On November 27, Syrian opposition forces launched a large-scale military operation, “Rade’ Al Adwan”—translated as Deterring Aggression—against the Syrian regime. Comprising thousands of fighters from Turkey-backed factions and Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (HTS), a former affiliate of al Qaeda, the offensive marks a dramatic escalation in the prolonged conflict. Opposition military leader Hasan Abd Al Ghani described the operation as a response to recent regime attacks on civilians aimed at preventing further aggression and facilitating the return of displaced civilians to their homes. Initially perceived as preemptive, the campaign has rapidly shifted dynamics on the ground, with the collapse of regime forces’ defenses and complete withdrawal from some fronts. As a result, opposition forces reclaimed substantial territories and expanded to new areas, such as the west side of Aleppo city, which had remained under regime control throughout the 13-year uprising.
Videos of opposition fighters inside the Presidential Residence in Aleppo have sparked mixed reactions. Some opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad celebrated what they considered a long-awaited victory; others warned of political complications, underscoring HTS’s involvement and controversial past. The Joint Military Operation Room, an ad-hoc central command of armed factions participating in the ongoing campaign, released a statement urging its fighters to comply with its engagement rules and emphasizing a tolerant attitude towards religious minorities. Some activists interpreted this statement as a prospective ideological shift within HTS, whereas others regarded it as a mere rebranding attempt directed to the West.
The recent escalation in Syria has left analysts perplexed. Some have suggested that the operation denotes tacit coordination between Russia and Turkey to redraw de-escalation zones established via the Astana talks the two powers began with Iran in 2017, hosted by Kazakhstan. Others have attributed the timing of the offensive to the weakening of the Iranian axis and Hezbollah’s recent setback in Lebanon, which may have limited their capacity to support the Syrian regime. Moreover, rumors of a failed coup attempt within the Syrian army have further complicated the situation.
Whatever the truth behind these speculations, the recent offensive underscores the shortcomings of the international community’s current approach and the risk of a missing U.S. role in Syria. In this article, I will provide background on Syria’s conflict, a brief of the ongoing political efforts, and three reasons for the United States to regard political transition in Syria as a critical strategic interest: to weaken the Iranian government’s negotiation position, sustain the defeat of the Islamic State (ISIS), and combat global narcotic networks impacting the United States. To achieve these objectives, the incoming administration should adopt a concrete strategy in Syria focused on achieving an expeditious political transition. This strategy should enhance diplomatic engagement, follow a time-bound incremental approach, and address thematic issues one at a time.
The Syrian Uprising: A Quest for Human Dignity
In 2011, Syria erupted in mass protests against the Ba’ath Party’s four-decade authoritarian rule. Under this regime, Syria was dominated by a single family (the Assad family) and a tightly knit network of patronage governed with no regard for the rule of law. Protesters, united by a common call for human dignity, took to the streets in cities across the country.
As demonstrations intensified, the regime deployed intelligence services and military forces to suppress the movement. Some military officers, unwilling to turn their weapons on civilians, defected and joined the burgeoning armed opposition. This gave rise to the Free Syrian Army (FSA), initially formed to protect protesters but soon engaged in a broader struggle to overthrow the authoritarian regime.
During the first year of the revolution, Syria’s political opposition began to coalesce in exile. The emerging bodies they created drew significant participation from the Syrian diaspora influenced by both regional and international powers. The first major step came in October 2011 with the formation of the Syrian National Council, an opposition body that faced criticism from Western observers for its perceived dominance by the Muslim Brotherhood. Recognizing the need for a more representative opposition platform, the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces was established in Doha, Qatar in 2012. This new coalition aimed to present a more inclusive and credible alternative to the Assad regime on the global stage. But these early efforts to create a political coalition capable of brokering an end to the conflict were undermined by an increasingly complicated, multi-sided war.
From A Struggle for Freedom to A Proxy War
With a rigid and violent regime, weak and divided political opposition, and considerable influence from regional and international powers, the Syrian battleground has devolved into a complex set of interconnected proxy wars, wherein Syrians have the least power. This political dynamic created fertile soil for foreign actors to wield power and facilitated the infiltration of extremist militias into Syria, each fighting under different ideological banners.
Militarily, what began as clashes between the Assad regime and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) escalated into a full-scale war. Iranian military personnel, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias intervened to bolster the Syrian regime after the FSA’s territorial gain. The disarray among states supporting the uprising’s proponents was mirrored internally; new armed factions emerged, undermining the nascent FSA and laying the groundwork for the armed opposition’s fragmentation.
By the end of 2011, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), a former Al Qaeda affiliate established by Abu Musʻab Al Zarqawi in Iraq, expanded into Syria under the name Jabhat al Nusrah (Al Nusrah Front). Al Nusrah broke away from the ISI in 2013, forming an independent branch of al Qaeda. That same year, the ISI expanded its own footprint into Syria, forming the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Recruiting thousands of foreign fighters, ISIS captured vast territories, at one point controlling an area the size of Great Britain, and rebranded itself as simply the Islamic State. This self-declared caliphate was largely dismantled by a U.S.-led coalition and Kurdish forces following an intensive ground and air campaign that lasted from the fall of 2014 to 2017. Meanwhile, infighting among armed opposition groups resulted in Al Nusrah capturing nearly all of Idlib province in 2015. Al Nusrah also continued to evolve; in 2017, it was relaunched as HTS, an ostensibly independent Syrian extremist group. HTS remains in control of Idlib to this day.
Iranian-backed extremists also flocked to Syria. By early 2012, Iranian military personnel, Hezbollah, and over 30 Iraqi militias intervened to bolster the Syrian regime after the opposition’s territorial gains. But Iranian assistance was not enough to contain the opposition.
In 2015, Russia’s military intervention against armed opposition forces altered the balance of power in favor of the Assad government. It provided much-needed critical air support and facilitated the reclamation of critical cities such as Aleppo and Homs. Russia’s provision of air defenses also changed the landscape for States supportive of the opposition.
The complexity of the conflict intensified with the direct involvement of Turkey, which conducted multiple operations targeting both the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) factions, against which Turkey has been engaged in armed conflict for decades, and the Islamic State. The Turkish intervention culminated in establishing control over segments of northern Syria that remain under its control today.
Although former (and future) U.S. President Donald Trump ordered the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Syria in 2018, the United States has instead maintained a presence in northeastern Syria of close to 1,000 military personnel to assist the PKK-connected Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in their fight against the remnants of the Islamic State. Concurrently, Israeli airstrikes have periodically targeted Iranian and Hezbollah positions inside Syria.
For the past five years, the military landscape has been nearly static, with Assad and his allies controlling most of Syrian territory. Meanwhile, insurgent strongholds in Idlib and Turkish-controlled areas remained largely inactive until recently. In short, the Syrian conflict continues to be a microcosm of broader geopolitical rivalries, with no clear path to resolution in sight.
International Efforts in Syria: The Devil Lies in the Details
In 2011, during a press conference regarding the first Arab League delegation to Syria, then-Foreign Minister Walid Al-Muallem famously remarked, “If we are to drown the delegation in details, they better learn how to swim.” Unfortunately, this statement has proven prophetic. It encapsulates the complexities and inefficacy that have defined international efforts to achieve a political transition in Syria. These efforts have been marked by turmoil across the broader political landscape, including the states supporting the uprising, the various opposition armed forces, and the dynamics between these groups, Assad himself and pro-Assad factions in Syria and abroad. The interplay of these actors, combined with persistent geopolitical rivalries, hindered meaningful progress.
In 2012, early attempts to resolve the conflict, including the Arab League’s mediation efforts and the United Nations’ six-point plan, failed to gain traction. The Syrian regime’s refusal to implement genuine reforms and honor ceasefires, coupled with the opposition’s fragmentation, thwarted any chance of a negotiated resolution and defined Syria’s tragic trajectory toward prolonged conflict.
In mid-2012, the Geneva I Conference on Syria presented a roadmap for political transition, but quickly faltered amid disagreements over Bashar al-Assad’s future role. A few years later, in 2015, the Vienna Conference on Syria emerged as a significant international diplomatic effort. It provided a glimpse of hope for ending the conflict as, for the first time, major international and regional powers, including the United States, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia, convened to discuss a political solution. Notably, no Syrian representatives were present, underscoring the proxy nature of the conflict.
The conference concluded with the Vienna Communiqué in October 2015. It called for a Syrian-led political transition, emphasized the country’s unity and the need for a ceasefire, and excluded terrorist groups such as Al Nusrah (later known as HTS) and the Islamic State. This step led to the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2254, which formalized a roadmap for negotiations between the Assad regime and opposition groups, the drafting of a new constitution, and U.N.-supervised elections. Despite the ambitious goals, deep geopolitical rivalries between the United States and Russia, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, hindered consensus on critical issues such as the future of Bashar al-Assad. The absence of Syrian stakeholders from the discussions and continued military conflict on the ground further limited the plan’s implementation, though it laid the foundation for future peace efforts.
With a political stalemate and the absence of clear enforcement mechanisms for Resolution 2254, Russia, Turkey, and Iran launched a parallel diplomatic initiative, the Astana Talks, in 2017. This process effectively supplanted the U.N.-led negotiations, focusing on consolidating ceasefires and establishing de-escalation zones. However, the Syrian regime and its allies frequently violated these zones, undermining the talks’ credibility. So far, the Astana Talks have seen 22 rounds of negotiations. Yet, despite the marathon of discussions, recent military offensives underscore that the talks have failed to bring an end to hostilities, leaving Syria’s conflict entrenched and unresolved.
In a final, desperate effort to revive the U.N.’s role in Syria and re-energize Resolution 2254, the U.N.-backed Constitutional Committee was formed in 2019, tasked with drafting a new constitution. Yet, the Committee has drawn significant criticism from Syrians for two main reasons. First, many view it as a tactic to bypass the implementation of Resolution 2254 by prioritizing constitutional reform over a true political transition. Second, the selection process for Committee members has been widely criticized. The 150-member body is divided into three groups: 50 from the Syrian regime, 50 from the opposition, and 50 from civil society. However, critics argue that Turkey and the Syrian regime essentially handpicked all the members, including those supposedly representing civil society. This has led to concerns about the Committee’s credibility and its ability to effect meaningful political change.
The international inability to resolve the Syrian conflict had effectively resulted in a stalemate until the recent military operation. In the interim, Arab states, notably the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, began to normalize their relations with Damascus, indicating a transformation in regional dynamics. This culminated in Syria’s re-admittance to the Arab League in May 2023, a development that signaled a potential realignment in the Middle East.
However, the latest developments have once again underscored the deep-rooted instability of Syria under the current political framework and the continued influence of proxy actors. The recent military escalation proves that Syria’s future remains uncertain, with longstanding divisions and external interventions continuing to shape its trajectory.
The Misstep of Marginalizing Syria: The Misguided U.S. Approach
In response to the recent military escalation, the National Security Council Spokesperson Sean Savett released a statement that reads, “the United States has nothing to do with this offensive, which is led by […], a designated terrorist organization,” a reference to HTS. Savett’s statement further stressed the importance of “a serious and credible political process that can end this civil war once and for all with a political settlement consistent with UNSCR 2254.” These generic comments symbolize the United States’ ineffective or, more accurately, lack of strategy in Syria – a path that can be traced to President Barack Obama’s administration.
The Obama administration attempted to navigate Syria’s complexities but to no avail. Aside from the successful political efforts to dismantle the Syrian regime’s chemical arsenal and the provision of humanitarian aid, the administration’s policies were largely ineffective, if not counterproductive. Multiple military training programs and exhaustive diplomatic efforts to broker a ceasefire yielded little to no tangible progress. This is not to diminish the efforts of dedicated members of his administration, many of whom I witnessed first-hand working tirelessly in support of Syrians. These individuals often pushed boundaries to bring about change, and at times, expressed frustration with the lack of strategy.
While some voices called for the deployment of U.S. armed forces to confront Assad directly, I do not believe that this was a necessary course of action. The core failure of Obama’s Syria policy, in my view, lies in considering Syria as nothing more than strategically insignificant.
Under President Donald Trump, the United States largely continued the Obama administration’s approach to Syria. The Trump administration prioritized battling the Islamic State and conducting drone strikes on suspected al Qaeda operatives. The primary deviation from Obama’s policy was the launch of punitive airstrikes against the Assad regime following its chemical weapons attacks. However, beyond these strikes, the Trump administration did not make a sustained commitment to facilitating a political transition in Syria.
Reversing Course: A Need for An Active and Effective U.S. Role in Syria
Over the past 13 years, Syrians have consistently appealed to three different U.S. administrations with constructivist principles, such as protecting human rights, facilitating the return of 13 million displaced people, and preventing further chemical attacks. Yet, their appeals have largely fallen on deaf ears given the dominance of the Obama doctrine, which has reduced Syria to mere leverage in broader political negotiations with Russia or Iran. However, this doctrine has proven to be misinformed.
The incoming administration should prioritize achieving a political transition in Syria not merely to uphold international norms but also to advance U.S. strategic interests in the region and international stability at large. In this context, I will mention three reasons.
First, the U.S. settlement with Iran must start from Syria. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, Syria holds greater strategic significance for the Iranian regime than vice versa. Syria affords Iran critical access to the Mediterranean Sea and serves as a crucial conduit for supplying Hezbollah. This relationship has enabled Tehran to augment its influence in Lebanon by capitalizing on anti-Israel rhetoric. Prolonging the conflict has, in fact, fortified Iran’s military presence in Syria, permitting it to establish a base for Iranian forces and proxies within Syrian territory. Absent Syria, Iran’s Axis of Resistance would encounter substantial logistical and geopolitical challenges. Consequently, before proceeding with any negotiations with Iran, the United States should play an active role in actualizing Resolution 2254. This step will shift the political dynamic in Syria to a less favorable position for Iran, thereby diminishing Iran’s leverage in negotiations.
Second, supporting political transition in Syria is crucial for sustaining the U.S. defeat of the Islamic State and ensuring the safe withdrawal of American forces. Enduring instability and weak governance are the primary factors that fuel extremist resurgences. Historically, the Islamic State has exploited Syria’s fragmented political landscape and power vacuums, particularly in marginalized areas. Without a legitimate and stable political arrangement, these regions remain vulnerable to insurgent operations and extremist recruitment. Furthermore, an orderly political transition would facilitate coordinated international reconstruction efforts, reducing economic hardship and social discontent, all key factors that the Islamic State leverages to gain support. Without such a roadmap, a withdrawal of U.S. troops risks replicating the experience in Afghanistan, where a hasty exit led to a rapid Taliban victory. President-elect Trump has been vocally critical of that exit and he should take heed of these lessons in Syria. Thus, the incoming administration should devise a plan for facilitating political transition and strengthening local governance in Syria ahead of withdrawing the U.S. troops from there. It is only by empowering government institutions and sustaining political transition that the United States can exit Syria responsibly, mitigating the threat of an Islamic State re-emergence.
Third, ensuring expeditious and sustainable political transition in Syria is crucial for U.S. efforts to combat narcotic transportation. Syria has become a major hub for drug production, particularly Captagon, which funds the Assad regime and its allies, including Hezbollah. The prolonged Syrian conflict has facilitated the emergence of a narco-state, with the Captagon trade generating revenues far surpassing Syria’s legitimate exports. This drug trade fuels regional instability and extends beyond the Middle East through Hezbollah’s established networks in Latin America. These networks, especially in the Tri-Border Area, pose a risk of narcotics entering the U.S. market. Addressing Syria’s narcotic economy through political stabilization could disrupt these illicit networks, cutting off a significant revenue stream for hostile actors and reducing the potential flow of drugs into the U.S. market. Given President-elect Trump has made curbing narcotic smuggling a key promise of his campaign, prioritizing Syria’s political transition perfectly aligns with his agenda. Addressing Syria’s pivotal role in the global narcotics trade would undermine the economic foundations of hostile actors, such as the Assad regime and Hezbollah, and contribute to broader efforts to secure the U.S. population by reducing the flow of narcotics and disrupting illicit production networks.
Path Forward: Taming the Devil
Current analyses often present the United States with a false dichotomy: support either Bashar al-Assad or HTS. This framing is not only misguided but dangerously simplistic. The question of who rules should not take precedence over how they are chosen. It is the process by which leaders come to power that distinguishes democratic systems from authoritarian ones. Such a focus on individuals distracts from the broader, more critical issue of establishing a legitimate political process. This mirrors the distracting minutiae noted by al-Muallem, where details obscure the larger picture.
Moving forward, the incoming U.S. administration should adopt a pragmatic, incremental approach in collaboration with international and regional stakeholders. This strategy should be guided by clear timelines and focused on specific thematic areas. For example, the United States should push for consensus on the release of political detainees as a precondition for any political transition in Syria.
Furthermore, it is essential that the United States pressure the U.N. Special Envoy to Syria to abandon the notion of drafting a new constitution, which is currently unfeasible given the rigid political dynamics. Instead, procedural constitutionalism should be prioritized. The failure of current political actors to compromise renders the drafting of a constitution impractical. Incremental constitutionalism offers a more flexible and realistic approach, focusing on process rather than outcomes. It enables dialogue and legitimacy to emerge organically across Syria.
In such a context, constitution-making requires designing procedural frameworks that promote political and constitutional stability. Thus, the Syrian Constitutional Committee should delegate the responsibility for procedural design to apolitical, technocratic actors, with current members serving only an advisory role. Lastly, accountability must be paramount. The United States should avoid brokering a political deal that could compromise its accountability. Such an approach leaves the roots of the war unaddressed, thereby risking the reemergence of conflict. In fact, participation in the transition should be contingent upon Syrian actors’ willingness and ability to engage in a genuine, people-driven accountability process.