One of President-elect Donald Trump’s first congratulatory phone calls the day after the election was with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. A Ukrainian official described the conversation to the Washington Post as “very pleasant” and other sources said it was, as the Post paraphrased, “amicable.”

It was only the next day that Trump spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin, and even then, the Kremlin denied the call had taken place – perhaps a sign that it didn’t go quite as the Russian leader had hoped. The Post, which first reported the conversation based on five sources, cited “a person familiar with the call” in reporting that Trump “advised the Russian president not to escalate the war in Ukraine and reminded him of Washington’s sizable military presence in Europe.” Certainly not a message that Putin would have welcomed.

The timing and tone of these exchanges are among growing signals that Trump and his administration may not be an easy mark for Putin, as many analysts have feared. Certainly, talk by Trump and Vice President-elect J.D. Vance about a fast-tracked peace deal raises alarms for Ukraine. That’s especially true seen through the prism of the former president’s friendly relationship and frequent contacts with Putin in the past — indeed, reportedly even since Trump left office —  as well as the lingering questions about connections between Trump’s successful 2016 campaign and the Russians  and the Kremlin’s attempted interference in the 2020 election.  What’s more, Ukraine backers have worried that Trump might be willing to trade off Ukrainian interests, as reflected in the 2019 impeachment by the House of Representatives over Trump’s urging Zelenskyy to do him “a favor” by investigating then-former Vice President Joe Biden and his son, all while delaying $391 million in congressionally approved military aid to Ukraine.

But since at least this September, when Trump conducted an apparently friendly meeting with Zelenskyy in New York and spoke of making a “fair deal” for peace, signs have been building of an approach that might yet surprise pro-Ukraine critics of the president-elect. They include his pick for national security advisor, U.S. Rep. Mike Waltz, a Florida Republican who, even as he has criticized the Biden administration’s aid to Ukraine without a more specific end game, has also repeatedly expressed the need to rein in Putin’s Russia and to use leverage of even stronger U.S. military backing for Ukraine to get Putin to the negotiating table. There are also some indicators from Trump’s first term that point in the same direction. Trump’s own future priorities and the current state of geopolitical dynamics may augur a peace deal that at least gives Ukraine leverage.

Concerns that Trump Could Embolden Putin

Trump insisted often on the campaign trail that he would end the war in Ukraine by inauguration day or “within 24 hours.” That and repeated statements from Trump-aligned figures criticizing Biden’s handling of the war prompted concern that the next administration would cut a deal that would leave Ukraine permanently weakened, if not worse, and Putin only emboldened. Such an outcome also would further undermine the global rules-based order, given Russia’s invasion in 2014 and its full-scale assault in February 2022 are widely understood as a clear “crime of aggression” under international law.

Even at their September meeting, Trump equivocated on his relationship with Zelenskyy and Putin. “We have a very good relationship. And I also have a very good relationship, as you know, with President Putin,” Trump said. And Trump has announced he plans to nominate Tulsi Gabbard, who represented Hawaii as a Democrat in the U.S. House but since said she was leaving the party, as director of national intelligence. Gabbard has been widely criticized for repeating Russian talking points on Ukraine, such as false claims about U.S.-funded bioweapons labs in Ukraine and saying the Biden administration and NATO could have avoided the war if they had “simply acknowledged Russia’s legitimate security concerns regarding Ukraine’s becoming a member of NATO.” The latter comment was seen as embracing Putin’s specious argument for dominance over Ukraine, which has been independent of the Soviet Union for more than three decades and has made clear its own preference for a future within the European Union and, ideally, NATO.

Trump-Aligned Russia Hawks

But some Trump-aligned critics of the Biden administration’s policy are hawks on Russia, and their criticism of the Biden administration seems to focus mainly on its incrementalism in providing weapons to Ukraine piecemeal and only after extended delays. They’ve also criticized the policy as lacking a strategy beyond the vague promise of supporting Ukraine “as long as it takes,” without a sufficiently clear commitment to its victory and what that looks like. In general, support for Ukraine on Capitol Hill and beyond has been bipartisan.

In a recent online roundtable organized by the German Marshall Fund of the United States, longtime Ukraine expert and supporter Melinda Haring, a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council, and David Kramer, a former State Department official who now serves as executive director of the George W. Bush Institute, argued that, as unlikely as some think it might be, Trump has an opportunity to, as Haring put it, “do what the Biden administration didn’t do.”

“It’s critically important that Ukraine has never asked our men and women to fight this fight for them,” Kramer said. But with U.S. assistance, the Ukrainians have shown their capabilities, he said, and continued military aid, rather than come at a cost, also creates U.S. jobs. Analysts note that Trump approved lethal military aid for Ukraine during his first term in office, importantly including Javelin missiles, which the Obama administration had denied – and that was long before Russia’s 2022 full-scale assault.

Significantly, Waltz has long reflected the combination of criticism of the Biden administration paired with a hard line on Russia. In a September 2023 op-ed on the Fox News website, for instance, he wrote that “[s]topping Russia before it draws NATO and therefore the U.S. into war is the right thing to do.”  An op-ed he co-authored for The Economist in the days just before the Nov. 5 election, said, “Supporting Ukraine for “as long as it takes” in a war of attrition against a larger power is a recipe for failure,” but he also signaled a tough line on Russia. “America can use economic leverage, including lifting the pause on exports of liquefied natural gas and cracking down on Russia’s illicit oil sales, to bring Mr Putin to the table,” Waltz and co-author Matthew Kroenig, vice president of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, wrote. “If he refuses to talk, Washington can, as Mr Trump argued, provide more weapons to Ukraine with fewer restrictions on their use.”

Waltz took a similar line in a Nov. 4 interview with National Public Radio. Referring to the prospect of a “diplomatic resolution” to the war, he said, “First and foremost, you would enforce the actual energy sanctions on Russia. Russia is essentially a gas station with nukes. Putin is selling more oil and gas now than he did prewar through China and Russia.” And he continued, “We have leverage, like taking the handcuffs off of the long-range weapons we provided Ukraine as well.” To be sure, Waltz also commented that “of course, I think we have plenty of leverage with Zelenskyy to get them to the table.”

Economic and Geopolitical Interests

The focus on energy market dynamics suggests further ways Trump might see it in his interest to be tougher on Putin than might have been expected. In the NPR interview, Waltz spoke of “unleashing our energy, lifting our LNG ban,” saying of Putin, “his economy and his war machine will dry up very quickly.” Waltz was referencing frequent Republican arguments in favor of ramping up U.S. oil and gas exploration and a Biden decision in January to limit U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas. Those exports have risen dramatically since Russia’s full-scale invasion to help Europe wean itself off Russian gas supplies, trade that has benefitted U.S. producers. Further constricting Russia’s sale of oil and gas could provide another impetus to bolster U.S. public support for Republican aims to increase domestic production and counter formidable concerns of environmentalists about the effect on greenhouse gas emissions and climate change.

Ukrainian anti-corruption leader and former member of Parliament Hanna Hopko, who with colleagues has lobbied Washington persistently to support Ukraine since the 2022 invasion, says she expects the Biden administration’s stated view of the Ukraine cause in terms of rule of law and sovereignty will give way under the Trump administration to much more pragmatic considerations, such as questions about energy supplies, investment, and economic potential. In the German Marshall Fund roundtable, she said that, in his meeting with Zelenskyy in September, Trump expressed appreciation for Ukraine’s sacrifices and innovation in the defense sector and the possible benefits for the U.S. defense industry, such as Ukraine’s engineers, space technology and development of drones and Neptune missiles for its defense against Russia.

Geopolitical considerations may tilt somewhat more in Ukraine’s favor, too. Trump and his pick of Cabinet members and aides for his incoming administration have made no secret of their wish to challenge China economically and on security in the Asia-Pacific, including Chinese military actions against Taiwan, the Philippines, and others. Republicans have long been stalwart supporters of Taiwan’s de facto independence. But Putin has become increasingly dependent on China, including for oil and gas sales, and he recently affirmed his support for China’s stance on Taiwan. Further, his decision to accept not only weapons from North Korea but also some 11,000 troops to fight alongside Russian forces (if not many times more) in Ukraine has alarmed U.S. leaders on both sides of the aisle.

Accounting for Future Risks

Against those odds and judging by Trump’s posture during his September meeting with Zelenskyy and reports of their recent call, the incoming U.S. president may be sufficiently impressed by the Ukrainians’ will to fight, their innovations on missiles and drones, and their future economic and military potential to throw much of his support their way — at least enough to strengthen their position in negotiations. That is measured, of course, against other statements by Trump, including, at least on the campaign trail, publicly criticizing Zelenskyy as “a man who refuses to make a deal” and calling the Ukrainian leader “the greatest salesman ever” (though the latter may be, in Trump’s view, intended as a compliment – and indeed, he followed it in that instance by saying “I’m not knocking him.”).

Josh Rudolph, a senior fellow at the German Marshall Fund, said during the online discussion that it is “significant” that Trump spoke with Zelenskyy before speaking with Putin. Rudolph also noted the possible risk to Trump if Putin gets a deal that gives him time to rearm within Trump’s four-year term. That would raise the prospect of another military assault by Putin to try to capture all of Ukraine before another U.S. president comes into office who he thinks would be more likely to stop him. “The last thing Trump is going to want is another chaotic collapse, ala Afghanistan,” Rudolph said, referring to the chaotic 2021 fall of Kabul and the U.S. withdrawal under Biden.

Certainly, Ukraine is still fighting an uphill battle, not only on the literal warfront, where Russia controls about 18 percent of Ukrainian territory and where Ukraine is losing ground, but also in its determination to become a member of NATO, a prospect that Putin has long opposed. Although NATO has held out the prospect of membership for Ukraine since 2008, it has repeatedly slow-rolled the process. But Ukraine’s size and its experience in a hot war for more than a decade, not to mention its troop contributions to U.S. war efforts in the past could be valuable arguments in its favor. That may be especially true as Trump resumes his pressure on European allies in NATO to increase their spending on their own defense and rely less on the United States. Fears about Trump’s support for the alliance itself also shape the background.

In the final analysis, Trump, Zelenskyy, and Putin, with their advisors and other world leaders, will be playing a high-level game in the coming months. Multiple factors, almost too numerous to delineate, will be at work. At the center will be no less than the security of Europe, given that Putin appears to have escalated from rhetoric against Europe to sabotage (not to mention a reported brazen terrorist plot against the United States). Leaders around the world, whether in the Middle East or in the Asia-Pacific and beyond, will be watching the results for signs of the U.S. posture toward their own futures going forward.

IMAGE: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and then-Republican presidential nominee, former U.S. President Donald Trump, shake hands during a meeting on September 27, 2024 in New York City. The meeting coincided with Zelensky’s visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. (Photo by Alex Kent/Getty Images)