Every country has a right to adopt legislation and regulation to prevent foreign interference in its internal affairs, protect national sovereignty, and oversee foreign funding to nonprofits and civil society organizations. However, the growing trend of overly restrictive legislation, including laws in Europe and Eurasia wielding the power of government and the taint of the term “foreign agent” against what should be protected activity reveals how authoritarian governments misuse these laws to specifically target human rights defenders, civil society members, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Governments believing that their political dominance is at risk increasingly seek to control and intimidate civil society, stifling dissent by creating a chilling effect and by blocking potential support for otherwise legitimate enquiry, criticism, and opposition.
The global spread of such measures, including Russia’s foreign agent law, across Eastern Europe and Eurasia and even into the European Union itself, exposes the driving forces behind this trend and points to potentially effective strategies to counter it. If left unchecked, two broader consequences are likely to emerge in addition to the specific detrimental impacts of the laws in each specific case.
First, the civil society sector, often considered the “schoolhouse of citizenship” for their role as incubators of citizen involvement and connection with government, will be dismantled. This will fundamentally alter the structures and participatory methods underpinning the democratic institutions that may exist within a country. It will have a similar effect on the many international and regional organizations that cultivate and depend on civic participation, including the United Nations, the EU, the Council of Europe, and the Organisation for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE).
Secondly, the continued spread of these laws risks pressuring the broader international community—including Western governments, institutions, and international organizations such as those above—into accepting a new reality that effectively normalizes, or even trivializes, apparent violations of fundamental rights such as freedom of expression and association. Even a respected French researcher working for a Swiss conflict resolution NGO was sentenced to three years by a Moscow court in October for ostensibly violating Russia’s “foreign agent” laws. France has said he was “arbitrarily detained.
While there has been some resistance to the adoption of these laws (from both civil society within countries as well as from the international community and foreign governments), responses have generally lacked sufficient force and urgency. However, there is still time to take a strong stand to protect core principles of democracy and the rule of law by safeguarding the freedom of speech and association that underpin civil society and an active NGO sector.
Identifying the Trend
Between 1994 and 2015, more than 60 countries adopted foreign agent-style laws and at least 19 countries implemented other types of regulatory checks and tax registries. In 2024 alone, at least six countries have proposed or adopted foreign agent-style laws, a worrisome trend that has been particularly striking in Europe and Eurasia. This expansion is concerning not only because these laws serve as political tools to suppress civil society, but also because they alter the very fabric of societies, instilling fear, intimidation, and self-censorship among the public and evoking an atmosphere of suppression reminiscent of the Soviet regime.
These laws are substantially different from the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) enacted in the United States in 1938. It requires individuals and entities engaged in lobbying or similar activities on behalf of foreign actors to disclose their activities. It does not, however, restrict their operations or attempt to discredit organizations. In contrast, the legislation discussed here differs not only in its scope (failing to exempt humanitarian organizations), but also in the repressive enforcement mechanisms, including imposing severe restrictions, monitoring requirements, and penalties.
Furthermore, the U.S. law is intended to apply to individuals or entities advocating on behalf of foreign interests, whereas these restrictive foreign agent laws are aimed at suppressing organic domestic advocacy on behalf of domestic interests just because the repressive government disagrees with those views. Any foreign financial and technical support the organizations may be receiving is generally aimed at underpinning genuine civic and democratic involvement, writ large, initiatives such as anti-corruption work and advocating for political prisoners – in other words supporting the democratic and rule-of-law aspirations of citizens in societies that don’t have well-developed philanthropic sectors of their own.
The more recent proliferation of laws in the Europe-Eurasian region more closely resemble the “foreign agent” law enacted by Russia in 2012. The legislation, at the time entitled “On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Nonprofit Organizations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent,” requires local NGOs receiving foreign funding and engaged in “political activity” to register as “foreign agents,” under threat of administrative and criminal sanctions. This legislation also imposes extensive reporting and labelling requirements, severely hindering the operations of NGOs.
Since adopting the law, the Russian government has periodically expanded its scope, targeting an increasing number of individuals and entities. Amendments have extended the law’s reach to media outlets; private individuals; groups that publish “printed, audio, audiovisual, or other reports and materials;” and citizens who report or share information on issues such as crime, corruption, or problems related to the military, space, and security services. On its face, the law deems any foreign and international organizations “undesirable,” along with local citizens cooperating with them. These entities face punishment under the law for allegedly posing “threats to the country,” and they are barred from participating in fundamental civic activities. The law permits unscheduled inspections not only of the “foreign agents” themselves, but also of any individuals associated with them. The Russian Foreign Agents Law, alongside other stringent government measures, has arguably succeeded in its goals of creating profound chilling effects and making it nearly impossible for NGOs to operate, while discouraging individuals from engaging in civic life.
The Rise of ‘Zombie’ Laws in Eurasia
Similar laws have spread across Eurasia. Often referred to as “zombie laws,” they sometimes linger in legislative processes, resurfacing every few years, with some never fully being enacted nor completely dismissed. For example, in Kyrgyzstan, such a law was first introduced in 2014 by a couple of Kyrgyz members of parliament who are strong Kremlin supporters, before ultimately being adopted in April 2024. The “Law on Amending the Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on Noncommercial Organizations,” commonly referred to as the “Law on Foreign Representatives,” reportedly is 90 percent identical to the 2012 Russian Foreign Agents Law. The Kyrgyz law mandates that NGOs receiving foreign funding or holding foreign assets, and engaging in “political activity,” must register as “foreign representatives,” under threat of administrative sanctions. The law is part of a pattern of wider crackdowns on civil liberties in Kyrgyzstan, with independent journalists and media outlets also being targeted by intensified state scrutiny and repression.
The Kyrgyz Law on Foreign Representatives imposes extensive reporting and labelling requirements, creating a challenging and burdensome environment for NGOs. Specifically, the law’s implementing guidelines require covered NGOs to mark all their materials and services as produced by “a foreign representative,” provide annual reports of financial audits conducted by independent parties, submit regular activity reports and publish them on the Implementing Registry website, and open themselves for random checks by government officials, including the Prosecutor General’s Office.
Since its implementation, the Kyrgyz government has posted a list of non-governmental organizations registered as foreign agents. Although it appears there are some organizations willing to self-register, many continue to resist registration while others have felt compelled to dissolve their operations, citing the onerous rules and repressive and intimidating climate.
Similarly, in the Republic of Georgia, the parliament in May passed the euphemistically titled “Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence,” or even more misleadingly the “Transparency Law” for short. The legislation was first introduced in 2023, but subsequently withdrawn following mass protests. According to the law, civil society organizations receiving more than 20 percent of their funding from other countries or international organizations must register as “organizations serving the interests of a foreign power.” The law requires that NGOs self-register, with penalties exceeding $9,000 for non-compliance. Additionally, the law grants the Ministry of Justice the authority to forcibly register an organization and impose recurring fines on those found in violation, effectively empowering the government to dismantle entities deemed uncooperative. The Ministry of Justice can also conduct arbitrary inspections and demand retroactive information on staff salaries and NGO activities, disregarding attorney-client privilege and confidentiality.
This law not only violates international standards and obligations on fundamental rights such as free speech, association, and privacy, but it also violates several provisions of Georgian constitutional law. As noted in an amicus brief submitted by one of us (Fernanda) for a pending case before the Georgian Constitutional Court, these constitutional provisions uphold rights to privacy, freedom of expression, and participation in public life. They also mandate that the government take all necessary measures to ensure Georgia’s full integration with the EU and NATO—protections that the foreign agents law clearly undermines because of its undemocratic nature which would hinder Georgia’s path to EU membership.
Spreading to the EU
As previously mentioned, these laws have existed in various forms across the globe for several decades. In recent years, however, the adoption of such measures has intensified, with a troubling pattern emerging: even the EU, despite its ostensible membership standards of freedom of expression and assembly, has not been immune to this trend.
In Hungary in 2017, the government adopted the “Law on Transparency of Organizations that Receive Support from Abroad” (Law on Transparency). This law prompted significant international pressure to rescind it, including several infringements procedures launched by the EU’s executive body, the European Commission. That led to a June 2020 decision of the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) that Hungary was violating EU rules. Ten months following this decision, the Hungarian government repealed the law in 2021. However, the administration of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has continued its campaign against civil society organizations, especially targeting those working on human rights, the rule of law, and other issues the government finds inconvenient.
In December 2023, the Hungarian government tried again, this time with the Protection of National Sovereignty Act. The new law gives the government unlimited discretion to monitor and investigate civil society organizations and others who are perceived by the government to be engaging in activities “influencing democratic discourse and state and social decision-making processes … carried out in the interest of another state and, irrespective of its legal status, of a foreign organ or organisation and natural person if they can harm or jeopardise the sovereignty of Hungary.” While this may not, on its face, constitute a violation of international law, it grants the government unchecked discretion to conduct fishing expeditions for information, creating a significant risk of suppressing the rights to association, assembly, and free speech.
A newly designated Sovereignty Protection Office (SPO) responsible for enforcement of the law began implementation in February by identifying, targeting, and investigating individuals and organizations in civil society working on human rights, freedom of media, and anti-corruption. One of the first investigations that SPO conducted was on Transparency International Hungary (TI Hungary). In June, the SPO issued an inquiry letter requesting detailed information about the organization’s activities and structure. By October, the SPO released its findings, asserting that TI Hungary was acting on behalf of U.S. interests and accused it of spreading disinformation. Reflecting on these attacks against civil society, we examined the harmful effects of the law in both Hungarian and EU contexts, finding that it presents a serious threat to free and independent society.
In Slovakia, the parliament passed a draft law on foreign agents on its first reading in April. If ultimately signed into law, it would require all non-governmental organizations that receive more than 5,000 euros ($5,400) a year in foreign funding to register with a government agency. Some experts anticipate that this law will be passed by the end of the year and would enter into force by January. The legislation is a part of a broader trend in attempts by the government of Prime Minister Robert Fico to undermine democratic norms, marked by increased centralization, crackdowns on civil society, and targeted attacks on judicial independence and independent media. Organizations also face other intensifying financial and operational constraints, with proposals to limit their tax-assigned funding and restrict their participation in public oversight of EU funds. While this bill has drawn sharp criticism from the European Commission, which has threatened immediate action if it is passed, Slovakia’s tightening restrictions signal an erosion of democracy across the region.
In Bulgaria, the far-right Revival party introduced a draft foreign agent-style law in parliament in September. If passed, any individual or organization receiving more than 500 euros ($540) from abroad, will be labeled and registered as “foreign agents.” The proposed law follows Revival’s recent success in pushing anti-LGBTQ+ legislation and illustrates increasing attempts to restrict civil liberties and silence dissent, including journalists and independent media. During the Oct. 27 general election, the country’s seventh election in the past three years, the Revival party came in third, receiving 13.8 percent of the votes, while Bulgaria’s center-right party coalition, GERB, led with 26 percent. While the relationship between Revival and GERB has historically been antagonistic, the consistent support for Revival suggests a potential shift in Bulgaria’s political landscape, with nationalist and pro-Russian sentiments gaining traction.
Regulatory and Tax Systems Also Wielded Against Civil Society
Even several countries in Eurasia that have not adopted a fully-fledged foreign agents law have created regulatory systems and tax requirements to achieve similar results, including controlling and harassing civil society, with profound chilling effects. For example, in Kazakhstan, the government has used restrictive tax regulations to monitor and limit civil society activities. First, in 2016, local NGOs were required to report foreign funding to tax authorities. Then, in 2022, new legislative amendments mandated that this information be publicly accessible. Most recently, in 2023, the State Revenue Committee of the Ministry of Finance created a registry for individuals “receiving money and (or) property from foreign states, international and foreign organizations, foreigners, and stateless persons.” The Ministry published information from this registry, identifying 240 individuals and entities receiving foreign funding for activities such as providing legal assistance, conducting surveys, and undertaking data collection, analysis, and dissemination. International organizations these actions as efforts to intimidate and suppress civil society, similar to the government’s use of tax laws to target human rights groups, media, and election monitors ahead of the January 2021 parliamentary elections by threatening heavy fines and suspensions.
Azerbaijan presents another interesting variation. There, the authoritarian regime controlled by President İlham Aliyev employs existing and new regulatory systems to restrict civil society. The government has imposed complex registration requirements, stringent controls on foreign funding, and frequent inspections, preventing many organizations from operating and exposing them to criminal charges. At the same time, the government regularly suppresses civic discourse and conducts politically motivated arrests of journalists, activists, and human rights defenders. This has further degraded the human rights landscape in the country, undermining freedoms of expression, association, and assembly.
Belarus and Uzbekistan instituted restrictions for civil society much earlier. In Belarus, President Alexander Lukashenka, who has been in power for three decades, has systematically intensified his regime’s control over civil society by implementing harsh regulations. Since 2011, laws criminalizing foreign funding to NGOs and prohibiting them from using foreign banks have effectively dismantled the operational freedom and independence of civil society. Amendments to the Criminal Code have broadened the scope of state treason, penalizing organizations that engage with foreign entities under the guise of protecting national security. Not only have these laws had a chilling effect, but over the past few years, human rights organizations have been shut down and dozens of human rights defenders, including journalists and lawyers, have been arbitrarily detained and imprisoned or fled.
Uzbekistan’s restrictions on freedom of association date back to the early 2000s, when NGOs were first required to register with the government, thereby limiting civil society by enforcing state oversight, particularly for those receiving foreign funding. More recently, a 2022 decree requires than any NGO supported by foreign funds must appoint a government “national partner” to oversee planning and implementation, essentially embedding State agents in civil society work. These constraints, coupled with challenges in the complex registration requirements and the targeting of outspoken activists, reflect an ever-tightening civic environment in Uzbekistan.
Not Enough: Reactions of International and Regional Organizations
The response from international and regional organizations to this accelerating pattern of crackdowns on civil society across Europe and Eurasia has been mixed—occasionally robust but most often lukewarm—ultimately proving to be insufficient to halt this dangerous trend.
For EU member States, a robust response from EU institutions—including the European Council made up of heads of State and government, the Council, the Commission, and the European Parliament and the CJEU—can have a significant impact. This was exemplified in Hungary’s above-noted 2021 repeal of its Transparency of Organisations Supported from Abroad Law following the Commission infringement proceeding at the CJEU, which had determined that the measure violated EU laws guaranteeing privacy, freedom of association, and free movement of capital.
EU membership imposes an additional layer of responsibility and accountability for upholding rule of law and human rights obligations, and the EU holds considerable leverage over its 27 member States through a range of actions. When governments fail to comply with EU treaties and violate rule of law obligations, the Commission can suspend financial assistance through EU budget conditions. Member States’ voting rights also may be suspended under Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union, known as the “nuclear option.” The Commission can initiate infringement proceedings before the CJEU against member States, and if they are found in violation of EU law and fail to comply with the Court’s ruling, this can result in a second infringement action triggering financial penalties. Furthermore, private litigants may refer preliminary questions to the CJEU to clarify incompatibilities between domestic laws and EU rules. These mechanisms underscore the EU’s ability to enforce compliance and uphold its foundational principles.
In October this year, the European Commission brought a new infringement procedure against Hungary to the CJEU over its latest such law, the Protection of National Sovereignty Act (described above), and the creation of the Sovereign Protection Office to enforce it. The Commission asserted that the actions violate EU fundamental principles such as democracy, privacy, freedom of expression, and freedom of association.
In Georgia, large sections of civil society condemned passing that country’s law, and President Salome Zurabishvili vetoed the bill as “unacceptable” and “inconsistent” with the country’s EU membership path. However, the Georgian Parliament overrode the veto and the law came into force. The international community has vigorously and publicly opposed the law as a threat to basic rights. The U.S. government, for example, paused more than $95 million in assistance to Georgia and imposed sanctions against those “who have undermined Georgia’s democracy and the human rights of the Georgian people,” including high-ranking government officials. The EU similarly paused 30 million euros ($32.5 million) in financial support and halted Georgia’s accession to the European Union. In October 2024, the parliamentary elections resulted in a win for the pro-Russian Georgian Dream party. However, the election was widely recognized as not free, with many national and Western leaders calling for an investigation into the alleged electoral violations. Most recently, protests have intensified following the ruling party’s decision to suspend talks on EU accession.
In Kyrgyzstan, the international response has not been as robust. Although in July 2023, the European Parliament adopted a resolution “on the crackdown on the media and freedom of expression in Kyrgyzstan,” calling on the government of the Kyrgyz Republic “to respect and uphold fundamental freedoms, in particular media freedom and freedom of expression,” the Kyrgyz government still adopted the foreign agents legislation in April 2024. In spite of this adoption and continued suppression and prosecution of media and journalists by the Kyrgyz government, the EU in June signed an expanded partnership and cooperation agreement with Kyrgyzstan, which is not a member of the Union. These seemingly contradictory actions not only cast doubt on the EU’s commitment to holding Kyrgyzstan accountable, but also undermine the EU’s overall dedication to its values and institutions, especially at a time of shifting geopolitical dynamics and growing authoritarianism.
The OSCE has taken a firm stand against such laws, even though Russia and other offending States are members, and despite the price it has paid in terms of Russian retribution. The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) provided an Urgent Interim Opinion on the Draft Law in December 2022, calling the draft “incompatible with international human rights standards” and urging the government to abandon the proposed legislation. The OSCE in February expressed strong concerns over the Kyrgyz law, repeatedly calling on the government to review the bill and bring it into compliance with established standards.
Furthermore, the OSCE has provided a space for open dialogue with civil society members, government officials, and scholars from its member countries. The topic of the expansion of such foreign agent laws took center stage at the OSCE’s recent Warsaw Human Dimension Conference, where we both participated. During the event, OSCE institutions, experts, official OSCE members’ delegations, and civil society members actively engaged in discussions, advocacy, and collaborative brainstorming on the ways for civil society to deal with this growing trend.
The Venice Commission, the advisory body of the intergovernmental human rights organization the Council of Europe, also has issued expert opinions following thorough reviews of such laws. In the case of Georgia, for example, the Commission recommended repealing the law on the grounds that its fundamental flaws would involve significant negative consequences for freedoms of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, and the prohibition of discrimination. The Commission also published an opinion on the Hungarian Transparency Law in March 2024, as well as a 2013 opinion on an earlier version of Kyrgyzstan’s draft law, condemning them for the disproportionate restrictions on fundamental rights such as free speech, freedom of association, and privacy.
Yet, other major international organizations appear to ignore the potential damage of such laws entirely, often based on exceedingly narrow definitions. The World Bank, for instance, in its 2024 Business Ready (B-READY) report assesses global business and investment climates across 10 topics and three pillars: Regulatory Framework, Public Services, and Operational Efficiency. Hungary and Georgia rank highly, with Hungary ranking especially high in the Regulatory Framework category and Georgia excelling in Operational Efficiency. In Dispute Resolution, Georgia ranks 2nd and Hungary ranks 5th. Clearly this narrow evaluation overlooks broader, systemic rule of law issues. The arbitrary application of foreign agent laws not only undermines civil society but also illustrates the broader risks of capricious government regulation, which can create an unpredictable and unstable regulatory environment for business. Georgian officials have already used these rankings to promote the country’s robust governance and business-friendly environment, despite ongoing concerns about democratic backsliding and rule of law challenges that ultimately could weaken the larger environment for doing legitimate business. The World Bank’s selective assessment can obscure underlying issues, lead to misconceptions about the true state of governance, and depict countries as safe havens for foreign investors when they are anything but that.
Curbing the Spread
Against this backdrop, principled foreign donor governments and global leaders, international organizations, and advocates for social and human rights can take a number of steps to support civil society members (as well as steps the local organizatons themselves can take) in continuing their essential work and maintaining their vital roles in their societies:
- Provide support and solidarity to the members of civil society, including technical support, or financial assistance.
- Provide assistance to independent media in countering harmful propaganda narratives about the work of civil society that foster fear and intimidation.
- Leverage financial and political influence by adopting a stronger, more decisive stance to enforce compliance with established policies and values. The EU, in particular, should show greater resolve and agility in deploying its protective mechanisms—including infringement procedures, conditionality provisions in its financial and economic aid, and both soft and hard tools—to ensure adherence to its standards and prevent the erosion of the Union’s own integrity and credibility.
- Engage international financial institutions (IFIs) in discussions on such laws and encourage them to conduct thorough due diligence on governments’ human rights records when considering loans and investment projects. Since civil society is critical for ensuring accountability in project implementation, active IFI engagement with civil society is essential.
- Facilitate inclusive political dialogue at all levels—local, national, and transnational—ensuring that civil society members are meaningfully included in these conversations to foster a collaborative approach to policymaking.
The international community must get more serious and act with more urgency to stem the erosion of civil society, given the pivotal role of the sector in ensuring that democratic standards are upheld. This is particularly acute in the face of growing challenges to the rule of law and at a time of rising economic inequalities, which can often exacerbate social tensions and undermine trust in institutions, including civil society. By fostering resilience, advocating for accountability, and engaging in strategic collaboration, supporters of civil society can enable these domestic organizations to work collectively and share strategies to safeguard human rights, counter restrictive measures such as foreign agent laws, and reinforce social justice and democratic values across jurisdictions.