expertise in specific domains that could be called upon when needed. Beyond the professionalization of their armed forces, HTS also established the semi-independent Syrian Salvation Government (SSG) in November 2017 to deliver services and manage civilian administration in its territories.
In the hours after Aleppo and Hama were re-captured by rebel forces, the SSG was deployed to deliver services and develop a civil administration, helping HTS and its allies present themselves as a responsible governing authority, thereby giving greater legitimacy to the group amongst both civilians and the international community. Through the SSG and its various ministries, HTS seeks to further distance itself from its past affiliations with Al Qaeda and ISIS and present itself as a responsible local partner that can lead Syria in the future. Through its years-long process to build strong institutions and professionalize its armed forces, HTS was carefully laying the groundwork to be ready when an opportunity presented itself.
The Weakness of the Assad Regime and Its Foreign Allies
HTS’s opportunity came late last year, as Assad’s regime and its supporters in Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah became increasingly over-stretched and distracted by other conflicts over the past two years. Over the course of the past year, Hezbollah and its leadership have been severely degraded as they fought with Israel. Iran, which has backed both Hezbollah and the Assad regime, has been pulled in several directions through its involvement with conflicts across the region and significant domestic challenges at home. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its involvement in proxy conflicts around the world have also deepened over the past two years, splitting the Kremlin’s attention among many different competing priorities. While the overall Russian presence in Syria has only declined slightly in recent years, some of its best personnel and equipment have been sent to other battlefields. Beyond these competing pressures for scarce resources and attention, Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah increasingly signalled that Assad over-relied on their support for the past 13 years.
The impact of these geopolitical changes over the past two years was felt on the ground in Aleppo when the rebels began their lightning offensive. Multiple sources in the area reported to this author that as the rebels advanced on western Aleppo, many Hezbollah and IRGC positions were empty or put up little resistance to the encroaching insurgents. Russian jets, which often helped turn the tide in the regime’s favor during previous battles, were also unusually slow to respond to the rebels’ advances during the first three days of the operation. Without these supports, the regime’s defensive lines quickly collapsed, and the rebels were able to capture many towns and cities with little opposition.
As the full extent of the rebels’ advance in Aleppo and further south became clear, Russia and Iran re-engaged their support for the Assad regime to prevent further losses and embarrassment, but it was too late to stop the insurgents’ advances. While the SAA, backed by Russian and Iranian forces, attempted to mount a more robust defence of Hama, the city only held out against the rebels’ advance for a few days longer than Aleppo. Russia and Iran slowly began to step up support for Assad at this stage in the offensive, as they sought to to avoid the collapse of the Assad regime. But it was too little, too late to stem the tide of momentum the rebels had seized.
For its part, Hezbollah signalled it would only be able to provide limited support to the regime amidst months of losses in Lebanon. As the northern offensive led by HTS swept down through Hama and Homs, smaller rebel groups in the south mobilized under the Southern Operations Room (SOR) and quickly reached the outskirts of Damascus. As the rebels encircled the capital from both the north and south, Iran and Russia responded with only limited resolve. Damascus was quickly captured by the combined rebel forces.
The rebels used kamikaze FPV drones and new rocket-propelled UAVs with larger payloads and ranges, allowing them to strike high-value targets well behind the frontlines. While these innovations helped the insurgents advance swiftly, the weapons were only available in limited numbers and likely did not turn the tide on their own. Similarly, HTS’s inghimasi units – known for immersing themselves in battle deep behind enemy lines – infiltrated Aleppo city in the hours before the main offensive, giving the operation an edge. But again, the inghimasi units alone were unlikely to be decisive. Instead, the groundwork for the success of the rebels’ advance was laid years in advance through HTS’s professionalization and institution building, alongside the steady weakening of the Assad regime’s supporters in Hezbollah, Iran, and Russia.
The Road Ahead
While the rebels made full use of these factors to topple the Assad regime and recapture Damascus, the road ahead will only get harder. Governing a country as large and diverse as Syria is no small task. The HTS-led transitional government faces major challenges in maintaining stability, providing adequate services, and freeing itself from past sanctions. While HTS remains the strongest and most cohesive group in Syria, it must avoid the temptation to dominate any new government that emerges if it hopes to achieve these goals. The leader of HTS, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa) consolidated control over the Syrian armed opposition in northwest Syria through military force and mergers, and there is a clear risk that he is attempting to do the same in Damascus now. Jolani’s recent appointment of hardliners and loyalists who fought with him in the Al-Nusra Front, as well as foreign fighters (muhajirun) from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, Albania, Chechnya, Egypt, and Jordan to the new Syrian army have sparked concerns about how inclusive the new administration will be in the months and years ahead. Moreover, as HTS feels less vulnerable than it did in Idlib and increasingly more secure and empowered in the capital, there are risks that HTS will be less tolerant of other groups and actors across Syrian society.
Now that the shared goal of toppling Assad has disappeared, maintaining unity among the governing coalition will be crucial to ensuring a stable and durable peace in Syria. Jolani has demonstrated his ability to do what many of his jihadist rivals have failed to do: engage in politics. This is what makes Jolani unique and separates him most from the failed efforts of ISIS to deliver lasting results in many countries. However, if Jolani seeks a stable peace in Syria now, he will need to continue engaging in political processes and meaningfully negotiate with different groups in the country. Only an inclusive government that incorporates each of the groups that participated in the offensive, as well as all parts of Syrian society, will be lasting and stable.
The international community can play an important role by encouraging the HTS-led government in Damascus to stay on an inclusive track in the months ahead. Through diplomacy, humanitarian and economic support, and examining recognition based on demonstrated actions rather than words, the international community can encourage HTS to form a responsible and representative government. Implementation of the broader aims in Resolution 2254, which provides a previously agreed-upon framework for a Syrian-led government that is representative of all actors and each segment within Syrian society, should be at the top of this list. The international community should avoid direct interventions, which have so often failed in the past, and focus on supporting Syria’s recovery from the Assad regime. The international community sidelined and ignored Syria over the past five years and it cannot afford to repeat that mistake.