The Middle East has been plunged into further crisis yet again. Having waited to respond until after a series of Israeli provocations – including recent Israeli incursions into Lebanon, the killing of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah alongside a high-ranking Iranian general, and the assassination of Hamas’s political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran – Iran has now attacked Israel directly for the second time. On Oct. 1, Iran lobbed a barrage of ballistic missiles into Israel, apparently targeting the Mossad headquarters in a densely populated Tel Aviv suburb and Israeli air bases in the Negev Desert. Israel is now embroiled in conflict on four fronts: Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iran (whether directly or in Syria and Iraq).
Iran’s rationale for attacking Israel seems clear: reset deterrence and restore the credibility of the “axis of resistance,” Iran’s network of proxy groups spanning Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen in countering Israel and the United States in the region. Iranian leaders reportedly perceived that their prior restraint in responding to Israel had been perceived as weakness. The cost of inaction, in other words, was simply too high.
It remains to be seen what price Iran will pay for this latest armed reprisal. But nearly a year after the fateful October 7th attack, one thing is clear – the risk that the war in Gaza will engulf the region is higher than it has ever been. And few diplomatic levers remain to stop the spiral of violence.
Recalibrating Red Lines
Iran’s attack was not merely symbolic. Unlike the well-telegraphed and feckless attack in April, Tehran clearly intended to inflict damage. Iran launched nearly 200 high-speed ballistic missiles – hypersonic Fatteh-2 missiles with an estimated maximum speed of 10,000mph that can quickly overwhelm defenses (within 15 minutes from launch). This is the first time Iran has been known to deploy this capability. By contrast, Iran in April launched 110 surface-to-surface missiles, 35 cruise missiles, and 185 drones, all of which are easier to intercept as they travel at far slower speeds. This time, according to some reporting, Iran also launched a cyber attack against Israeli defense systems prior to the ballistic missile launch, suggesting there was a coordinated effort to ensure the missiles would get through. Finally, Iran gave little to no prior notice of this attack, unlike in April when Iran said it gave 72 hours’ notice of the attack for the region to prepare.
The U.S. tone was also markedly different this time. Rather than urging restraint as he previously did after the April attack, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan called the attack a “significant escalation by Iran” that would result in “severe consequences.” And while the Biden administration has been publicly urging Israeli leaders to curtail strikes against Hezbollah, certain senior White House officials reportedly told Israel in private that the timing was right to ramp up military pressure on the group; and President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris issued statements, after the fact, supporting both the killing of Nasrallah and diplomatic paths to deescalation. The United States is apparently trying to walk a fine line between supporting Israel’s efforts to dramatically reduce Iran’s influence in the region and avoiding an all-out war.
For all the differences between the April and October attacks, there is one significant commonality – neither were militarily successful. What both attacks have in common is that they resulted in minor damage to military bases and few (perhaps one) casualties. The Israeli military stated its air force base sustained “a few hits” from Iran’s attack yesterday, and that “there is no harm to the functionality” of the Israeli Air Force. The single reported casualty was a Palestinian man living in the West Bank killed by falling rocket debris. The April attack similarly resulted in minor damage to Israeli bases, as well as injuries to a 7-year-old Arab Bedouin girl.
Despite the limited damage, Israel has vowed to inflict a “painful response.” Iran has “made a big mistake” and “will pay” for attacking Israel, said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Unnamed Israeli officials have emphasized that no options are off the table, highlighting strikes against Iran’s nuclear program, oil infrastructure, or air defense systems, as well as targeted assassinations. Israel previously struck an air defense system protecting Iran’s nuclear site at Natanz in response to the April attack.
As Israel weighs its response, the United States could easily find itself in the crosshairs once more. The United States has around 40,000 troops stationed across the Middle East – prime targets for Iranian proxies to attack in Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf. Yesterday, Iraqi militant groups have warned U.S. bases would come under fire if the United States joined any Israeli responses against Iran.
What is more challenging now is managing the potential fallout. Diplomatic levers that existed in April, when the Biden administration worked with partners to contain the situation, may no longer be available. Red lines have been repeatedly crossed in the past year, and Iran has learned from recent events that restraint will not lead to de-escalation. Instead, Israel has decimated Iran’s closest and strongest ally in the region, not just by decapitating Hezbollah’s senior leaders, but also by destroying nearly half of the group’s missile and rocket stocks accumulated over more than three decades. Neither restraint, nor Iran’s “new equation” strategy of increased direct confrontation with Israel, appear to be reestablishing the equilibrium that existed between Israel and Iran before October 7th.
Still, Iran and Hezbollah remain formidable adversaries with a vast network of advanced missile, cyber, asymmetric, and intelligence capabilities. And Israel’s intelligence failures on Oct. 7 demonstrated that even less sophisticated adversaries can exploit weaknesses in Israeli defenses. Israel, and the United States, would be wise to approach the current situation in the region with extreme caution – particularly amidst blurry and shifting redlines. The successful repulsion of Iranian attacks along with the extraordinary effectiveness of the spate of Israeli operations against Hezbollah can easily give way to dangerous overconfidence.
Reverberating Effects
Beyond the current crisis, wider concerns persist about how the latest cycle of violence will shape the trajectory of the region, Iran’s nuclear calculus, and even the U.S. presidential election in November. Fragile ceasefire talks are likely to stall further, as there appears no end in sight to the fighting in Gaza. What’s more, with its proxy network in disarray, Iran may very well conclude that the only viable way to restore deterrence is to cross the nuclear threshold.
Fears of an “October surprise,” meanwhile, may be overblown. While U.S. presidential candidate Donald Trump claims the latest escalation supports his narrative that the Middle East was “at peace” during his presidency, nothing could be farther from the truth. After all, Iranian proxy attacks on U.S. troops in the region increased after the Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the Iran nuclear deal and assassinated Iranian Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani. And the legacy of the “maximum pressure” campaign is an Iran that faces fewer, not more, constraints on its nuclear work – with less international oversight and reduced transparency.
Perhaps the greatest danger now lies in the broader regional and global repercussions of this ongoing war. The delicate balance of deterrence between Iran, its proxies, and Israel has been fundamentally upended, making future escalations not just possible, but increasingly likely. As Israel and Iran continue to exchange blows, the risk of miscalculation grows, with the potential to draw the United States and other regional powers into a far wider conflict. At the same time, the space for diplomacy has narrowed, with all sides entrenched in more rigid, maximalist positions, while U.S. policymakers remain, in significant part, distracted by domestic politics.
Historically, October is a time of transition. As the Jewish New Year of Rosh Hashanah begins, there is a promise of renewal, a time for the world itself to be reborn. The decisions made now will determine whether the region spirals further into a disastrous conflict or sees Israel achieve a significant military success that dismantles Hezbollah and reduces threats from Iran. Either way, the current crisis is likely to alter the geopolitical balance in the Middle East in ways that will redefine the region for decades to come.