The annual climate summit, the 29th session of the United Nations Conference of Parties (COP29), concluded this week in Baku, Azerbaijan. After days of intense negotiations, nearly 200 exhausted nations reached a $300 billion agreement on climate finance. The Baku Agreement, called the “New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance,” stated that developed country Parties would take the lead in providing developing States with “at least $300 billion per year by 2035” for climate action. This fund can be derived from a “wide variety of sources,” including private investment or multilateral development banks loans. The Baku Agreement encourages developing nations to make contributions on a voluntary basis.
The Azerbaijani government immediately characterized the Baku Agreement as a “historical decision,” while activists assailed the deal as inadequate in addressing the needs of climate-vulnerable States. The two-week Baku conference itself was chaotic in contrast to last year’s comparably more organized conference in Dubai. Last year’s COP28 chairman, Emirati Sultan Al Jaber, exhorted the delegates to “work harder, work faster, work smarter” in corralling nearly 200 nations to reach an agreement to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050.
As the dust settles in Baku, international climate progress appears to have lost some of the slow but steady momentum set in motion by the last three COP conferences in Glasgow, Egypt, and Dubai. The Glasgow–Egypt–Dubai trifecta established a novel loss and damage fund and shepherded the first “global stocktake,” an assessment of the international response to climate change, as required by the Paris Agreement. Perhaps most importantly, in Dubai all 195 nations committed to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050, marking the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel era.
To be sure, Baku faced significant geopolitical headwinds and, perhaps, any climate agreement was a welcome relief after two intense weeks of negotiation. And Azerbaijan, a petrostate heavily reliant on fossil fuel extraction (with a troubled human rights record to boot) was a controversial choice to host any climate summit. Climate negotiations were further undermined by (1) continual mistrust between wealthy and poorer states over who pays for climate adaptation and loss and damage; (2) fierce pushback from petrostates on firm commitments to transition away from fossil fuels; (3) ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Ukraine; and (4) the sobering realities of a forthcoming Trump presidency — an administration that has promised to renege on the United States’ international climate commitments.
Climate Finance: Achieving a Modest Deal on Aid to Developing States
Over 50,000 people flocked to COP29, dubbed the “Finance COP,” in Baku with the hope of making substantive progress on climate finance and building on the muted success of COP28 in Dubai. To achieve these objectives, poorer developing States — which are disproportionately suffering from the effects of climate change — had to firm up commitments from their wealthy, developed counterparts. There were hopes that a new constituted body, the Independent High-Level Expert Group (IHLEG) of Climate Finance, would help achieve a breakthrough sum of $1.3 trillion dollars a year of funding. The Finance Group was tasked to assess the state of the global climate finance system, and to make recommendations to deliver on the specific finance goals set forth in the Paris Agreement. But a comprehensive, finance breakthrough was a challenging proposition under any circumstance. After several rounds of back-and-forth, climate negotiators settled on a far more modest sum of $300 billion dollars per year while calling on all actors to work together to provide $1.3 trillion per year to developing countries by 2035. This financing will pay for a “laundry-list” of climate action items for developing nations. This includes helping them transition from fossil fuels to clean energy, assisting with climate adaptation and resilience, and providing aid for disaster preparation and response.
Ongoing Divisions Between Developed and Developing Nations
The modest climate finance agreement brought to the fore the historic divide between developed and developing nations. As a general matter, developed nations have a higher expectation and firmer legal commitments to aid developing countries. This higher expectation is consistent with the legal principle of “Common but Differentiated Responsibilities” between developed and developing nations. There is consequently a strong political incentive for countries to remain characterized as developing in the context of climate commitments.
But how does one make this critical delineation, and who is the final arbiter of developed nation status? The answers to these questions remain unclear, and this uncertainty was on full display in Baku. Thirty years after the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change was negotiated, the international community has failed to reach a consensus on which States are considered developed and developing. The 1992 Framework Convention divides the world between developed nations (known as “Annex nations”) and developing nations (“non-Annex nations”). The United States, Europe, Japan, and other wealthy nations were initially classified as developed in 1992 and clearly possess that status today. But China, India, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil were classified as developing nations in 1992 — does that status still apply in 2024?
Indeed, emissions patterns and who is emitting have changed dramatically since the original Framework Convention was signed. Today, China is the second largest economy in the world, and now emits more greenhouse gas emissions than any other nation by a wide magin. Saudi Arabia is a petrostate whose economy is inextricably linked to fossil fuel extraction. In contrast, Europe and the United States achieved peak emissions in 1979 and 2005, respectively. Clearly, the United States and Europe Union members are developed nations that should pay their fair share, but shouldn’t China or Saudi Arabia be required to chip in?
Tragically, the Framework Convention lacks a clear legal mechanism with clear metrics on when a nation “graduated” from developing to developed status. This inflexibility creates continual friction at the climate negotiation table, as displayed in Baku, when China, India, and other non-Annex nations fought to maintain that status and avoid legally binding commitments.
In a clever — albeit somewhat cynical — diplomatic move, China allied with developing nations in proposing that the United States, Europe, and other large polluters contribute up to $1.3 trillion per year in climate financing. That figure is a non-starter and unrealistic given both geopolitical and energy market realities. With the war raging in Ukraine and Western nations shifting away from Russian oil and gas, Russia has found new fossil fuel markets in India, China, and the developing world. The $1.3 trillion climate finance number was changed to $300 billion per year by 2035. The Baku Agreement’s text merely invites China and other developing countries to make additional contributions. With the ink still drying on this agreement, no one—particularly poorer nations—seems satisfied with this number.
Some 15 years ago, developed nations already committed to pay $100 billion a year towards climate financing. But achieving that more modest goal has proven to be challenging. Even with the ink barely dry on the Baku Agreement, it is unlikely that the incoming Trump administration will embrace any new international climate finance commitments. This is particularly true when the United States is held to a higher standard than China, its leading competitor and “pacing challenge.”
Limited Progress on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels
At last year’s climate summit in Dubai, the international community achieved what was widely perceived to be a breakthrough: all 195 States agreed to transition away from fossil fuels by 2050. Yet since Dubai, the world is collectively pumping more fossil fuels into the atmosphere than at any point in human history. The Paris Agreement’s goal of keeping global temperatures below 1.5 degrees Celsius appears to be out of reach, despite the Baku agreement reaffirming the world’s commitment to achieve it. Indeed, greenhouse gas emissions must fall by 42 percent by 2030 just to have a chance of meeting this Paris Agreement’s benchmark — yet global emissions continue to increase.
China, India, and other nations continue to build new coal-fired power plants, a move out of step with the transformational action needed to avert irreversible, catastrophic climate harm. There is already a widely–known greenhouse gas emissions gap—the difference between current emissions and emissions required to avert irreversible catastrophic harm. Baku highlighted the growing implementation gap that exists between theoretical commitments and actions on the ground. In the runup to Baku, several notable climate leaders — including former Executive Secretary of the Framework Convention on Climate Change Christina Figueres and former U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon — urged COP reform and a renewed emphasis on implementation over rhetoric:
28 COPs have delivered us with the policy framework to achieve this. However, its current structure simply cannot deliver the change at exponential speed and scale, which is essential to ensure a safe climate landing for humanity . . . . [w]e need a shift from negotiation to implementation, enabling the COP to deliver on agreed commitments and ensure the urgent energy transition and phase-out of fossil energy.
But timelines, specific goals, and firm implementation commitments were routinely thwarted at Baku. Saudi Arabia, for example, challenged efforts to establish firmer timetables and commitments to reach the transition goals. One attendee labeled Saudi Arabia’s actions as akin to a “being a wrecking ball.”
The Trump Effect at Baku
Baku’s climate negotiations were somewhat reminiscent of the 2016 Conference of Parties held in Marrakesh, Morocco (COP22). COP22 took place after Donald Trump’s 2016 victory over Hillary Clinton, and was also criticized as heavy on rhetoric but light on substantive progress as fossil fuel lobbyists were granted observer status. In a case of déjà vu all over again, Baku shared many commonalities with Morocco.
While China has overtaken the United States as the world’s largest annual emitter, it remains the largest historical greenhouse gas emitter. Despite other countries looking to the United States for climate leadership, Trump has said that he will withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, similar to his decision in June 2017. The Paris Agreement remains the key international climate agreement that drives future climate negotiations. A possible “Paris withdrawal 2.0” could undermine U.S. leadership, cracking the door open for China and other nations to fill the leadership vacuum. As the largest economy and largest historical emitter, U.S. leadership and participation in international climate negotiations is a virtual prerequisite for substantive climate progress.
More Questions Than Answers
The world leaves COP29 at Baku in a more humbling, uncertain place. The conference itself was characterized as poorly managed and chaotic, and there are more questions than answers on future climate progress, to include:
Will President Trump withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement?
President Barack Obama signed the Paris Agreement in 2015, and it entered into force shortly thereafter. While some commentators have made the case that Trump should remain in the treaty as a way to shore up U.S. leadership, I estimate that the United States will initiate withdrawal procedures immediately after taking office. Oval Office. As a legal matter, the Paris Climate Agreement is a sole executive agreement and not a treaty, so Senate advice and consent is neither contemplated nor required. Trump withdrew from the Paris Agreement in the summer of 2017, but the process took three years due to the peculiarities of the withdrawal procedure outlined in Article 28 of the Paris Agreement. The United States consequently did not officially withdraw from the Paris Agreement until November 2020, and Biden immediately rejoined upon assuming office. I anticipate that Trump will withdraw from Paris immediately upon assuming office via a simple, written notification to the agreement’s Depositary, the United Nations Secretary-General. Upon receipt of the written notification, United States will begin the withdrawal process in accordance with Article 28, with official withdrawal taking place in January 2026.
Will President Trump withdraw from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)?
It remains unclear whether Trump will choose the climate “nuclear option”: withdrawal from the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Chnage, the underlying treaty upon which all international climate negotiations are based. Lead authors of Project 2025 proposed doing just that, and reporting this summer indicated that there is a draft order draft order to remove the United States from the entire United Nations’ framework.
In contrast to the Paris Agreement, the UN Framework Convention is a treaty within the meaning of Article II of the Constitution. The Constitution provides that the president has the power to “make treaties, provided that two thirds of the Senators present concur.” The Constitution is silent on the process to “unmake treaties,” although there is precedent for the president to withdraw from treaties independent of congressional action. The president has unilaterally withdrawn from arms-control treaties in recent years. My colleague Professor Jean Galbraith notes that withdrawing from such treaties independent of Senate action is likely legal (although Professor Harold Koh has argued that the conventional wisdom underlying unilateral treaty termination is wrong):
Historical practice supports the conclusion that the President can unilaterally withdraw the United States from treaties which an earlier President joined with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate, at least as long as this withdrawal is consistent with international law.
In 1979, for example, President Jimmy Carter withdrew the United States from a defense treaty with Taiwan without congressional approval. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) challenged Carter’s authority in Goldwater v. Carter. The Supreme Court found the case non-justiciable under the political question and ripeness doctrine, leaving Carter’s decision to stand and the legal question of his authority to independently terminate a treaty unsettled.
The United States helped lead climate negotiations and shepherded the UNFCCC through intense negotiations in 1992, when President George H.W. Bush signed the Framework Convention. In a sign of far different political times, the Senate unanimously ratified the Framework Convention. While withdrawing from Paris would be met with resignation and disappointment from world leaders and environmentalists alike, withdrawal from the Framework Convention would likely send shockwaves around the world and could lead to litigation. And a U.S. withdrawal would signal U.S. abandonment of international climate leadership for a generation. Rejoining treaties is particularly difficult in the U.S. constitutional system and would require Senate advise and consent, a point also brought home by Professor Galbraith.
Will China’s influence grow on the climate stage?
China, the world’s leader in renewable energy, had an outsized presence at Baku, with over 1,000 of its delegates were in attendance. The United States appears poised to withdraw from Paris again, and will likely have a far more contentious relationship with U.N. governance bodies with the incoming Trump administration. China has attempted to position itself as a more reliable leader than the United States, with Chinese leader Xi Jinping stating that “we should not let our vision be blocked by fleeting clouds.” China has heavily invested in Global South infrastructure projects via its Belt and Road initiative — economic investments that appear to be paying political dividends on the climate stage. At Baku, China partnered with G77 nations as a way to solidify its identity as a developing nation and distance itself from historically wealthier counterparts.
Still, China faces several uncomfortable realities: China has been the world’s largest emitter for two decades, and its emissions are growing. And Chinese rhetoric on free trade and commonality does not match reality. As the United States ducks its role as a climate leader in Trump 2.0, will China be able to fill the vacuum left behind? I remain skeptical, but I do anticipate that China will invest heavily in the United Nations and international governance while painting the United States as a fleeting cloud and unreliable climate partner.
Where do we go from here?
Despite the climate finance agreement, Baku appears to have pumped the brakes on the momentum put in place after COP28 in Dubai. With Trump returning to the Oval Office and rising geopolitical tensions, future international climate progress is more uncertain than ever. To be sure, getting nearly 200 nations to collectively agree on climate commitments can be a herculean challenge, and Baku serves as a sobering reminder of the complexities of achieving international consensus on an issue dubbed the “mother of all collective action problems.” Still, several esteemed world leaders have exclaimed that U.N. climate talks may no longer be fit for purpose, and we clearly need to take transformational action today to avert irreversible, catastrophic harm tomorrow. I come away from Baku with a sobering recognition that international climate progress — and the earth’s wellbeing — is entering a precarious time.